


JPRS-UPA-89-066
12 DECEMBER 1989



JPRS Report



Soviet Union

Political Affairs

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Party Control System Assessed

90UN0155A Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 24 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by Yuriy Kurbatov: "Power Cannot be Divided"]

[Text] After many years of neglect and stagnation, the large army of people's controllers began to see the light for perhaps the first time two years ago. At that time there was a public announcement from the lofty forum of the June (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum about the need to create a unified, integral system of control based on the USSR People's Control Committee [KNK] which would have sweeping authority throughout the country. Alas, these good intentions were fated never to be realized. The more time passed, the stronger became the conviction that some mysterious forces would bring to naught even the most fainthearted attempts to bring rudimentary order to our system of control.

Now, after two years have passed, I have decided to question whether it could have been otherwise? Does any new idea really have any chance at all of surviving to reach its logical conclusion? Unfortunately, I cannot find an affirmative answer to these questions.

Perhaps I am expressing a controversial idea, but it seems to me that the country has been unlucky with its system of control from the very beginning. Everyone knows what great significance V. I. Lenin attached to registration and control organizations, and how thoroughly and logically he worked out their conception and structure. How difficult it was, indeed, to do this at the very beginning of the development of the Soviet bureaucracy. "Checking on people and checking on the actual execution of affairs—this, and I repeat, this and only this is all there is to all work and politics", he wrote.

I do not know how or in what kind of society we would be living today if these thoughts and ideas had not clashed with the totalitarian bureaucratic system which was quickly gathering momentum and usurping all authority in the country. Do not forget that the unified control agencies created at Lenin's initiative—The Central Control Commission and National Commissariat for Worker-Peasant Inspection [TsKK NK RABKRIN]—were abolished as early as the 17th Party Congress. To wit, in independent control, the newly conceived command bureaucratic system immediately assessed the potential danger of the enemy to itself and moved quickly to get rid of it.

Those who think that all this is in the distant past and, in a word, at least was successfully dealt with a long time ago, are mistaken. Let us not delude ourselves: though in recent years we have begun to quote Lenin more frequently, there is something more than Leninism in our everyday lives.

I think that in all the post war years, the number of experiments with the control agencies in our country was

equaled only by the number of different "improvements" in agriculture. All those in power tried to gain control for themselves.

...Control the people, Lenin advised; but which ones? Those who led the country to the edge of bankruptcy and the economy to a dead end? Or those who are today applying the brakes to the rails of perestroyka? And what about the actual execution of affairs? What can be said about this when practically every other government decree is either sabotaged or never carried to fruition. For then we must identify those who caused our misfortune, who allow our country to be plundered, who waste billions of public rubles, and who sent our troops to Afghanistan and dragged our country into a senseless military competition.

I do not want to draw a historical parallel but it is obvious that we are not yet in that phase of development of a democratic society in which one is allowed to intrude upon the holy of holies, the command bureaucratic system, which despite all our invocations not only will not surrender its position but rather is going on the offensive. As everyone knows, power is not divisible.

I do not wish to say that 10 million controllers were completely inactive all these years. They checked and controlled; they caught swindlers and bribers and even fired some people. But all this was done within limits clearly defined from above, the boundaries of which they were not allowed to cross.

I do not intend for these notes of mine to cast even the smallest shadow over the millions of unselfish people who truly believe in their work and who tried during the years of stagnation to stand in the way of those who embezzle public property or take bribes and those who like to live at the expense of others. But their energy and force was squandered on trivial matters and details and did not touch the roots of the shadow economy, the Mafia or organized crime. The paradox is that the more controllers, different commissions and other control agencies we have, the more confident the underworld business big shots feel and the more general irresponsibility, criminal negligence and impunity spread like a cancerous tumor. Today we are reaping the fruits of this total lack of control. Do we really know anything about who was actually guilty of the Chernobyl tragedy, or the serious catastrophes in the air, on land or at sea? Believe me, I am not completely persuaded, either of the "guilty" or of the "punishment", in the now often used phrase "The guilty parties received well deserved punishment".

I do not think I am the only one troubled by these questions. It is no accident, apparently, that so many pointed debates spread through the USSR Supreme Soviet during resolution of the issue of creation of a Constitutional Oversight Committee and during the appointment of a chairman for the USSR KNK. The people's deputies sincerely tried to investigate a system for organizing control of affairs which is as intricate as it could be and splintered like broken glass. So it turns out

that we have more control organizations than we know what to do with and not a single one has full and equal powers with state organs. The violent debates at the Congress, as we recall, came to naught: no Constitutional Oversight Committee was formed. Although at present it does not exist (there is only a commission to review its creation), voices already ring out, calling for limitations on its authority and sphere of influence. Apparently, a strong control agency with broad parliamentary powers is not to the liking of many people. It seems to me that, in the pointed debates about drafting the most important laws of our lives, the people's deputies lost sight of this very detail. But we all know how many sentimental and idealistic laws adopted by the Supreme Soviet vanish without a trace.

Just where does this leave us today? This question, to some degree, had to be answered at a recent meeting which the new leadership of the USSR KNK had with journalists. The speech of its chairman, G. Kolbin was full of optimism. The committee acquired a new, higher status. It is now, in essence, a control agency of the Supreme Soviet, and it is strengthened by links with people's deputies and various commissions and committees of this higher organ of state power. Unified control agencies based on the national control committees are being created in enterprises and organizations.

With regard to the creation of a unified integral control system, there are, in the view of the leadership, questions which must be resolved in phases. We have begun at the bottom, they say, and will work our way to the top. With regard to the new law on national control, it was announced ambiguously that today the law must be formulated not on paper but in practice during the transition to new types and methods of work. In other words, sometime in the far distant future. At first glance, this recommendation might appear logical but, indeed, has past experience really taught us nothing? What, for instance, has become of the tens of thousands of local people's control agency recommendations about which the USSR KNK has not inquired in the past two years?

From what was said in the beginning of my notes, it is evident that there is no particular need for additional commentary on these passages. After all, the Supreme Soviet, having approved the new structure of the USSR KNK, did not confer upon it either new status or new powers. With regard to the practical activities of the control agencies, they are regulated as before by the law on people's control in the USSR which was adopted ten years ago. One might say it is an exemplary document of the period of stagnation which, while precluding practically nothing, contrives also not to permit anything.

So where are we going, one might ask—forward or backward? For what are we struggling? These are by no means rhetorical questions. On the eve of the election campaign in the people's control agencies, judging by our editorial mail, not only thousands of rank and file scouts, but also those who head committees at various levels are

asking themselves these questions. For this reason, neither can I share the optimism of the new leadership of the USSR KNK. Moreover, judging by the mood of the letter writers, we must be fearful of the outcome of the entire election campaign. After all, the NK Committee is entering it without an accurate bearing toward the future, without a specific program, and without a serious legal base. Two years have passed in a futile wait for perestroika. Whether or not we want this, in the pivotal phase of perestroika the vast army of people's controllers seems as if it has been "switched off" from active work, and is in a state of confusion, expecting some kind of real change above. But it turns out there is nothing to wait for.

Further Discussion of 'Iron Fist' Approach

90UN0169A Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* in Russian 18 Oct 89 p 10

[Articles: "Reach Out For the 'Iron Fist'," by Arvid Kron; "Dangerous Mirages of Simple Solutions," by Aleksey Pushkov; "Which Side Right, Which Side Left?" by Vsevolod Vilchek. Translation of original article appears in the 2 October 1989 Daily Report: Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV-89-189) pp 96-101]

[Text] Today we continue the discussion begun by the I. Klyamkin-A. Migranyan dialogue, "Do We Need an 'Iron Fist'?" What should, and will, the transitional period to a market system and democracy be like? Can we avoid authoritarianism? The views appearing on this page vary widely. Apparently, it is too early to end the debate.

Arvid Kron: Reach Out For the "Iron Fist"

When I visit Moscow people often ask me, as a man from abroad (with 15 years of emigre status in France under my belt): What do people out there think of our perestroika? I answer frankly: Today foreigners hardly know more than you, and they understand much less, simply because to them a strange land is like a strange soul: shrouded in darkness. But still, Western observers noticed one thing, and when they saw it their jaws sagged with wonder: There are no centrists in Russia! This is all the more surprising to a Westerner, because in all Western democracies centrist groups and circles are very strong. Those countries' political stability is due mainly to the fact that the power there ends up in the hands of either center-right or center-left parties, never extremist (fascism was an exception, but that was long ago). So it is very hard for a Western person to imagine a country with no centrists at all. Nevertheless, that, I think, is the situation in the Soviet Union today. And it is obvious to any sensible Western politician that such a situation can only lead directly to hell.

That is not to say there are no centrists at all. At the center is no mean figure: Gorbachev. But he is alone, or almost alone. He is as it were at the center of a circle with mutually exclusive and irreconcilable forces deployed

around the circumference: The apparat, which is certainly in no hurry to relinquish its positions; the democratic intelligentsia, demanding all things at once; nationalists, whose wishes are well-known; and populists seeking culprits and retribution. Gorbachev doggedly strives to bring them all together on a common platform and in the name of common interests, but... in the process he is only losing his popularity. Because he is aligned with no one in a country where it is essential to be with someone. He wants to be for all people at once, which means that many see him as being against them. This is sad, more, it is tragic. He stubbornly repeats the phrase: Politics is the art of the realistic. This, undoubtedly, is an appeal for compromise. But the country doesn't want compromises. The only serious hope remains Gorbachev himself. It is a remarkable phenomenon: A compromise leader in a country of extremes!

Of course, there is centrism in the country, but it is weak, mute and invisible. Lately, however, it has been acquiring some vocal support. Most notably, the statements of Igor Klyamkin and Andranik Migranyan. Their ideas are as follows. The ultimate goal is, doubtlessly, democracy. But attempting a direct transition to democracy would be extremely hazardous and could plunge the country into chaos. Therefore, at least for the transitional period, it is necessary to have an authoritarian regime which would ensure public order and compliance with the laws being adopted. In other words, it is necessary to steer a course between the Scylla of a right-wing coup and Charybdis of civil war chaos by strengthening the "enlightened authoritarianism" of the Secretary General.

Yes, but the trouble is that nowadays the Soviet Union has also entered a period of political tradeoff, as in the West, with each one pushing his own goods: Democrats advertise freedom at little cost, populists want to scale the nomenklatura down to the level of the people (one of the motivations being to get even), while centrists, it appears favor... autocracy—the worst thing, it would seem, imaginable...

Democratization is proceeding in Hungary and Poland at a pace no one had ever dreamed of, while in China the hopes of Chinese democrats were shot down in Tienanmin Square. How to keep from confusing roads? So as not, for example, to head, with the best of intentions, for Warsaw and wind up in Tienanmin. Is it better to be bold or cautious? That is the question.

The centrists think it is better to be cautious and prudent. Leonid Batkin (LG, September 20), on the other hand, is brave. And magnanimous, because he pays homage to the intellectual courage of his opponents, A. Migranyan and I. Klyamkin, who advocate authoritarianism in a country craving for democracy. Magnanimity is good, and it is rare in a debate. But at the same time Batkin is condescending to opponents whose defeat is so obvious... Today any centrist who seeks a compromise between the authorities and the democratic intelligentsia is bound to be ridiculed. And therein lies the tragedy and doom of the situation.

Gorbachev is also of the "timid type." He is also against the brave Batkins. Not long ago he remarked in a fit of pique: "Politics isn't a forum where you can say anything." Anything meaning things that can lead nowhere. And if blood flows it is, of course, Gorbachev who will be held responsible, even if only to history, because he was the leader. Would Batkin then have even the intellectual courage to take responsibility as well? Because he would also be a co-defendant...

This should not happen. Everything must be done to prevent it from happening. But the immediate direct democratization which the democratic intelligentsia is seeking could easily lead to it.

Because firstly, as I already said, there are no centrists in the USSR who could serve as a cushion between extreme forces and make them compromise. Secondly, the opposition's structures capable of organizing and directing protests into a reasonable channel—structures of the type of Poland's Solidarity or Peasant party—are still barely in the embryonic stage. As long as they are not there we must wait.

Many hope that the Soviets can become such a structure. If they do, it won't be soon. After all, for Gorbachev democratization of the Soviets is not, and never was, the road to the multiparty system the democrats have been dreaming of. Rather, he is testing the limits of democracy in the framework of a one-party system. Migranyan thinks this is risky, but I see the Congress of People's Deputies and the current Supreme Soviet as a brilliant accomplishment of Gorbachev's. To teach a lesson in democracy to a nation which has never known democracy, to foster a taste for democracy without upsetting the one-party system and, therefore, without risk: whether it was preconceived or simply happened, but it's wonderful! One way or another, the Supreme Soviet as it is will be a battering ram hammering away at the uncontrolled power of the apparat. All it needs is time to work.

But whereas there may, perhaps, be no need to rush with democracy, the market is urgent. Salvation today will come not from democracy, but from the market.

We must face the facts: the USSR is now just barely taking to the road of partially decentralized economy, a road followed without much success by Yugoslavia for already 40 years, by Hungary and Poland for 30 years, by China for 10 years. There is nothing worthwhile on that road and it's no use lingering on it. You must go further. You must do something none of those countries has dared to do: Introduce market relations. None other than Gorbachev declared on 30 May 1989 at the congress that reform meant "establishment of a full-fledged socialist market. Of course, the market is not omnipotent. But so far mankind has not developed any other, more effective or democratic economic mechanism. Socialist planned economy cannot do without it." As far as I know, that was the first direct statement by Gorbachev, or any major communist leader, in favor of a market system.

Gorbachev is a key figure. I see him as a man for a super task. He has set himself the goal of building socialism with a human face in which life would be comfortable. It's even like a personal goal for him: I think he would like to be remembered in history for this accomplishment. But the apparat would not and will not jeopardize its position for reforms. Hence Gorbachev's ambiguous position vis-a-vis the apparat, as distinct from the unity of Brezhnev's times. Gorbachev is taking risks and thereby antagonizing the apparat; on the other hand, the apparat is his only support. The Supreme Soviet still doesn't count.

Thus—forward, that is, towards a market system.

But the apparat and a market system? Virtually everyone I have talked to find this juxtaposition absurd. And yet... As a person with Western experience, I am constantly asked in Moscow about the opportunities for trade with the West. Mainly these are managers, but I have also met with people from the party apparat. The topics are always the same: What can we sell to get hard currency, which can be used to buy equipment, which can be used to produce more, and so forth. And at the same time, of course, take care of oneself. All this is one hundred-percent market talk virtually no different from what one constantly hears in the West. But my interlocutors have a vague idea of the Western market, moreover, they are not at all sure that anything can come of this, and, of course, they lack the iron grasp of a capitalist sensing a bargain. Nevertheless, these are market people, ordinary market people, there can be no doubt about it. They would all rush to the market, if only they were let off the leash. Let them off the leash! The market is beneficial to the apparat. Let them have it.

The apparat must be used... This is something the intelligentsia is not ready for. It doesn't want to have anything to do with the apparat. To many the slogan of democratization appeals precisely as a means of getting rid of the apparat. But who would replace it? The intelligentsia? The intelligentsia must get rid of that foolish dream once and for all. The intelligentsia is not a ruling class and never will be. The intelligentsia is a class of moralizers.

There is a profound similarity between the intellectual opposition in the West and in the East. In the West the intelligentsia thinks: We are educated, clever, we are the salt of the earth: Why, then, does the bourgeoisie rule the country and us? That is why over there the intelligentsia is for nationalization. In the Soviet Union for the same reasons they can't stand the rule of the apparat, so they want denationalization... My dear classmates, don't you think that both is equally foolish? Power will always belong to others: disciplined, hard, not without demagoguery. That is characteristic of any apparat, but not the intelligentsia.

Give unto God what is God's and unto Caesar what is Caesar's. And live in peace. For those of the intelligentsia who can and wish to engage in it there is always a

place: Some are already in the Supreme Soviet, others will follow. That is something to strive for, but not worth a revolution. Because a new ruling class will again be "not it."

In short, the intelligentsia must give up its claims to replace the apparat in power. That means it must temporarily stop pressuring for more democratization and start pressing hard for the immediate introduction of market relations. This would untie Gorbachev's hands. No longer fearful of a stab in the back from the democratic intelligentsia during a critical moment of brief chaos caused by the transition to a market economy, he will use the power over the apparat vested in him by the apparat to force it to dismantle the administrative system and replace it with a market one. The most retrograde and useless part of the apparat resists and is removed, while a large majority accepts change without fearing for its future.

I will voice one heretical idea. It's really good that democratization hasn't gone too far, otherwise the country would be in a democratic dead end: It would be impossible either to further democratize an underfed population, because the country would explode from pervasive permissiveness, or to advance towards a market economy because it would explode under the pressure of transition. Now, when the head of state is in control of the situation, he can undertake the transition. In case of popular unrest or panic he will have the power and means to curb them. That is normal. It would be quite absurd to have suffered dictatorship for 70 years, then at the last moment not to take advantage of what it can achieve in certain situations.

What lies beyond the hill, in market socialism? Instead of one there will be two ruling classes: administrative-bureaucratic (the state and party apparat, the military leadership, etc.) and managerial (industrial leadership). The powerful managerial class will be hostile to the excessively strengthened administrative class, fearing for its independence and, therefore, will be a firm defender of democracy. In general, with the emergence of such a class Gorbachev's democratization can be considered irreversible, because it will have a powerful defender. It is probably too early to speak of anything else. It will be a new country, a new destiny, a new history.

Aleksey Pushkov: Dangerous Mirages of Simple Solutions

The concept of nonauthoritarian transition to a market economy and democracy expounded by I. Klyamkin and A. Migranyan is intellectually quite stimulating. It lacks, however, a realistic sense of history, an understanding of the limitations of speculative reasoning, a desire to verify their illusory harmony against the algebra of real-life development of states and societies.

What apparently tripped up our political scientists was a desire, so familiar in history, to find one more universal—and unifying—conceptual scheme that would help overcome what they see as a dead-end situation.

Let us start by saying that, contrary to Klyamkin, authoritarian regimes have never effected transitions to market economies. Royal absolutism in the countries of Western Europe only facilitated the formation of a national market (but did not create it, as Klyamkin claims elsewhere). An important factor (but only one of several) in the development of a market economy at a time when its basic elements were already ripe, was the beginning disintegration of purely feudal economic relations, with the development of factory manufacturing and expansion of trade. That is, the external, including legal, conditions of economic development were adjusting to the already functioning economic structures and relations.

It is true that no one in the world escaped a period of authoritarianism during the formation of a national market. But Russia already traversed that road during its own period of absolutism. We also had both authoritarian rule and a market economy. It is another matter that the process was much longer and more painful than in the West, and then it was interrupted.

Indeed, in such recently backward nations as South Korea, Thailand and Brazil dictatorships objectively played the role of a tool of economic modernization, frequently forced and paid dearly for by the working sectors of the population. In the course of this process, as the economy developed, social interests diversified, the bourgeois class (which was, incidentally, far from homogeneous) grew stronger, the workforce expanded, together with its readiness for social protest, and the entire societal structure became more complex. At a certain stage it attained a degree of maturity when it acutely felt the need for bourgeois-democratic institutions to express the diversity of socio-economic and political aspirations that evolved with it. However, the foundations of political democracy appeared in those countries not thanks to dictatorship, but despite it. If in Western societies authoritarian regimes facilitate economic modernization and thereby involuntarily create the prerequisites for their own removal from power, this is precisely because of the market character of the economy. Our country, however, is starting out from a fundamentally different basis. Let us agree that there is a fundamental difference between authoritarian rule in the absence of market relations (which our authors advocate) and when there exists a basis for such relations.

While concentrating on the differences between the Stalin totalitarian model and Western-style authoritarianism, Migranyan fails to mention that development in market conditions creates a basis for the emergence of other power centers which can and do come into opposition with authoritarianism. Yet this is of fundamental importance. Authoritarian power in societies following the private capitalist road is concerned with the political sphere and, to some degree, with ideology (although far from always); it is least of all concerned with the economic sphere. In any case, it does not seek its total domination by the state, the complete destruction of

existing economic structures and relations, and their replacement by fundamentally new ones.

I. Klyamkin appears to address this, but he fails to draw the necessary conclusions. And these are that, from the point of view of going over to market relations, our country must start from less than zero. It must create a mechanism operating on the basis of objective socio-economic laws not on a bare spot but instead, and in spite, of a functioning administrative-command system.

Can the faults of this system, the profound distortions of the entire social mechanism which have already become part and parcel of its natural self, be overcome with the help of neo-authoritarianism, that is, those selfsame administrative-command methods? I would think not. One can't continue to treat a long-festering disease with the same old medicines, even in new packaging. First and foremost, because any authoritarian regime in our country would inevitably have to rely on those same social strata and forces which have no vested interest in either the final breakup of the administrative-command system or in a radical change of its concomitant socio-political system. Now we are being offered to start as it were all over again. But is it possible in qualitatively different conditions?

True, we are assured that in the present circumstances the regime will actually be forced to follow the road of change and reform in response to an objective need to modernize society, to the requirements of the economy and of modern technology. But the demands for modernization are but one, albeit important, aspect of our social development; they may influence it but not necessarily predetermine its course. Testimony to this, incidentally, is the entire history of world socialism and the Soviet Union itself, which confirms that the momentum of socio-political structures is frequently stronger than objectively ripe requirements. Did our country only just now approach the threshold beyond which continuing to pursue the old course can result only in sliding into a crisis? And haven't all attempts—extremely timid, it must be said—to overcome that threshold so far ended in failure?

In general, a theory whose main preoccupation is the need for modernization, however universal it might seem, has, historical experience shows, its limitations. In the first place, because it was nurtured in the soil of Western experience and reflects precisely that experience. This is also recognized by many Western political scientists. But we have a society which has experienced a profound and comprehensive transformation, a historically unique society based on a complete break with the past, with its economic structures, mechanisms, traditions and experience. As much as Klyamkin may scoff about our uniqueness, after following a unique road with no analog in history for 70 years, we cannot, apparently, avoid it in the transition to democracy as well.

While opposing any parallel development of economic and political reforms, Migranyan and Klyamkin at the same time essentially fail to offer a single truly reasoned

argument, except for the aforementioned analogies. But speaking of analogues, the the Stalin model was to some degree introduced along parallel political and economic directions. So the two can hardly be separated in dismantling it. Moreover, the experience of China shows that in conditions of existing socialism the development of market relations does not necessarily mean the automatic introduction of democracy.

It is also obvious that under any authoritarian regime, regardless of its intentions, the incentives to break down old and introduce qualitatively new economic and political mechanisms decrease rather than increase. Economic reforms cease to be a subject of extensive, free debate. Pressures from below on issues of expanding democracy, public involvement in management and national decision-making decline sharply. Openness [glasnost] itself becomes a toy in the hands of the authorities who can do whatever they wish with it. Finally, in authoritarian conditions there is no way that the "horizontal" structures and institutions without which civic society is impossible can evolve. The very essence of authoritarianism presumes the "verticalization" of society and is inimical to decentralization of authority, the transfer of some functions and prerogatives to the local level, and self-government, without which it is impossible to advance along the road of restructuring [perestroika].

Migranyan declares one of the guarantees of market-democratic orientation of an authoritarian regime to be its concern with retaining the nation's international status, which requires interaction with the world community and "new thinking." In general, this is a valid argument, but... There are different interpretations of the meaning of world-power status. For a long time it was assured primarily by building up our military potential. Today it is such that, even if partially reduced, the rest of the world will be forced to reckon with us, and not just reckon, but accept as a necessary partner in resolving all more or less major international issues. And this may be quite sufficient to maintain the illusion of status in the eyes of the regime.

The very idea of an "iron fist" as a means of establishing democracy is a mirror reflection of the position of conservative circles convinced that in the course of perestroika "everything is collapsing," although actually all that is collapsing is the historically limited model of socialism we have inherited from the past. What these two positions share in common is a lack of faith in perestroika and underestimation of our society's democratic potential. They also find common ground in the assessment of our prospects. Migranyan fears an uncontrollable explosion of passions, which frightens him more than renewed stagnation. It is in such a formulation of the question that the opponents of renovation find strength and arguments in support of their position: better stagnation than spontaneous popular explosions and violence. Actually, though, both are worse.

In this connection there once again arises the question of the intelligentsia's responsibility for the ideas it puts

forth. Today some of its representatives, with the very best of intentions, are once again tempted to find a formula of success which could resolve the problems facing the country along the road of radicalism. They are worried by the situation in the country. But who said that transition to a qualitatively new society can be simple or speedy?

I would say that, considering our history, the entire terrible burden of the past which our society must carry with it, and the acuteness of ethnic and social problems, what is happening today in the Soviet Union—and, I stress, in our very specific conditions—is a political process.

It is, of course, necessary to calm passions, avoid hasty, ill-conceived measures, and overcome what has become deeply rooted incompetence in the sphere of economic and political management. How to do this is an extremely difficult problem. Actually, its successful resolution will depend on the art of politics and, in the final analysis, on the success of perestroika. But that is a subject for a special article. Here I would only like to warn against authoritarian temptation, which has its supporters and which may prove fatal for our society.

Vsevolod Vilchek: Which Side Right, Which Side Left?

If I have understood I. Klyamkin and A. Migranyan correctly, they say that the country has to resolve a number of extremely complex problems. Political production regulators must be replaced with market automation. Ethnic conflicts must be extinguished. Numerous social ills have to be treated. Will the fledgling democracy withstand the burden? Democracy is valuable in itself, democracy is the desired goal, but can it at the same time be a means of resolving economic and other problems? It is dangerous not to see that in real-life conditions the democratization process frequently acquires a, figuratively speaking, oncological character, promoting the rapid growth of malignant tumors, and can lead to catastrophe: chaos and then dictatorship of an at best neo-Stalinist type.

Hence the conclusion that there has to be a strong transitional authority, the historical prototypes of which can be found in the absolutist and authoritarian regimes which made possible the establishment of the bourgeois "civil society" that later got rid of authoritarian patronage. An analog of absolutism is, in the view of the participants in the dialogue, a presidential form of government, introduced for a specified period without eliminating democratic safety mechanisms.

That is, probably, all that Klyamkin and Migranyan said, for which they were duly drawn and quartered. Magnanimously by K. Batkin in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, contemptuously and angrily by G. Diligenskiy in NOVOYE VREMYA. Moreover the latter, in the best tradition, created an "enemy image" with its cover blurbs, "Who's Afraid of Democracy?" and "A Response to 'Iron Fist' Advocates," thus warning readers that they would be dealing with ideological speculators whose sole

purpose was to win popularity at any cost. To be sure, it was all done not without a modicum of elegance: if anything has improved in our country it is the art of meanness. Many LITERATURNAYA GAZETA readers also responded to Klyamkin and Migranyan in the NOVOYE VREMYA spirit.

Of course, accusing the authors of Stalinism was a misunderstanding: Machiavelli, who appealed to the Absolute Prince, was, as the readers doubtlessly know but forgot in their rage, expressing the interests of the bourgeoisie, not the feudals, of tomorrow's society, not yesterday's. In part, Klyamkin and Migranyan have only themselves to blame. As they were writing for the mass media they should have explained that by "market" they didn't mean vendors' stalls but capitalist production regulators. Then Diligenskiy wouldn't have fretted about how badly history is taught in our schools if even a Doctor of Philosophy doesn't know that Great Novgorod also had a market.

But all in all, I would say that the storm of criticism aroused by the debate is a good omen: there are defenders of democracy out there. They would only do better to defend it not from Klyamkin and Migranyan, but from chaos, from a turn in events which the criticized scholars attempted to predict so as to cushion the fall. Had the social scientists and journalists displayed the same courage two or three years ago there would have been fewer mistakes, dangers and logjams on the road of perestroika.

I do not mean to say that Klyamkin's and Migranyan's logical constructions are above criticism. The trouble is that the criticism is misaddressed. The participants in the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA dialogue and their opponents are speaking of different things. The opponents are saying how they cherish democracy. The dialogue participants are speaking of how to get out of the mire of problems. Let us get back, at least briefly, to the essence of those problems.

When we have reached a state of affairs when one republic is capable of blockading another, that is alarming: the situation is getting out of hand. Who can confidently master it? Democracy? But the blockade of one republic by another is not so much the result of a democratic expression of the will of the masses. Authoritarian masses. But are there any other?

Who will guide this blind torrent into a reasonable channel?

Apparently, economics, market forces. That is the question (not of confrontations, not of popular fronts, but of their deep rear) that concerns Klyamkin more. Few people today doubt that the half-measures proposed by the government will not extricate the economy from the crisis: attempts to somehow adjust or patch up the mechanism crumbling before our very eyes are in vain. The socialist countries' experience shows that when

administrative bonds are loosened their artificial, extra-economic economies rapidly begin to destruct and stabilize only at the level of market relations.

The process is extremely painful: rising prices, unemployment, mounting social tensions. Even in Poland, where there are no interethnic problems, the ruling party was incapable of undertaking a radical economic reform without a mortal, physical threat to the apparat, so it shifted the responsibility for the consequences of going over to market relations to the opposition forces that had matured by then. As a result, contrary to the "asynchronous" scheme drawn by Klyamkin, the processes of establishing economic and political democracy coincided. Klyamkin may say that we still don't know how things will work out in Poland. But we do know what would happen in a country which abounds in "fronts." Who will shoulder the responsibility for truly revolutionary change, if deputies were galled even by the mild "unpopular measures" of L.I. Abalkin's anti-inflation program?

Those are the political and economic problems which, according to Klyamkin and Migranyan, only "neo-absolutism" is capable of resolving. The scholars (at least Klyamkin) have no wish to see such a turn of events; I think they would be only too happy to side with their leftist critics, but... What alternatives do their opponents offer?

What we need is not a "strong hand" but strong democracy: That is the brilliant aphorism which L. Batkin throws to the masses. Mentally I rise and join in the ovation of the best representatives of Sajudis, Interfront, Pamyat, the liberal intelligentsia, the miners, the cooperators... It would be nice... But if grandma belonged to the stronger sex she would be grandpa.

Diligenskiy is also all for strong democracy, though at the same time he is convinced that in the circumstances of profound economic and social crisis what is needed is... a strong central authority and authoritarian leader. The leader's decisions, Diligenskiy explains in his reply to the "strong hand" proponents, should not be manacled by a "cumbersome voting procedure," while opposition forces should refrain from criticizing the leader, and God forbid that they should strive for power. Their duty is to provide "constructive criticism of the ruling circles." I am not caricaturing, I am quoting, like writing a banner: "Political parties and movements! Actively join the socialist emulation movement to implement the instructions of M.S. Gorbachev!" It would not be too much of a caricature illustrating Diligenskiy's proposal of a "reasonable form of political pluralism." If the idea of an authoritarian leader who can be neither criticized nor bothered by voting procedures is the democratic alternative to the ideas of the participants in the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA dialogue and the actual meaning of the idea of "strong democracy," then all we have left is to argue what is better: to grovel standing or rebel on our knees.

However, there is, in my view, also something of value in Diligenskiy's article: By stretching the criticized authors' idea to absurd lengths Diligenskiy involuntarily exposes its real, not theoretically abstract, vulnerability. I understand the concerns of the dialogue participants, I understand the logic of their reasoning. What I fail to understand is what prerogatives they (or at least Migranyan) would like to delegate to the leader who already holds two key posts? Do serious political scientists really believe that the Central Committee or the Supreme Soviet can block the leader's ability to act? It would be more correct to say that there simply is no such ability, because the bureaucracy is already, and democracy still, incapable of supporting a strong central authority.

It is the absence not of authority, but of something else. In the first place, of a clear, bold program capable of integrating that part of the people who have the courage of standing up to both the madness of national "fronts," the selfishness of the apparat, and the upsurge of crime. That part of the people who understand the danger of radical reforms but are also prepared to guarantee that they are fair and will provide social protection for the weak. That part of the people who would neither relinquish power to anyone nor reject anyone who accepts elementary human values and norms of life.

"Part" is the root of the word "party". Our last historical opportunity is for it to overcome the crisis, its renovation, radical democratization and capacity for "transitional authoritarianism" which would naturally disappear as the goal draws closer. It is truly a unique opportunity. As unique—Batkin is right—as the October Revolution, as our country and state, which has merged with the party and cannot transform into anything else except through the transformation of the party.

However, let us consider all that has been said a hypothesis: We don't have to wait too long for its confirmation or rebuttal. Until October 1990. The important thing is not just to wait.

Legal Basis, Current Concept of Deputy's Inquiry

90UN0212A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY
VESTNIK in Russian No 19, Sep 89 pp 1, 3

[Article by L. Tsvetkov: "A Deputy's Inquiry"]

[Text] Specialists see in the term "deputy's inquiry" a certain official act whose legal force is guaranteed by the USSR Constitution. A deputy has the right to address a inquiry, for example, to the USSR Council of Ministers with regard to matters involving the activity of the government directly or of the organs subordinate to it, and to receive a reply within a three-day period. With regard to matters of a deputy's activity, he may address all state and public organs and participate in examining the problems posed. Now everything which proceeds from the deputies addressed to other organs shall be covered by the concept of an "appeal."

It is possible that, subsequently, more differentiation will be introduced between a deputy's inquiry and other types of appeals.

But up to now there is no such differentiation. There is, however, an ardent desire on the part of the deputies to immediately take practical steps for the purpose of solving problems (and there are so many of them in our life!), to influence the activity of officials and institutions, to revolutionize the processes taking place in the society. And the deputies are actively utilizing their right.

Thus, as of today, the USSR Government alone has received from them more than 1500 appeals sent by 862 authors, i.e., approximately two out of every five representatives from the body of deputies has considered that their concerns are sufficiently important for their voters and substantial enough for the entire society that they should be included among the tasks of the USSR Council of Ministers and its organs.

In many instances this is indeed the case. Here, for example, is an appeal, registered in the Administration of Affairs of the Council of Ministers under Number One. A.Ya. Troitskiy, who was elected as a USSR people's deputy from the All-Union Organization of Veterans of War and Labor, addressed an appeal to N.I. Ryzhkov, stating the desire (it was subsequently stated by others as well) to see that a government decision be adopted on increasing as early as the current year the pensions of those disabled citizens who receive less than 60 rubles a month. We all know with what understanding this appeal was received: under the conditions of an extremely severe budget deficit, a possibility was, nevertheless, sought to implement this proposal.

This is not an isolated example. Recall how many times references to the deputies' opinions and desires resounded with decisive arguments concerning the working out of extremely important state acts—drafts of decrees and laws. Let's recall that it was only the third variant of the draft plan and budget for 1990 which was "passed" by the USSR Government and the Union Supreme Soviet—the previous two drafts had not sufficiently taken into account the demands of the people's elected deputies for a thoroughgoing reorientation of the country's economy keyed on social goals.

To "write in" such demands, desires, and proposals into the current activity of the highest executive and administrative organs would be impossible if, prior to the First Session of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, there had not been a well-thought-out and approved "technology" for working with their letters and telegrams in the divisions of the Council of Ministers and its standing organs. It ensures that persistent attention is paid to each appeal from a deputy. To extract the optimal idea from it and to start its course of movement—that is where the government is putting its emphasis. Is the other side—the deputies—also keyed in to such an operational approach?

By mid-July an analysis had been made of their questions and proposals, as received during the period of the Congress's work. The most frequently encountered topics are as follows: ecology, implementation of the economic reform, and improving the management of sectors. Further along are problems of housing construction, health care, pension security, public education, and culture.

But just what came out in first place in the appeals, which, as a rule, were not made from the speaker's rostrum at the Congress? In one out of every five cases it was a matter of modernizing enterprises and financial-technical support. In other words, the persons elected by the people were not embarrassed to speak out in the role of "appealers."

The sociologists, who have already begun to analyze the composition of the deputies with what is called a fine-toothed comb, would, most likely, be interested in looking into the journal where the appeals to the government have been listed in written form. One eye is struck by a long list of queries from one of the deputies, a well-known sovkhoz director. He appealed 13 times to the level of the USSR Council of Ministers. One would think that, with such activity, his contribution to the overall state restructuring would be undoubted.

But here is a "nominal" list of his petitions. 28 May—a request to purchase an entirely outfitted cheese-making plant and bakery for the sovkhoz. After some time, two more letters about obtaining imported equipment for an ice-cream parlor and a shop for baking bread and pastry items. 5 July—a request for aid in building a club and a sports complex. 19 July—more about allotting equipment to the sovkhoz. Having concerned himself, first of all, about his own farm, this deputy evidently decided that it was high time to give some thought about others as well. In July and August there followed three appeals about providing electric power and railroad cars to the coal producers of Ekibastuz, as well as to the open-pit Borodinskiy and Berezhovskiy mines. Again the operative emphasis is on the principle of "Give," even though the representative of the higher legislative organ was, in all probability, well-apprised of the above-mentioned situation and with the demands of the "Greens," who were blocking electric-energy plans without proposing any alternative variants. They also knew about the freight-car pool, one third of which was obsolete and, furthermore, being kept at the freight consignees'. Letters from voters along with their specific requests served, as may be surmised, on four occasions as causes for appeals. And only in two cases was there mention of developing fundamental trends of agrarian policy.

It is understandable that for a deputy no matters are "alien." And if, for example, the voter Mamayev makes some noise about introducing pumps of his own design or voter Matveyenko is concerned over the abolition of the Issyk-Kul Oblast in Kirghizia, then the deputy's duty is to look into these concerns. But it is hardly right for each of them to be brought to the state governmental

level, by-passing those levels which could and should solve these problems, including, for example, the republic-level organs, local soviets, etc. The same thought comes to mind when you take a look at the list of queries by the absolute "champion" (15 appeals), Yu.Ye. Burykh, a deputy from Donetsk Oblast, and certain others who have submitted a minimum of 10 petitions each.

It is evidently unavoidable, especially during the initial period, that the representatives of the higher legislative authority be burdened with executive-administrative requests concerning the allocation of apartments, motor vehicles, soap, etc. Experience in genuine state activity will come with time. But it will come faster as the deputies understand better that the present government cannot act within the framework of the old administrative-command system and, like a small-scale proprietor, distribute benefits and resources as he sees fit. There can be only one approach for everyone nowadays: a firm executive and administrative authority implementing well-founded legislation. And it is this which constitutes a genuine state order.

Moscow CPSU Secretary on Need for Party Reform

18120004A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 36, 10-17 Sep 89 p 5

[Interview with Yuri Prokofyev, Cand.Sc. (Economics), second secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU by Yegor Yakovlev: "Reforming the Party"]

[Text] Today's guest: Yuri Prokofyev, 50, Cand.Sc. (Economics), second secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU. He has held government and Party posts since 1968, as First Secretary of the Kuibyshev District Party Committee and Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies.

Lagging Behind

[Yegor Yakovlev] The CPSU Central Committee has published a resolution on the conduct of report-and-election campaigns in Party organizations. It mentions the need to ensure "a frank and fearless exchange of views" at Party meetings. What state is our Party in if, in the fifth year of democratization, one must take special steps to ensure that Communists not be afraid to say what they think even among themselves?

[Yuri Prokofyev] If we subscribe to what is in the Constitution—namely, that the Party is the leading force of society—perestroika should also have been started with it. Then all the other processes, I believe, would advance more quickly. We have not done this and we feel this all the time.

[Yakovlev] The Party initiated perestroika but the Party is lagging behind perestroika. How can this be squared? I believe that the road of renewal was taken not by the

Party as a whole, but by its leadership which, at that stage, possessed absolute power.

[Prokofyev] The need for perestroika was recognized both in the upper echelons of power and inside the Party, as well as among the people. This alone made current developments possible. But the process of renewal began in a spontaneous way. The theory and practice of perestroika took shape together with its development. Hence the miscalculations and blunders which were made in the first four years.

[Yakovlev] The inevitability of a political reform had become obvious by the time of the 19th Party Conference. But even the Conference did not come out unambiguously in favour of reforming the Party. From the rostrum of the Conference—I remember this—the Party's leading role was spoken about as an axiom. However, given the skills in power relations and the birth of new political structures, this is rather a theorem. Only after the March 26 elections of people's deputies proved so unfavourable for many leading Communists was it grasped that the Party's dogmas need to be reconsidered.

[Prokofyev] I can't agree with you. The Party means 20 million members—and all with different levels of consciousness and understanding. I am sure that many Party leaders long ago realized the need for reforming the Party. But even today, there are quite a few who think differently, who look for the source of all the trouble somewhere else: in the excessive politicization of public opinion. For me the fact of the Party's lagging behind became clear after the 19th Party Conference. The elections merely confirmed this having demonstrated the rejection of the Party apparatus and the functionaries of many leading Party organizations. Here it is—the credibility crisis.

[Yakovlev] But there is also a crisis within the Party. Today it can hardly be described as an alliance of like-minded persons. Some subscribed to democratization, others are adamantly against it and thus against perestroika. Or take the louder and louder talk about a strong hand. Some dream about it for the sake of bringing about an antidemocratic order, whereas others content that no transition to democracy is possible without an authoritarian regime. But in their forecasts both rule out the Party as the guiding force in society's renewal, as the guarantor of democratization. A strong hand instead of a revolutionary Party—we have already learned this lesson.

[Prokofyev] All of this again proves the urgent need to reform the Party. One of the commentaries published in MOSCOW NEWS said: unless the Party overcomes its lagging behind, perestroika will pass it by. I would put it differently. Without a resolute reform of the Party, perestroika will not materialize, it will peter out.

Levers

[Yakovlev] Thus, let's agree: a reform of the Party is on the agenda. But what are its levers? They have to be

defined and set in motion. As I see it, no decisive changes have occurred between the April Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee—the published transcript of which shed light on the different opinions about the Party's leadership—and the July conference of first secretaries. Both gatherings took different looks at the ongoing processes. Some said one thing, some said another, but neither side budged.

[Prokofyev] For me a different thing is more important. Both at the April Plenary Meeting and at the July conference Communists freely said what was on their minds. There was nothing like this before. As to the levers for reforming the Party, we must first define its place and role in the new political structure. What are we building? A renewed socialism? This is a slogan. But what we need is practical development. Hence also the reform of the Party. We have reduced the apparatus of the Moscow City Party Committee by one-third and abolished all the sectoral departments. But nothing has changed: the Party's functions in society remain the same. And the reduced apparatus—today these are really competent, qualified people—operates in the old way. Again we are helping the countryside, endorsing quotas and sending people to help harvest the crop. Or at the Bureau of the City Party Committee we discuss the question of food supplies for Moscow. Some say the leaders of the Moscow City Soviet's Executive Committee should be punished for their negligence. OK—we'll punish them. But from this it logically follows that we are a higher authority, over the Moscow City Soviet. We penalize and demand, meaning that we will be responsible if the situation doesn't improve. We speak about a transition from the command-and-administer system. But in fact, this is merely a departure from it. For a transition there is a need to know exactly: where the movement shifts and how.

[Yakovlev] You say that we need to know exactly what we are building. In the bygone times only select scholars were permitted to decide this and they invented whatever they were ordered about real socialism. Isn't it time to shift this work onto Party members in the broadest sense—letting them define the policy of their organization.

[Prokofyev] This is why a plenary meeting of the Moscow City Party Committee decided to launch a discussion in the city Party organization. Again some said that first we needed to work out a platform and submit it for discussion. But this would again be a model formulated by the apparatus. We need to develop discussion from below, to ascertain the viewpoints of Communists and non-Party people. And to create our platform on this foundation.

[Yakovlev] But are there limits on this discussion or can it take its own course?

[Prokofyev] The discussion is not limited by anything. However, considering the inadequate level of politicization in our Party organizations, we have drawn up a

questionnaire with scientists formulating questions the City Party Committee cares most about. First: what is the Party's place and role in our society. Then, what is interrelation between the Party and the Soviets in the new political structure. Then, along what lines and to what limits should democratization within the Party be carried out? And, lastly, specific proposals on amendments in the Programme and Rules of the Party.

[Yakovlev] Many things need to be discussed, including the talk about a multiparty system, engaged in by Communists as well. At first glance, this seems almost paradoxical: members of a ruling party in favour of creating a rival party. I think, however, that this has been prompted not so much by their attitude towards their Party as by concern over its present state and a desire to enliven it and place it in competitive conditions. Today a broad discussion in the Party would galvanize efforts into the necessary channel. If, of course, it is carried out with the utmost frankness. You remember what Lenin said as early as April 1917, persuading his followers not to be afraid of betraying old recollections: "...if you want to change your underwear you must take off your dirty shirt and put on a clean one."

[Prokofyev] May your readers forgive me, but I think much of the current talk is the product of our political illiteracy. Totalitarian regimes exist even under a multiparty system—in Latin America, for instance. The discussions going on among many Communists are ultimately prompted by one thing: the possibility to voice their own point of view. Sometimes references are made to the decisions of the 10th Party Congress which declared against the existence of factions leading to a split in the Party. But it by no means forbade voicing one's opinion or having one's own platforms. Our people don't read documents well, or rather they see in them only what they want to see. A discussion is needed today primarily for politicizing the Party organizations.

[Yakovlev] It seems to me that, like all of society, the Party is very politicized today. It's a different matter that an attempt is being made to permit or prohibit opinions seething at grassroots levels and this, of course, does not promote a normal flow of political thought from bottom to top.

[Prokofyev] I think that you somewhat idealize the situation in the Party. Society has indeed been extremely politicized—by the elections of people's deputies. But so far this is not true of the Party. Many Party organizations are at a loss: what need is there for discussion? Most organizations don't see any. For years a contradiction, even a split has existed in the Party. Part of its membership directly exercised power and became the administrative-distributive system. The remainder kept aloof from political affairs. A split occurred—not the one that exists between the majority and the opposition, but a global and objective one. Now it will have to be surmounted by reviving an integral and vibrant political organism. To close the gap between what the Party ought

to be and what it is today, between its political quintessence and the forced administrative language of practice: submerging into the executive apparatus, you take over from it the commands from top to bottom.

[Yakovlev] What other directions in the reform of the Party do you see?

[Prokofyev] There are no recipes. We think things over and search jointly with the commissions of the City Committee and with Party activists. There is a need to amend the Party Rules. To specify the principle of democratic centralism. Without it the Party can't exist. But is this principle balanced enough in practice? Do we have more democracy or centralism? If we take a look at the Rules, centralism in it is buttressed by specific norms, but democracy is merely mentioned. It too should be regulated. The Rules say that the Central Committee must regularly inform of its activities. Now the magazine IZVESTIYA TsK KPSS (News of the CC CPSU) has started appearing, and the demand for information seems to be fulfilled. But you will agree that if it has been decided that the Central Committee should annually report on its activities to the conference, and that Central Committee members should annually report to the primary party organization, this is already a different level of glasnost.

Place

[Yakovlev] Addressing the July conference at the CPSU Central Committee, Nikolai Ryzhkov alluded to the vagueness of relations among the CPSU Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers. But should the Party necessarily be part of this triangle? For a state committed to the rule of law an obvious thing is the triad of legislative, executive and judicial authority.

[Prokofyev] Now a new political system is being created—a system which will fulfill those official powers largely exercised by the Party. What place should the Party have in this situation? The Party committees which supported the Kuzbas strikers' equitable demands and wanted local and central bodies to take fundamental measures—those committees were one with the people. Life itself defined their stance. Aren't there seeds of the future in this: a new concept of the Party's function and role in society? It must give vent to the people's interests. Otherwise it's impossible to be a political party. When the state authority passes decisions designed to meet people's requirements, the Party supports this and does all it can to translate it into life, but if the reverse takes place, it acts as an opposing force and criticizes the incorrect decisions and acts which are unpopular among the people. At the 19th Party Conference Mikhail Gorbachev said that inasmuch as we had no multiparty system, the role of an opposing force was allotted to the press. I believe that in the new political structure this role will have to be assumed by the Party.

[Yakovlev] In accordance with your scheme, it appears that the Party influences the same state structures only from without.

[Prokofyev] But if it enters the state structures and remains part and parcel, we shall return to the old problems. Incidentally, this is just one of the variants which, I believe, can help the Party break out of the closed circle of economic affairs.

[Yakovlev] Your judgments about the Party's place in society come close to the approach which has now been chosen for examining ethnic problems. A draft platform of the Party on the national question is being discussed. As a result, the coming Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee will lay out the Party's policy on the national question. Yet it is the Congress of USSR People's Deputies that will decide these problems. But these are only the first steps. The Party's position in a renewed society is one of the most pressing issues.

[Prokofyev] I'm sure that this question will be pivotal at the 28th Party Congress.

Time

[Yakovlev] We sit here deliberating over the need for a reform of the Party. But do we know how much time we have left?

[Prokofyev] Very little, I believe. The reforms of the Party must be carried out at the same rate with which

society is being politicized. The Central Committee has not yet passed a decision, but at the July conference this was spoken about: there is a need to move up the Congress.

[Yakovlev] And it must be devoted primarily to the Party.

[Prokofyev] To the Party itself. And prior to the Congress there should be a Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee which should examine different platforms and scenarios, and submit them for popular discussion.

[Yakovlev] This discussion would draw attention to the Party and its life. Today a paradoxical situation has taken shape: politicization, on the one hand, and loss of interest in the Party, on the other.

[Prokofyev] I would say—not only in the Party. The people are tired—and not only of the hard social and economic conditions. They are tired of the tension. There are some who bluntly say today: it doesn't matter what system we have and what party, if only there were calm, if only there was enough food to eat. This is the most horrible thing. There is such political fatigue.

[Yakovlev] Lenin has a term—political satiety.

[Prokofyev] More likely, it's weariness. If we were to speak about political satiety, this can be applied to the elite, to the leading strata. But in the case of the people, it's fatigue.

Poll Shows Dissatisfaction With Party Informational Work

90UN0176A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
12 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by I. Petrov, doctor of historical sciences: "I Know, You Know..."]

[Text] "We must improve information"—this has been said at nearly every meeting with labor collectives which this author had last year and this year. This problem is persistently raised by party workers and secretaries of primary party organizations. One is reminded of the categorical statement on this score by worker Ya. Kronbergs:

"A fight is now going on to reduce paperwork [otchetnost], and this, of course, is quite correct. But let no one think it strange—paperwork is necessary, only it is necessary to change its direction. To make the informational flow proceed not from bottom to top, but the reverse. If it were up to me, I wouldn't skimp—I'd introduce the post of information engineer. And I'd hang up a bulletin board with announcements where it would show precisely: what is the income and expenditures of the enterprise, tell by name who is guilty of waste, information about the resolution of cadre questions, economic ties, and the results of work at the enterprise by higher levels of party and soviet organs, and minutes of the party and trade union committees. Everything, to minute details, about the professional life of the production organization, should be made known. I am convinced that on the basis of this information it would be possible to form a competent opinion of the collective. People would appear who are able to calm unhealthy passions."

The search for ways to improve party information were discussed at a "roundtable" conducted by the Latvian CP Central Committee Department of Organizational-Party and Cadre Work, at which, in particular, it was noted that Leningrad Rayon is taking under advisement and subsequently implementing all reasonable suggestions of the working people. And it started with the fact that they created what they called "an idea and plan bank." And suddenly it turned out that the rayon had extraordinarily thoughtful people, moreover among all different categories of working people!

The study of public opinion makes it possible to draw this conclusion: many people are not satisfied with the existing volume of information. New approaches to the supplying of information are necessary. Recently the republic conducted research, the goal of which was to study the essence, content, status, and means of improving the informational work in primary party organizations of the republic.

It is very important to know what attitude party officials and communists have toward it, and how they understand information supply. And here are the results: party information is considered to be a method of leadership

based on communication with the masses by 30 percent of released [osvobozhdennyye] and 7 percent of nonreleased [neosvobozhdennyye] party officials. It is regarded as an instrument of party leadership and a means of educating the working people by 43 percent of those questioned, including 33 percent nonreleased party workers and 48 percent of rank-and-file party members. Seventeen percent of nonreleased party officials and 24 percent of rank-and-file party members consider the essence of party information to be constantly to keep party members on the course of activities of various links of the party. These questions showed that 88 percent of respondents inclined to the idea that party information entails information not only about intra-party life, but also about the economy and the social sphere.

Also studied was the degree of satisfaction with the information available through various channels—reports of higher-level party and soviet organs, and economic leaders, as a result of their communications with the working people, and so forth. Above all, attention is drawn to the fact that not one of the above-mentioned channels for conveying information is universal. Thirty-one percent of those questioned indicated that they most often drew information from the reports of communists in party organizations. Almost half of those questioned (49 percent) were completely dissatisfied with the materials presented for analyzing the state of labor discipline. Forty percent of respondents gave a very low rating to information contained in reports on the activities of soviet organs, and 37 percent of those questioned had the same opinion of information characterizing the activities of Komsomol organizations, and also the economic organs of their rayon.

Very few are completely satisfied with the information from party (3 percent) and state organs (6 percent). A few also rely on reports from the informal organizations and various foreign radio broadcasts.

Information from party organs is satisfying to a significant degree according to 37 percent of those questioned, from state establishments—31 percent, while from informal organizations this figure is only 14 percent, and a still smaller number from foreign radio broadcasts (a total of only 3 percent).

It is clear that working people are interested most of all in the information which is reported by official and state organs. And to the question "What is your attitude toward the informational material which comes out of the informal organizations," 46 percent of those questioned (and 67 percent of persons under 30 years old) answered that they consider it important and useful, 26 percent of those questioned (51 percent of those under age 40) consider that they provide no useful information at all, but merely reflect the narrow, egotistical interests of certain groups of people, and 17 percent of those questioned (35 percent under age 50) consider that they are causing harm to the unity and cohesion of our society.

As is well known, an important source of information, providing rich material on the state of our society, are the mass information media—press, radio, and television. Data show that the basic mass of those questioned evaluate with great care the plenitude of information provided by all the mass information media. Thus, just under a quarter of respondents noted that the central press is fully adequate to their needs, and for television and radio, still fewer—11 percent. The greatest number of responses fell into the “partially adequate” category: from 51 percent for republic radio and nearly 74 percent for Central television. The assessment “is not adequate” was given by 17 percent of respondents for local newspapers and journals, and by under 9 percent for republic radio.

At present, when great significance pertains to analyzing the letters of working people, it is important to note that not much more than half (51 percent) of those questioned responded that this is not done in their collectives, and that where it is done, only 14 percent are satisfied with the state of affairs. As the poll showed, as before the bulk of the letters are complaints about various squabbles, and only 3 percent of those questioned indicated that the nature of the letters had changed in favor of constructive suggestions directed at resolving production and social problems.

More than a third of those questioned (37 percent) chose the response “difficult to say.” Only 34 percent of respondents indicated that they were more satisfied than dissatisfied with the situation of information from bottom to top, while among workers 28 percent were more dissatisfied than satisfied with the situation of information from bottom to top.

It is impossible not to take an interest in these data. All the mass information media are satisfying the working people to a very small extent as sources of information about the activities of party organizations. For example, television fully satisfies only 16 percent, radio 17 percent, rayon, city, and republic newspapers 25 percent, and party journals 31 percent of all those questioned. As a function of occupation, satisfaction on the whole with materials about party work was as follows: for workers [rabochiye] 20 percent, for workers in administrative apparatus 52 percent, and for engineering and technical workers 50 percent.

Fifty-four percent of respondents noted that party information at the present time is still not supplied in the way it should be, and it is too early to speak of its development. Among workers, 85 percent were skeptics.

Forty-nine percent of respondents said that party information during the period of perestroika has improved, while 37 percent feel that everything has stayed the same as before. No one, though, noted a worsening of the situation with party information in this period. As this question makes clear, so far party organizations are obviously not focusing enough attention on this problem.

The CPSU Central Committee has more than once focused attention on the necessity of improving informational work. On 15 July 1988 the CPSU Central Committee Politburo decree “On Working Out the Concept of the Informatization of Society” was passed (IZVESTIYA TsK KPSS No 7, 1988). The document provided an objective assessment of the state of affairs in this field and pointed out that “under these conditions, if we do not take decisive, fundamental steps in the informatization of society, the backwardness in this field may become irreversible and will be one of the main factors slowing down the material and intellectual progress of the country.” The special importance of information is also attested by the work of the first Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Tajik Local Election Nominating Plans

90US0166A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST

TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 27 Oct 89 pp 1, 3

[Article by N. Khubaydullayev, chairman, Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Legislative Proposals: “The Procedure for Nominating Candidates for Deputy to Local Soviets of People's Deputies”]

[Text] As we know, elections to local soviets of people's deputies and the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet took place this year and will take place in the spring of next year. These elections undoubtedly have a most important meaning for the further realization of the political reform, renewal, and strengthening of the soviets as organs of people's power, and of the entire course of perestroika.

The September 1989 extraordinary session of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet adopted the Law on elections of deputies to Tajik SSR local soviets of people's deputies.

Considering that many requests are coming from localities to comment upon a number of the articles of this law, I would like to pause upon several points of this document, taking into consideration some of the supplements introduced recently.

We speak first and foremost of the procedure of nominating candidates.

According to Article 32 of the Law, nomination of candidates for deputy begins 2 months before and ends 1 month before the elections. Considering that the elections are scheduled for 24 December 1989, nomination must begin 24 October and will continue for 1 month.

The nomination of candidates for deputy are conducted at meetings (conferences) of labor collectives of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, collectives of trainees and students of professional-technical schools, specialized secondary and higher educational institutions located within the territory of the corresponding council of people's deputies, if no fewer than 100 people participate in them. What will happen if the 100 people

are not gathered, but there are labor collectives? In these cases, the law permits the nomination of candidates to be conducted at joint meetings (conferences) of several labor collectives in order that the total number of workers, trainees, and students participating be no fewer than 100 people. But we must remember that the rule indicated is effective only for nomination of candidates for deputy of oblast, city, and rayon soviets of people's deputies.

A different procedure has been established for the nomination of candidates for city (city rayon), kishlak [village], and settlement soviets of people's deputies from labor collectives. In these cases, the nomination may be conducted by labor collectives numbering no fewer than 20 people. If this quantity of workers (pupils, students) is not reached, then the nomination is performed at joint meetings of several labor collectives, but again, with the participation of no fewer than 20 people.

In labor collectives containing over 150 people, the nomination of candidates (for any local soviet) may be conducted at meetings of collectives of shops, departments, sectors, brigades, and other subdivisions of enterprises, institutions, and organizations. Here we must keep in mind that these collectives nominate candidates for deputy independently, and regardless of the number of workers.

The right to nominate candidates is granted to public organizations in the bodies of their oblast, rayon, city, and city rayon organs. What may be considered a public organization? For example, the charter of the Tajik Republic Society for Water Rescue (OSVOD Tajik SSR) states that the society's oblast, city, and rayon organs are conferences, councils, and presidiums of the soviets. Approximately the same organs function in other public organizations. Consequently, it is these organs (conferences, councils, and council presidiums) which may nominate candidates for deputy.

The nomination of candidates for deputy is conducted at residence-based voters' meetings. The meeting is competent if they are attended by no fewer than 150 voters residing within the territory of the election okrug, for elections in oblast and Dushanbe city soviet of people's deputies; no fewer than 100 voters for elections to city and rayon soviets, and no fewer than 75 voters for elections to settlement and kishlak soviets of people's deputies. But there is one exception to this rule. If fewer than 2,000 voters live in the territory of the settlement and kishlak soviets, the meeting for candidate nomination is competent if no fewer than 15 voters attend.

Who is entrusted to call these meetings?

The law states that the residence-based voters' meetings are called both by the okrug election commissions together with the soviets of people's deputies or their presidiums and at the initiative of the organs of the population's independent social activity (where there are no okrug election commission, their functions are fulfilled by the district election commissions).

Residence-based voters with a proposal for holding a meeting must address the election commission, which, together with the soviet of people's deputies or its presidium, is obligated to consider its essence within 3 days. In the event that this proposal is accepted, the date, time and place for conducting the meeting are established, and the okrug's voters are informed of these. If the proposal to conduct a residence-based voters' meeting is declined (it may be declined if an organ of the population's independent social activity is not located within the territory of the given okrug, or if this organ's initiative is not supported by the minutes of its session on the given issue), the organ of the population's independent social activity it issued a copy of the grounds for the decision. The party in disagreement has the right to appeal this decision in the rayon (city) people's court within a 3-day period; it is obligated to consider the complaint within 3 days. The decision of the court is final.

The nomination of candidates for deputy is granted to meetings of military servicemen; they are convened by the military units' command. If conducting a general unit servicemen's meeting is impossible, meetings are conducted within subdivisions.

All conditions for the nomination of an unlimited number of candidacies, and for free, broad discussion must be created at the meetings (conferences). Every meeting participant has the right to introduce a proposal on candidates for deputy, to participate in their discussion, to support the proposed candidacies or introduce proposals objecting to them. A meeting participant may propose his own candidacy for discussion as a candidate for deputy.

The decision on the nomination of a candidate for deputy is made at the meeting either by open or secret ballot. The voting procedure and other procedural matters are established by the meeting (conference) of the organs of public organizations.

It should be noted that every labor collective, collectives of trainees, students, and public organizations, residence-based voters' meeting and military unit servicemen's meetings nominates only one candidate for deputy to oblast, rayon, city, and city rayon soviets. As far as the city (in city with rayon divisions), kishlak, and village soviets of people's deputies are concerned, at one meeting, several candidates for people's deputies may be nominated at a single meeting. In question here is only one corresponding soviet of people's deputies.

As we emphasized earlier, collectives of shops, departments, brigades, and other structural subdivisions of enterprises, institutions, and organizations have the right to independent nomination of candidates for deputy.

The question may arise, does one labor collective have the right to simultaneously nominate candidates for deputy to oblast, city, (rayon), and kishlak (settlement) soviets? Yes, it has the right if it observes the conditions

indicated in the law. For example, a labor collective numbering no fewer than 100 people, or a residence-based voters' meeting attended by no fewer than 150 people may simultaneously nominate at one meeting three or two candidates for deputy (depending upon the administrative-territorial division).

A candidate for deputy is considered nominated if more than half the meeting (conference) participants or the majority of the total body of membership of the public organization votes for him. A record is made of the nomination of candidates for deputy. The candidate for deputy is notified of the decision made within 2 days.

Who may be nominated for deputies?

As is indicated in the law, citizens working or residing within the territory of a city and rayon of the corresponding oblast soviet are nominated for candidates for deputy to the oblast soviet of people's deputies. This means that workers of oblast organizations and institutions may be nominated for candidates for oblast soviet deputy only in the city where they work, or in the rayon where they live (in the event that they do not live and work in the same place. For example, if a worker of a Leninabad Oblast organization works in the city of Leninabad, but works in Khodzhenstskiy Rayon, he may be nominated for candidate from the city of Leninabad or from Khodzhenstskiy Rayon). This limitation is primarily aimed at allowing each rayon or city to have more of its representatives in the oblast soviet. After all, it is no secret that in certain rayons (cities), a significant number of deputies of the oblast soviets comprised workers of oblast institutions and organizations, thus depriving rayons (cities) of the opportunity to nominate its best workers to superior soviets.

As far as candidates for deputy to rayon, city, city rayon, kishlak, and settlement soviets are concerned, they may be citizens working or living within the territory of the corresponding soviet of people's deputies.

According to Article 87 of the Tajik SSR Constitution, a Tajik SSR citizen may be a people's deputy to only one Tajik SSR soviet of people's deputies. This means that if a citizen is a Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet deputy, he may not be nominated as a candidate for deputy to local soviets.

It is written in Article 12 of the Law that individuals within the body of the executive committees of Tajik SSR local soviets of people's deputies, with the exception of the chairmen of settlement and kishlak soviets of people's deputies, department and board managers of executive committees of local soviets, judges, and state arbitrators may not simultaneously be deputies to the soviet which appoints or elects them.

But what would happen if one of them decides to forward his own candidacy for deputy? In that case, there must be no hindrance or limitation, since after being elected deputy, this person is released from the position held (if we are speaking of the soviet upon which his appointment or election depends). They may be nominated as candidates to other soviet on a general basis.

All candidates for deputy nominated in observance of the requirements of the Law on Elections must be registered in the mandatory order. Rejection of registration may be appealed accordingly with superior election commission, soviet of people's deputies, or its presidium within 3 days.

A candidate for people's deputy registered in one election okrug of a local soviet may not present himself for registration in another election okrug, including in the event that he withdraws his candidacy in the election okrug where he was originally registered.

The labor collective, public organization organ, collective of trainees and students, residence-based voters' meeting of military unit servicemen's meeting which have nominated candidates for deputy have the right to rescind their decision on the nomination of a candidate for deputy at any time before the elections. In turn, the candidate for deputy may withdraw his candidacy at any time before the elections upon filing a statement with the appropriate okrug election commission. The population of the election okrug is informed on this.

In the event of the departure of a candidate for deputy after the term of registration of candidates for deputy, if there are no other candidates remaining in the election okrug, the okrug election commission, with the permission of the appropriate election commission, appeals to the labor collectives, collectives of trainees and students, public organizations, and general residence-based citizens' meetings, and military unit servicemen's meetings with a proposal to nominate new candidates for deputy. It should be borne in mind here that the okrug election commission must appeal not only when there remain no other candidates in the election okrug, but when only one candidate has been registered in the election district, for in accordance with Article 91 of the Tajik SSR Constitution, any number of candidates may be on the election ballot, but no fewer than two.

There is still one more feature toward which we should direct our attention. In the event that repeat elections are held, a Tajik SSR citizen who did not gather the necessary number of votes during the general elections may not be on the ballot again for the same soviet of people's deputies. For example, if a citizen was not elected deputy to the oblast soviet, he may be nominated as candidate for deputy to other soviets of people's deputies.

Belorussian Academician Discusses Bilingualism

90UN0016A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 19 Sep 89 p 3

[Article by L. Lych, doctor of historical sciences and senior associate at the BSSR Academy of Sciences Institute of History: "Subject to Discussion...The Problems of Bilingualism: The Discussion Continues"]

[Text] There is no greater pleasure for an author than to elicit a wide reader response to problems that he has taken up. I was able to experience this feeling while reading letters responding to the article "Thoughtfulness Instead of Emotion" that appeared in the 15 February 1989 issue of the SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA newspaper.

I am always interested and excited about reading everything that appears in the press about the Belorussian language. But what I got from the letters that I read can in no way be compared with what is picked up through newspapers and magazines. And this is totally understandable. In addition to their emotional effect, many of the letters left me with the impression that their authors are people who have a good understanding of the complexity involved in the current language problem in Belorussia and are seriously concerned about it. If I had the power, I would arrange to print all the letters that the editor received, as I am totally convinced that they would be of enormous value to the people who today are primarily responsible for putting into effect a language policy that is based on the principles of Leninist national theory. As we work out every possible approach to resolving the language problem in the republic, we are in dire need of the collective reason of millions of people and a very extensive exchange of extremely contradictory opinions on the most important and fundamental issues. And ideas and suggestions that are in line with steps that we are still timidly taking in returning their native language to the Belorussian people must also be subjected to extensive and thorough analysis.

While giving high marks to the letters that have been received, I would not want to offend the sincerity of their authors by reporting that not a single one of those letters despite their volume can form the basis for the measures that are now taking place in the republic in reviving the Belorussian language. I can only talk about individual bits and small, individual rational kernels scattered about in these letters. And this, I think, is totally logical. The wounds that have been inflicted upon the Belorussian language are far from minor and even a person who is deeply in love with his native language and has become wise through life's experience would find that it is beyond his power.

The letters that were shown to me, letters that are against any attempt to expand the framework of the Belorussian language's social functions and make it free from assimilation, are totally unconvincing and, moreover, are harmful from the point of view of the current policy for improving inter-nationality relations. The linguistic

model used by such authors only recognizes attempts to maintain the Belorussian language at the dilettante level and no more. They express totally groundless doubts as to the contemporary Belorussian literary language's ability to convey complex scientific and technical information to the reader. Some people only recognize the existence of the food problem in the republic while totally rejecting the language problem. It appears that many people did not gain anything during the bitter experience of the very difficult post-war years, a time when our national culture was pushed into the background because of the need to very rapidly restore the economy to its previous level. Many other thoughts that are ill-disposed and contrary to the Belorussians' national and cultural interests are also being expressed. Yet it is precisely through analyzing this type of letter that I would like to continue this discussion with readers about the fate of the Belorussian language.

Many of my opponents are afraid of the thought that expanding the social functions of the Belorussian language will isolate its users from progressive Russian culture. This inter-nationality trait in the character of Belorussia is very laudable. But is a withdrawal from the Russian culture and language unavoidable? Expanding the functional limits of the Belorussian language to the point where it is granted the status of a state language in no way signifies that the Russian language will become totally superfluous within our territory. We live in a country with many nationalities, a country that is linked by a million threads with the republics that make it up and with its center. We can and must communicate with them only through the medium of the Russian language. Tremendous amounts of administrative and service, technical and other documents written in Russian, documents that only in rare instances have to be translated into Belorussian, come and will continue to come into Belorussia from outside its boundaries. As before, getting involved with the tremendous number of examples of Russian artistic and scientific literature, periodicals, artistic and documentary films and regular translations of all-union radio and television programs and having the constantly touring theatrical collectives will help expand the language of inter-nationality contact among Belorussians. Russian will be studied in all types of Belorussian training institutions. Thus, even if a certain element among Belorussians consciously takes on the goal that I described, that of developing a generation that does not know the Russian language, nothing will come of it. Taking the social role of the Belorussian language to limits that guarantee its normal functioning will not turn us or our children into people who do not know Russian. It is the mastery of our native language to a much greater degree than today that will make the population of our country bilingual. At the current level, and we will be honest, the overwhelming majority of the population is unilingual, speaking not Belorussian, but Russian. And as we all know, many party documents specify national-and-Russian language bilingualism as the primary language policy at the current level of inter-nationality relationships. Therefore I find it extremely difficult to

agree with people who write letters suggesting that we renounce bilingualism in the land of Belorussians for the sake of the well-being of the Russian language.

The time of unilingual people has irrevocably passed. And as historical experience has shown, the more people know other languages, the more they value their own. A person cannot act any other way simply because of his own generally high cultural level.

Judging from the letters that have come it, the movement among union republics toward declaring that their national languages are their state languages, a movement toward which the Belorussian SSR has been more and more inclined recently, is creating a special anxiety for the future of the Russian language. Authors of these letters insist on declaring that the Russian language is the general state language covering the territory of the entire Soviet Union. In supporting their position, they refer to the U.S. experience, forgetting that the administrative areas that form the U.S. were created on the basis of territorial, and not national lines and that they are not sovereign states like our union republics. To add conviction, adherents for a single common state language, i.e. Russian, cite the very popular argument of the economic advisability of this solution because of the country's extreme shortage of material and financial assets so necessary to our perestroika. There is no doubt that if, for example, early in the 90th decade of this century we begin making the Russian language compulsory in all spheres of life of the Soviet nations and nationalities, retaining the national languages as a tidbit only for artistic culture, we would immediately gain a certain economic effect. We would immediately eliminate the need to duplicate the various service documentation that comes from the center and to make parallel use of two and sometime more languages in formulating all types of various signs and showcases and to simultaneously translate speeches during appearances at congresses, sessions and meetings. And one can cite other examples requiring the use of several languages and the additional expenditures associated with this. But is this an area in which we can save rubles? Do we not get an "effectiveness" here that we will never get from the unlimited sale of alcoholic drinks at incredible low prices?

I agree that economizing in material and financial resources is a very urgent problem, but I would only add that we should not gain this savings at the expense of languages.

And I would like to get involved in polemics with those who have a more or less condescending attitude toward the Belorussian language and who are not opposed to preserving it, but only if it is barred from the prestigious spheres of social life such as at the university, obviously ultimately not realizing that these are the areas that guarantee that any language not only survives counterattacks from other languages, but really flourishes. In this regard, adherents of limiting the functions of national languages are especially vigilant when talk turns to such a prestigious area of human activity as science. I

must say that during the period of stagnation people "worked" very zealously in this area and got rather significant judgments against using national languages when discussing science, totally failing to consider the negative consequences that arose because of that.

The prestige of national languages was seriously undermined in the scientific sphere and we have to take immediate steps to rehabilitate them.

For various reasons the Belorussian language has a very tenuous position in the national scientific area and this is having a very negative effect on its position in society. A language that is not involved in scientific activities will never enjoy real prestige. And the as-yet upcoming expansion of the Belorussian language's functions at the senior and secondary special school level also urgently dictates that it be introduced into this sphere as there will be an urgent need for textbooks and visual aids in the national language, something that will not come to pass without active participation by the extensive strata of scientific intelligentsia that are concentrated in the scientific-research institutes.

I also feel that the position of those who write letters totally rejecting anything that is specific and effective in saving the Belorussian language is totally unacceptable as well as harmful. They reassure themselves and everyone else with the fact that we, they say, cannot throw out history, since even without our language we have a rich national literature, obviously forgetting that in time people will only be able to read that literature as translations into some other language. If our linguistic foundation disappears, our fate will be no better than that of the Moors, Scythians, Polovtsians, Pechenegs and other peoples who disappeared from the historical scene.

A discussion about the lack of any practical necessity for preserving the Belorussian language is on shaky ground when people cite the example of Germany and Austria as proof. I agree that while they have a single literary language, the Germans and Austrians make up not one, but two separate nations. But here the opponents disregard the fact that by the time the Germans and Austrians had developed into independent nations, a single literary language had already developed in the territory that they had settled and consequently, when their own state systems developed, neither the former nor the latter had the slightest need of developing anything other than the common language that already existed. And we should also remember that the German and Austrian nations exist with one common language because they are two sovereign states. There is no doubt that had the outcome of World War II been different, there would not have been anything distinctive about the Austrian nation after 1938 when German Fascist forces occupied Austria under the "anschluss" policy that was in effect. And the common language that it shared with Germany did not help. On the contrary, Hitler cited this factor in justifying his forceful conquest into a neighboring state.

One would think that the difficult, unusual linguistic situation that has developed in our republic would make it more reasonable for us not to justify the reality of the total loss of the Belorussian language by citing the practical experience of other peoples, but to try, based on our local conditions, to find the true paths to overcoming this undesirable situation. And even more since measures that we are taking in our country to harmonize national and international relations allow us to get the required effects from our work to strengthen the social prestige of all national languages. Regardless of how extensive the world practice of people's linguistic development may be, we could hardly take a prepared prescription to heal the linguistic illness of the Belorussian nation. We will be able to successfully cope with this highly complicated task only when we have done a good job of examining the decline of the Belorussian language and quickly find and put into practice decisive means to eliminate the reasons for that decline. As regards historical international practices, it is best that we take from them only those things that guarantee that the native language of a nation survives and does not lead to its further loss.

I would like to spend some time on the recommendation to hold a referendum on the Belorussian language, a recommendation that is often seen in letters. One does not have to be a major strategist or even a so-so tactician to foresee that adherents of the Belorussian language will be defeated. After a half-century of the unnatural linguistic assimilation of Belorussians, an assimilation that was brought about by gross errors in regulating international relations, under conditions when our native language was practically eliminated from almost all spheres of social life, this language has stopped being a means of regular interaction among an enormous number of its legitimate users and is not seen as something native, close and valued. Is it completely legal to hold a referendum under these conditions? Certainly not. And we should not forget that a Belorussian who is not one of the first generation to be assimilated is in no condition to objectively evaluate the significance of his own native language. It is still not time for such a referendum. We can hold such a referendum only after a lot of explanatory and culturological work.

Here is one thing that stands out in reading these letters: the most outspoken opponents of reviving the Belorussian language are those representatives of the intelligentsia whose professional activities are most closely associated with using words as the primary instrument of their work. And as a rule, the reaction to the proposed introduction of using Belorussian is directly proportional to the positions that the various categories of intellectuals hold in their group: the higher they are, the stronger they resist. And this is totally understandable, for example, for the need for teachers at a scientific school to know Belorussian is incomparably less than that of a professor or teacher at a higher academic institution. Therefore when training personnel through post-graduate work, we must focus special attention on

the knowledge of Belorussian for those entering training; this will make it easier for us to resolve the problem of transitioning the republic's VUZ's [institutions of higher learning] to a language that is not native to the population.

And of no small importance in totally considering all factors in improving the practice of regulating inter-nationality relations at the current stage is the fact that almost all the people from the older generation are uncompromising against the Belorussian language. This is very obvious from reading letters that were covered in my article. There are a number of people in this demographic group who have a very clear memory of the Belorussianization that took place during the 1920's and 30's and feel that it is clearly a nationalistic fabrication. They mourn the fact that the struggle against "Natsdemovshchina" [Nazis and those of their ilk] that took place at that time was not carried out to its end and, in their opinion, if this had been done we would not have to deal with the harmful movement toward restoring national languages, a movement that is damaging to the friendship of the Soviet people. It turns out that a certain percentage of the people, even in the declining years of their lives, do not understand the progressive importance of our first Belorussianization and are not aware of the tremendous harm of the far-fetched battle against "Natsdemovshchina," as a result of which the Belorussian people almost totally lost the prime and elite of their intelligentsia, something that significantly slowed their social and cultural development.

Those people who during the post-war years wrote declarations about freeing their children from studying Belorussian do not want to agree with what is being done in the republic to rehabilitate the Belorussian language. They feel that the language policy of the 1960's and 70's was so correct that measures being taken in this area today are a direct step back and even feel that these measures are producing a certain amount of discord into inter-nationality relations. All of this means that now we really need an extremely well thought-out program of explanatory work among the masses covering the role of the native language in the life of the Belorussian nation. Unfortunately this work has not been given the necessary scope, especially among labor collectives. Periodical publications and radio programs cannot replace direct discussions between agitators and propaganda workers and workers, peasants and the intelligentsia covering these problems, discussions that allow workers to hear a number of valuable opinions from people worried about the fate of their native language and, when necessary, allow them to help people overcome their mistaken opinions about the needlessness and uselessness of preserving and developing national languages. One good thing is that "round tables" have recently been devoted to this problem. But they usually take place in a narrow auditorium. Why are they not "taken out" into the collectives of Minsk "Gomselmash," Automotive and Transport factories, the Baranovichskiy Cotton Association and others that have like numbers of working enterprises?

The possibilities of pluralism in expressing opinions on every specific issue, possibilities that have become available within the process of democratizing socialist society, have led to the fact that the press and radio are familiarizing us with the most contradictory materials relative to the advisability of rehabilitating the Belorussian language. And this approach is totally justified when one considers the uniqueness of the situation that has developed and the difficulty of putting it into effect. And I have to say that even now and then a thorough analysis of the thoughts of novel those obviously most malevolent toward the Belorussian language allows you to find something that is for rehabilitating the language, something that is impossible or difficult to find before getting acquainted with them. This gives me reason to feel that there is something of value in the letters and articles that are negative about the Belorussian language. It is quite impossible to take them as anything other than a vulgarization and a denouncement of the Belorussian language, unsubstantiated statements about the Belorussian language's uselessness to the Belorussian people who are confidently bursting to the heights of world culture. This path does not lead to a denial of the native language.

I remember an event that took place in one of Minsk's bookstores. After buying a pile of Belorussian literature, to my surprise a relatively young, neatly dressed man said, "Yesterday I heard such outrages against the Belorussian language on the radio that I decided to give not only myself, but my entire family as well access to it. I could not do this without books and here I am, with as much literature as I can carry." This is certainly a totally positive, justified reaction to an infringement of national feeling, although there are certainly other type of actions.

It is possible that someone who is happy about the Belorussian language would be glad to meet such a person. At least one family has thrown the door open to its native language. I suggest that this affected national dignity and offense is not acceptable for us to use as a method for restoring their native language to Belorussians. We should move toward this not because of negative reactions to something scandalous, but because of the deep realization that such communications are necessary and because of the influence of those specific measures that we should have been using for a long time at the level necessary to cause us to expand the social functions of the Belorussian language. In coming to the practical realization of those measures, we will be guided by the advice of V. I. Lenin that is still valid today: "We have to introduce very strict rules relative to the use of national languages in those republics with other nationalities that join our union and must be especially careful in verifying these rules (Complete Collected Works, volume 45, page 352).

The restoration of the Belorussian language must be done correctly in all relationships and must be thought out in every detail; people must be notified beforehand, i.e., we must observe the principle of publicity and glasnost. And what we get is... Recently instead of route names written in Russian the sidewalks, front and back

sections of many Minsk busses had signs in Belorussian. The question that immediately came up was, "What is the reason for this?" This question is totally justified and we cannot rule out the chance that letters will begin to pour in to the appropriate departments. Such letters would not be forthcoming if we had gone to the population beforehand through the VECHERNIY MINSK newspaper with an article such as "Dear Citizens of Minsk! The Republic has developed and is putting into effect a set of measures to expand the guidelines for using the Belorussian language. For this reason the latter will be used in printing bus, tram and trolley routes. We see no practical reason for the parallel use of Russian in these cases because of its proximity to Belorussian and because of our desire to avoid additional expenses in this design work. The use of only Belorussian on these signs is designed to help Russian speaking citizens of Minsk and guests in our capital master the oral and written use of Belorussian." And we should be guided by such principles when we set out to bring order to the names of population centers in the republic, the absolute majority of which are only in Russian, something that is in no way included within the guidelines of the Soviet practice of inter-nationality relations.

Yes, the difficult national language legacy has endured since the times of the cult of personality and the period of stagnation all the way to perestroika. And yet we cannot be passive in our struggle against their negative consequences for we are waging that struggle in the name of greater and noble goals. We must base our desire to restore the Belorussian language on a foundation of a complete understanding of the laws of social development because the Belorussian Nation is not some small ethnic group. We have the fifth largest population in this country. And if, because of our indecision and apathy, simply because of our inability to think things out or because we are clumsy in regulating the inter-nationality process because we have not thought it out to its conclusion, we lose the rich historical past of our people, there is no way that any of the planet's civilized nations will pardon us.

Russian Weekly Excerpts Estonian People's Front Bulletin

Demand for Soviet Troop Removal

90UN0077A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA in Russian No 37 15 Sep 89 p 8

[Excerpts from articles appearing in the Bulletin of the Estonian People's Front, circulation, 15,000]

[Text] From an article by M. Lotman: "Soviet Troops Should Be Withdrawn from the Baltic States."

That which signified a division in the sphere of influence for two aggressors, turned into horrendous suffering and destruction for the people of the occupied territory. The political reforms were accompanied by mass terror and

the unpardonable lies and demagoguery of the occupants' propaganda apparatus. Hundreds of thousands of Finnish refugees who fled from the Soviet troops invading Kareliya. Thousands of imprisoned Polish officers executed in the Katynsk Forest near Smolensk, and thousands more who have disappeared without a trace. Tens of thousands who were physically destroyed, hundreds of thousands forcibly deported to Siberia and hundreds of thousands more who were forced to seek safety in foreign lands, which marked the beginning of the policy of genocide toward the people of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The political reforms also began with a crude falsification: the farce of the "first free elections" and the "petition" concerning the acceptance of the Pribaltic states into the USSR system.

It is not enough to talk about the crimes of Stalinism or even judge them, we must somehow correct the situation. The Estonian People's Front has chosen several programs and measures directed toward strengthening the political and economic sovereignty of the republic. Under the auspices of the Party for National Independence and the Society for the Preservation of Ancient Monuments, Citizens' Committees are being created which are calling for the convention of the Estonian Congress, which will be authorized to resolve questions concerning Estonia's future.

Nevertheless, an end to Estonia's occupation is the key problem of its future. Only after the withdrawal of Soviet troops will it be possible to talk about the expediency of signing (or not signing) the union agreement and conducting really free elections or a referendum. The withdrawal of Soviet troops is in the interests of every honest person living in Estonia, regardless of his nationality or native language. Under the conditions of continued occupation, it is senseless, for example, to talk about the nation's right to self-determination. Consequently, the indigenous peoples of the Pribaltic should be counted among the enslaved.

(Bulletin of the Estonian People's Front, No. 24, 1989)

From an article by O. Sandrak and T. Liyv: "Peace, only Tartu Peace!..."

What should Estonia do to aid the restoration of Lithuanian and Estonian independence? Become independent first. We were the first, after having signed the Tartu peace treaty. We are still ahead of our southern neighbors. The dangerous majority of aliens primarily complicates the prospects for Latvia; the "danger" for the Lithuanians, on the other hand, is the small percentage of aliens and, in addition, the precarious future of Kaliningrad Oblast. Our prospects are better. To abide in the hope of others is only a waste of time.

What would our prospects of independence become against the background of the aggravated situation concerning the striving of other nations of the Soviet Union for separation? They would come to nothing. What Moscow can allow with respect to much-promised self-expression will become almost impossible if the country

splits apart at every seam. More likely, we will be seen as the cause of the evil and dealt with accordingly. The recommendations to expect the collapse of the empire are irresponsible and criminal, for they harbor the danger of losing not only time but also any chance at all, not to mention the possibility of remaining under the ruins ourselves.

Can our statehood be restored without a referendum? Of course, since the matter does in fact concern restoration. Technically this means recognition by the Soviet Union of the effectiveness of the Tartu agreement and the voluntary transfer of power on Estonian territory to a transitional government.

(Bulletin of the Estonian People's Front, No. 25, 1989)

'Citizens' Committees' Respond to Charges

90UN0077B Moscow *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA* in Russian No 40, 6 Oct 89 p 5

[Excerpt from article appearing in the Bulletin of the Estonian People's Front, circulation 15,000: "The Baltic: What Next?"]

[Text] Statement by the provisional committee concerning Estonian Citizens' Committees.

On 24 July 1989, at the 12th session of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet of the 9th convocation, deputy P. Panfilov condemned the action which created the Party for National Independence of Estonia, the Estonian Peasant Union and the extremist wing of the Republican Society for the Preservation of Ancient Monuments, so-called Estonian citizens' committees, which are striving to restore the bourgeois system to the Estonian SSR, as provoking and promoting destabilization of the political situation in the republic.

The Estonian Citizens' Committees (ECC) are accused of adventurism, separatism and instigation of tension between nationalities.

In connection with this, we have been authorized to report the following:

1. Citizens' committees are concerned with the registration of legal citizens of the Estonian Republic, no power in the world can forbid any committee or citizen this right.
2. The accusation of instigating enmity between nationalities is unfounded. A large number of Russian citizens of the Estonian Republic have been registered, as well as thousands of visitors who wish to obtain citizenship in the Estonian Republic in the future.
3. The accusation of separatism does not make sense. Estonia cannot separate from that to which it does not belong. The Estonian Republic never joined the USSR, but was annexed. Restoration of legality in the Estonian Republic is self-evident.

4. The accusation of adventurism and destabilization of the political situation is demagogical. The activity of the ECC is based on generally accepted norms of international law in accordance with which the Estonian Republic is a legally existing state. The immediate creation of normal legal relations between Estonia (and also Latvia and Lithuania) and the USSR is a factor of stabilization of security in Europe and consequently also in our country.

5. The accusation of restoring a bourgeois system in Estonia is premature. The resolution of this issue is only within the jurisdiction of the parliament of the Estonian Republic.

6. The Estonian Land Union is still not officially affiliated with the ECC. However, the Estonian Christian Union has been affiliated.

7. There is no extremist wing of the Society for the Preservation of Estonian Monuments (SPEM). However, there is a unanimous decision of the Council of representatives of SPEM concerning the creation of ECC.

8. Misunderstanding of the goals and essence of ECC was caused by the recent obstacles erected in their relationship with the mass media. The difficulty of obtaining adequate information is a dangerous factor in the destabilization of society.

9. We are prepared to present an explanation of the goals and activity of ECC no matter where, including in the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet and its commissions.

(Bulletin of the Estonian People's Front, No. 25.)

Estonian People's Front Prepares for Local Elections

90UN0244A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 18 Oct 89 p 3

[Interview with Mati Kheydmets, member of People's Front Central Staff for Conducting Elections, by V. Akimov: "What Is the People's Front Bringing to the Elections?"]

[Text] It should be noted first of all that we are coming to the elections with a carefully developed platform. It is a rather large and important document, which will be published any day now, and all of Estonia's inhabitants will be able to familiarize themselves with it and express their opinion of it. In general features, perhaps, it is not one, but several platforms. Its main political part concerns key questions on life in Estonia today. And it is not particularly intended for the elections to the local soviets and the resolution of individual local questions. On the basis of general political lines, each local organization of the People's Front developed their own platforms that take into exact account the specific character of a city or rayon.

Today, not only we, but, I think, other movements that are participating in the election campaign as well, have encountered this problem. For many years people were accustomed to reason (or the system conditioned them to it) in the following way: Elections to the local soviets are not an important matter. But when, they say, there will be elections to the parliament of the republic, then we will campaign for deputy seats. It is precisely for this reason that local soviets and participation in their work does not appear to be of any particular value now to many potential candidates for deputy. We believe otherwise. The importance of today's elections lies precisely in the fact that they are occurring in a period of preparation of reforms in local self-government. And in the fact that whoever ends up on the staff of the newly elected soviets will determine how competently the soviets resolve financial, economic, social, and cultural questions, and what they will be able to do in general for their own territories.

I repeat that the form of the previous soviets, whose deputies just convened for a session but who have not really been able to do anything practical, will suffice for many. Earlier the NF [People's Front] proposed that elections not be held until the Law on Local Self-government, which would clearly define the rights and authority of the soviets, is adopted. Then the person who is nominated by a collective or public organization as their candidate could determine whether he is capable of doing the work or not. Today, it is very difficult to explain to people how the new soviet will differ from the previous one, and, in the meantime, the new draft law is still being discussed.

[Akimov] In what way are you trying to find a way out of this situation?

[Kheydmets] Our general plan of approach to the elections is as follows: Local People's Front organizations—city and rayon—are acting independently, and the center is not directing them how to conduct the campaign and whom to nominate. But at meetings of the central staff (it includes representatives of all local organizations), once a week we discuss difficulties and problems that come up, and, together, we try to develop a reasonable solution. Now, for example, when there is a nomination of candidates for deputy, we have come to the conclusion that we have to try to find fitting people not only among activists and members of People's Front, but to get all of the most qualified and competent people in the city and the rayon to cooperate. There is sense in the fact that the People's Front has established as an objective going to the elections for local soviets not as a closed system, but as a movement that is open to all democratic forces.

[Akimov] What about a person who is fit in all respects, and who is competent and commanding, but who does not share the ideas of the People's Front? In this case, will the People's Front promote his nomination and election?

[Kheydmets] I still think that the basic election criterion for us is the attitude toward the People's Front platform. We cannot nominate and support people who hold opposite points of view. The problem is that there are many good and remarkable people whose political positions have not yet been defined. There are especially a lot of people like this in the villages. And when we talk to such a person and explain some facts that may not be clear, and, if as a result he agrees to speak on the basis of the People's Front platform, then we will willingly cooperate with him. And this is a normal process. Because every movement is interested in spreading its own ideas and to bring them to the attention of the people. The search for supporters is very important work. And local staffs, and the NF has them in each city and village, do everything possible for this. Including rayon newspapers, many of which have proposed that their readers state, in their opinion, who of those not associated with the NF can be a candidate for deputy.

[Akimov] One of the main reasons for tensions in public life is residential qualification. The session of the Supreme Soviet of the republic found a compromise version by having removed the voter qualification. But still a part of the Estonian population continues to believe that the retention of the qualification for candidates is not fair. What is the opinion of NH on this account?

[Kheydmets] We always considered and still consider both qualifications as a factor in raising the competence of the soviets—both local and Supreme Soviet deputies. The long-standing argument about whether this denotes an infringement of the rights of the Russian-speaking population, I think, is insipid. Because it relates in equal degree to Estonians, and to Finns, and to representatives of other nationalities. The idea of qualification is precisely that every decision concerning many people should be adopted by deputies who understand local conditions well. We still think that a qualification is needed. And we have a lot of supporters in other regions of the country. For there were many times when many unusual decisions engendered in Estonia were soon adopted in other places. The residential requirement, as I personally think, is specifically one of those examples. And first of all because the problem of migration is not just a problem for Estonia only, it is a national problem. A situation has to be achieved when local problems will be resolved by people who are used to them and understand them well.

[Akimov] Incidentally, with respect to the question of interpretation. The opinion has spread among part of the residents of the republic that the introduction of the residential qualification and the impending examination of the Law on Citizenship are attempts by the People's Front and other movements that are aimed at getting rid of the Russian-speaking population. Kind of by legal and peaceful means.

[Kheydmets] Our platform speaks to these problems pointedly and clearly. It is necessary that everyone takes the time to read it carefully when it is published. Actually, all of these innovations and legislative acts can, if

there is a great desire, be interpreted this way. But the question really comes down to whether this or some other movement presents the model of the future society of Estonia. There is a point of view—and it is strongly propagandized—that the model should be an analogue of that Estonia that existed in the 1920's through the 1940's. There are people who believe that Estonia has to be recreated in the form and political structure that existed at that time. These concepts also include the idea of a mononational society. And although it is not stated anywhere directly, that the Estonians have to be increased to 90 percent of the population, this can logically be argued to be the case.

Each person—and this is natural—thinks about his future. And if the theoretical model of this society, in which he will have to live, excludes his existence in the future, then this, of course, engenders a very sharp reaction. That is why the People's Front puts forth in its platform a model of the future Estonia in which there is a large Russian-speaking community. This position has not yet been openly and logically stated by the NF. How many this will be—a half million or 600,000 persons more or less—is not the problem. It is the principle that is important. The only solution—both in a political and psychological context—is to let all Russians living in Estonia know the principled position of the NF that a future Estonian state and a future Estonian society also includes that large Russian community which exists today. This is a sensible way of finding a normal method for the coexistence of different communities here. Because a directly stated or implied idea that, after political and other changes, the Russian-speaking community of Estonia will begin to decline quickly will in no way lead to anything good. I think that the attitude toward the Russian-speaking community in the final analysis will make it possible for the voters to make a choice between the People's Front, or example, the PNNE [Estonian National Independence Party], and other movements for whom the model of a future Estonia is, nonetheless, a republic of the period of the years from 1920 to 1940.

[Akimov] Will the attention of the People's Front be concentrated during the election campaign on a clarification of these features?

[Kheydmets] Of course, but by far not in all places. Because there are regions in Estonia today where this question is not paramount. It is not in Narva, for example, and not in Saaremaa. But in those cities and rayons where the national composition is represented by two large fraternal communities, this will be one of the main questions. I think that it is necessary to impart a clear understanding of the outlook for the development of Estonia to all normal and typical Russian people. And this is important not only for the results of the current elections. It is important overall for finding adherents among the Russian-speaking population. The People's Front considers it an important task that the democratically-inclined forces among the Estonian and Russian people understood well the essence of what is occurring and the prospects for the development of society.

Chernobyl Evacuees Ask To Leave MSSR Chauvinism*90UN0081A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA in Russian No 38, 22 Sep 89 p 7*

[Article by G.Ya. Smilevskaya, G.A. Reshetilo, L.M. Voznyuk on behalf of the collective of Chernobyl evacuees living in Kishinev: "Moldavia. September-89"]

[Text] We represent the collective of those people evacuated to Kishinev from the area surrounding the Chernobyl power plant. Our collective consists of 140 families, a total of 406 people. We have one request: let us return to the Ukraine. In our opinion, the relations between nationalities in Moldavia have changed, and it has been very alarming to witness it all. The wave of nationalism and chauvinism has been growing with each passing day. Every means of mass media has been directed toward sowing the seeds of doubt, then dissatisfaction and now hate toward the Russian people in the hearts of the indigenous population. And it is not a matter of the language law, rather the ultimate goal is to drive out the Russian-speaking population and then withdraw from the Soviet Union. The program of the People's Front makes no secret of this. And the republic's government is completely at the mercy of this movement.

How else can what happened in the republic before the session be seen? Anti-Russian statements, slogans, Rumanian flags. And what happened around the theater where the session was held defies description... It is painful to recall how the red flag was trampled and destroyed in the square. Does anything sacred remain in the hearts of those who did this? And no-one was punished! We cannot live in these circumstances, we are in constant fear for our lives. We have already experienced the horror of evacuation, it is a distressing situation of uncertainty and hopelessness. And now we are again forced to become refugees, that is, leave our homes once more and flee to find safety for our children. There are already a great many refugees in our country and our fears are not unfounded. But many of us will not survive this, and we feel we have the right to demand attention.

It is not our fault that we have already suffered once, do not make us suffer again! The price of delay in resolving this question will be our lives. What we have seen in Moldavia and what we know about other republics is causing us to fear for the fate of our entire Homeland. Moldavia has not become our home, it will drive the Russian-speaking population, as we are now called, from its land. There is no future for our children there. Therefore, we are appealing to the highest authority for help. Resolve the question of immigration to the Ukraine, Russia or an area on the left bank of Moldavia, otherwise we will be forced to walk to Pripjat where we were evacuated from!

Georgian Association To Repopulate Deserted Villages Created*18130012A Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI in Georgian 26 Sep 89 p 3*

[Unsigned announcement: "To Repopulate and Renew Deserted Villages"]

[Text] The Aghordzineba [Rebirth] Benevolent Association, which has the right of a legal entity, has been created under the Georgian People's Front.

Paata Gomelaury has been elected President of the Association, with Gigi Korinteli as Vice President. Members of the board are: Pikria Chikhradze, Mamuka Pachuashvili, Zaza Dzavakhishvili, Irakli Kakabadze, Tamaz Kakaladze, Niko Nikolozishvili, Zurab Zhvania, Ramaz Bakhtadze, and Davit Khomasuridze. Giorgi Meladze was elected chairman of the Audit Commission. The purpose of the Aghordzineba Benevolent Association is to revive Georgia's abandoned and deserted villages, build youth communities and villages, found new cultural centers in the countryside, promote the development of economic, social, and cultural activities in already existing villages, and adopt new methods of rural management on the basis of traditional forms of government in Georgian villages (the Georgian community [obshchina]).

One of Aghordzineba's main purposes will be to relieve the population pressure [razgruzka] on Tbilisi. In order to achieve practical realization of this purpose, the great majority of members of the Association will go to the villages to live.

The Aghordzineba Benevolent Association will begin its activities by building a community village on territory adjacent to the village of Akhkerpi, Marneuli Rayon. For the purpose, one million rubles have been deposited in the Association's account, funds which were raised by the public to commemorate the names of those who died on 9 April. The village, once built, will serve as a living memorial to those who sacrificed themselves for the Motherland. In matters of construction and organization, the Association will act in consideration of the opinions of all citizens who desire to live in the revived or newly built communities.

The Aghordzineba Benevolent Association has its own seal and bank account. The account number is 100700008 in the Tbilisi Kalinin Rayon Branch of Zhilsotsbank.

Problems of Adzharian Settlement in Akhalkalaki*18130013A Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI in Georgian 26 Sep 89 p 6*

[Article by Rusudan Gabroshvili, Manana Zaridze, and Irine Taliashvili: "Let No Crack Appear"]

[Text] Coming into Akhalkalaki, your heart is touched to see the new construction, yet there are many things that are as forboding as storm clouds.

Georgians number only 4.2 percent of the population in Dzhavakhetia today.... We certainly must appreciate their dedication to keeping Georgian genes alive.

Many Dzhavakhetian peasants have yet to emerge from their mud huts.... Maybe we ought to build houses for them? Perhaps we ought to treat them right as well? Maybe it's time to make up for our "negligence"!

Much has been written about SHUKURA [Beacon], the Akhalkalaki newspaper, which only has one page in Georgian and three in Armenian—remaining "the voice of one crying... in Dzhavakhetia."

Haven't we had enough? Isn't it time we woke up and opened our eyes to the big or small-time thieves stealing our Fatherland?!

Today all Georgia's attention is on Dzhavakhetia, and very hopefully too! Almost every day we hear or read reports about the settling of Adzharians there. We are gratified by the builders' enthusiasm and the fast pace of the construction. This year many new houses will decorate the villages of Akhalkalaki Rayon: 56 houses in Kotelia, 49 in Gogasheni, 44 in Apnia, 20 in Ptena, 50 in Chunchkha, 34 in Azmana, and 94 in Okami; next year, even more will be added. The Georgian land rejoices!..

Coming into Akhalkalaki, your heart is touched by all this new construction, but still many things are as forboding as storm clouds. The psychological weather that now prevails in the rayon is doubtful. Let's be frank: some of our "brothers" and "friends" are not happy about the Adzharians coming to settle! In fact, some are resorting to religious creed and attempting to conceal their real intentions behind that screen. They act as if it is their foundation; in reality, however, it has lost its validity. The Adzharians of Akhalkalaki (as well as those living in Adzharia, incidentally) are well disposed to their ancestral Christian religion which they were forced to abandon. Some Adzharians have even been baptized. The main thing, however, is that in the Adzharian's breast beats the heart of a Georgian who truly loves his Fatherland, and he carries the ancient Georgian genes.... What should religious differences matter to us? After all, those who pursued the "progressive way of life" also destroyed, ravaged, insulted, and desecrated our faith, hope, and aspirations! It is a sad coincidence, and after all that it would be a disgrace and a sin to allow anyone to point up our religious differences.

Now another and more important point: What the Georgian nation needs today is unity, cohesiveness, mutual support.

Let me start by saying that Dzhavakhetia has long been Georgia's sore point. Where the Georgian population has declined to 4.2 percent it is very difficult to speak of national causes. It is hard, very hard! But now there is hope: with the settling of the Adzharians, that depressing statistic should change—especially since the new settlers themselves are clearly aware of their national mission.

At the same time, we must not forget—we must all cherish—the 4.2 percent Georgian community and their faithfulness to the suffering land of Dzhavakhetia. We must appreciate their dedication to keeping Georgian genes alive.

Many Dzhavakhetian peasants have yet to emerge from their mud huts.... Life is hard for them, partly because of large-scale migration and partly because of those hard conditions.

Today, much is being done to revive Meskhetia-Dzhavakhetia, as is reflected, in particular, by all the help given the Adzharians. It seems to us, however, that we ought not to confine ourselves just to that. We ought to show the same concern for the 4.2 percent—because, as we know, diffident people can, through imitation, become impudent! On the other end of our sympathy we ought to perceive the face of the Dzhavakhetian, who is, perhaps, rather more oppressed than other Georgians.... Isolation, splitting, separation—these are what have destroyed us from ancient times....

In the Georgian villages of Dzhavakhetia, two-story houses are a rarity. Now the Adzharians' houses are to be added to them. This is quite a thing for the district! The local natives appreciate it themselves, but sometimes there is also a hint of good-natured envy: "We too have dreamed of such houses." And it's no wonder. Maybe we ought to build dwellings like that for low-income Dzhavakhetians? Perhaps we ought to treat them right also? Maybe now is the time to make up for our "negligence," perhaps now is the time to convince them of our loyalty and faithfulness.

Today the Adzharian carries a double patriotic burden: first, he becomes Christian; second, he settles in Dzhavakhetia. Merely building homes in return constitutes no more than material support, and that, frankly, is not enough. We now ought to create for the sons of this ravaged district a Georgian place with room for spiritual development. As a matter of fact, one senses a shortage of exactly that in Akhalkalaki. The Georgians who have settled there are praying for a VUZ to be transferred from Tbilisi to Akhalkalaki (in particular, the Zoological-Veterinarian Institute) and for a Georgian-language newspaper. Today there is an allegedly Georgian rayon newspaper, SHUKURA, which has only one page in Georgian and three in Armenian. For some time people have written about this newspaper that it does remain "a voice of one crying... in Dzhavakhetia." It amounts to nothing! In this year's KRITIKA Almanac No 3, there was an article titled "Who Does SHUKURA Light the Way For?" It was signed by some Meskhetian students, who said, "...In the not-too-distant past, Georgian-language materials took up three pages, as is still the case in the Akhaltsikhe Rayon newspaper TSITELI DROSHA.... We had to write this letter because of the pain caused by the neglect of the constitutional rights of the Georgian language, the republic's state language."

Our arrival there coincided with the ratification of the State Georgian Language Program. In response to that, Akhalkalaki bus station workers removed the Georgian signs from the buses (as a sign of protest?!), leaving only the Armenian in big letters and the Russian in small letters. As a gesture of courtesy and pretense, might they not at least have retained the Georgian?

The adoption of the Georgian State Language Program gives cause for hope, although the light from it has not as yet penetrated into Akhalkalaki Rayon, from the Russian-language signs in the offices to personal conversations. As a Georgian, you feel like an outsider there.... If you speak your native language, people treat you impolitely, they show you no consideration, they get mad and then blame you. These things happen most often in the state organs and government offices. Encountering such discourtesy, what is an Adzharian to do—he has not yet learned to ignore it, and he is proud of the fact that he has not lost his language under the enemy's yoke but has preserved his Georgianness. This is something to think about! Some of our Akhalkalaki critics retort, "Where have you been all this time, that you remember your Georgian now?" and they all but paste a "pseudo-patriot" label on you for "sticking your nose in their business...."

"Where were we all that time?" We were on the other side of that accursed road block at Atskuri, until 9 April, 15 July, and all the other terrible dates recently! Haven't we had enough? Isn't it time we woke up and opened our eyes to the big and small-time thieves stealing our Fatherland?

Despite all this, and beyond the lawful rights of the Georgian language, we are hopeful of the good sense of the descendants of Haos [Armenians]. Let no crack appear in the walls built by hand through the centuries; let no crack creep in!

Georgian People's Front Creates Abkhazian Chapter

*18130014A Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian
29 Sep 89 p 4*

[Article by KOMUNISTI correspondent Ioseb Gobechia: "Constituent Conference. Abkhazian Regional Organization of Georgian People's Front Formed"]

[Text] The constituent conference of the Abkhazian Regional Organization of the Georgian People's Front was held for two days in Sukhumi, in the Konstantine Gamsakhurdia Georgian State Dramatic Theater building. It was opened by Professor V. Karchava, head of the initiative group. Participants observed a minute of silence in honor of the bright memory of the victims of the tragedies in Tbilisi and Abkhazia.

The conference was attended by more than 500 delegates from all the cities and rayons of Abkhazia as well as guests from various regional organizations of the People's Front. Participating in the work of the constituent

conference were Professor N. Natadze, chairman of the Georgian People's Front; USSR people's deputies USSR People's Artist E. Shengelaia, P. Margvelashvili, and R. Salukvadze; Metropolitan Davit of Sukhumi-Abkhazia, head of the Georgian Orthodox Church's Department of Foreign and Church Relations; movie director L. Gogoberidze; and others.

Professor Z. Kvaratskhelia gave a report on the CPSU's nationality policy at the present stage; announcements were also made concerning the structure of the Abkhazian Regional Organization of the Georgian People's Front and the present political situation in the autonomous republic. Professor V. Karchava and Doctor M. Dzodzuashvili spoke.

The debates were participated in by educator R. Korchi-lava, Metropolitan Davit of Sukhumi-Abkhazia, surgeon Dzh. Dzhodzhuia of Sukhumi Hospital No 1, L. Gogoberidze, E. Shengelaia, Sukhumi Rayon Rustaveli Society representative S. Sadzhaia, N. Natadze, P. Margvelashvili, Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Deputy and USSR Artists Union member N. Mgaloblishvili, Gulripshi Rayon Rustaveli Society Chairman Sh. Dzhgamadze, Gulripshi educator A. Vasilchenko, Sukhumi Locomotive Depot engineer T. Gochaleishvili, Georgian People's Front representative A. Marshania, pensioner Kh. Sevastianov, Moscow Georgian Club representative G. Beritashvili, and others.

The speakers focused on the difficult situation in the social-political life of the autonomous republic, where extremists and persons egging them on have exacerbated interethnic relations, and opponents of perestroika have managed to put a knife in the back of the Georgian and Abkhazian peoples' centuries-old friendship. The speakers demanded that all disputes be resolved in a just manner and that those who actively participated in the bloody tragedy of 15-16 July 1989 in Sukhumi and who are still fomenting strife be punished.

The conference drafted a political statement to the Georgian Communist Party's Abkhazian Obkom and the government of the autonomous republic.

An election of the board of directors and the auditing commission of the Abkhazian Regional Organization of the Georgian People's Front was held. Professor Doctor of Medicine Sh. Dzhgamadze, head physician of the Gulripshi Lenin Sanatorium, was elected chairman of the board of the Abkhazian Regional Organization of the Georgian People's Front; elected as his deputies were Professor Doctor of History V. Karchava, of the Sukhumi affiliate of the Tbilisi Ivane Dzhavakhishvili State University, and Professor Doctor of Economics Z. Kvaratskhelia, of the Georgian Subtropical Institute. The board of the Abkhazian Regional Organization of the Georgian People's Front consists of 29 persons—workers, scientists, writers, physicians, jurists, economists, and educators. An opposition group consisting of 15 persons was also formed.

The conference unanimously adopted the program and charter of the Abkhazian Regional Organization of the Georgian People's Front, these documents being chiefly based on the charter and program of the Georgian People's Front but with account taken of specific regional characteristics.

Georgians Rally for National Military Formation

18130016A Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI in Georgian 14 Oct 89 p 5

[AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI report: "The Solution Is To Create a National Military Formation"]

[Text] **A Rally at Cinema House**

The time of the call-up for compulsory military service is nearly upon us, but the problems which have been discussed repeatedly at large rallies and demonstrations and on television and radio in statements by public spokesmen, also written about in the press, still persist. Incidents of the physical and moral abuse of Georgian soldiers still continue, sometimes ending in tragedy. One essential condition for doing away with such incidents and solving the problem is to create a national military formation—so stated participants in a rally that was staged at the initiative of the Georgian National Independence Party and the Saint Ilya the Righteous Society at Tbilisi's Cinema House on 11 October. Speakers included Nodar Natadze, chairman of the board of the Georgian People's Front; Zviad Gamsakhurdia, head of the Georgian Helsinki Group; Merab Kostava, a member of the board of the Saint Ilya the Righteous Society; Irakli Batiashvili, a member of the board of the Saint Ilya the Righteous Society and the Main Committee of the National Independence Party; Irakli Tsereteli, chairman of the National Independence Party; and Teimuraz Sumbatashvili, a member of the same Committee.

After the rally and demonstration, several dozen pre-conscripts stated they would not go into military service, and they started a protest demonstration at the Sports Palace.

Merab Kostava States Georgian National Salvation Group's Goals

18130015A Tbilisi LITERATURULI SAKARTVELO in Georgian No 40, 6 Oct 89 pp 6, 16

[Statement by Merab Kostava: "The Awakening Stage"]

[Text] **"The Road to Salvation...."**

Recently our society has been given the opportunity to reject outmoded thinking stereotypes and dogmatic principles. It is a time for reassessment of values. For this reason, it is time for us to get used to listening patiently to differing opinions, even unacceptable ones. In our press, the newspapers TBILISI and KARTULI PILMI

were the first to take steps in this direction, after which television opened the way to alternative thinking.

In short, formerly taboo positions unacceptable to official authorities are now being presented publicly.

Under the rubric "The Road to Salvation..." we will give space in our newspaper to some of the leaders [liders] of opposition national associations.

Perhaps readers will find some of what they have to say extraordinary, but we have decided to refrain from any commentary. We believe the time has come for readers themselves to determine their own attitudes to these people's thoughts and positions.

We have asked them a number of questions:

1. Would you please briefly state your organization's platform.
2. In your opinion, at what stage is the Georgian national-liberation movement today? How correct or justified is the position it occupies at present?
3. What measures would you undertake to settle ethnic conflicts in Georgia?
4. How do you account for the West's cautious, variegated attitude toward the situation in the Baltic republics? What conclusions can opposition national forces draw from this?
5. In general, how do you envision the social-economic prospects of a sovereign Georgian republic?

Herewith, MERAB KOSTAVA's answers.

1. Our organization, the Main Committee for Georgian National Salvation, and the Saint Ilya the Righteous Society that forms part of it, is an organization fighting for the nation's survival, national rebirth, and Georgia's full independence. This is fully consistent with our minimum and maximum programs of action. By maximum program we mean Georgia's full independence, its separation from the USSR and transformation into a free, democratic, law-governed state; the minimum program aims at resolving the problems generated by 70 years of Georgian subordination to Bolshevik Russia. Both programs—maximum and minimum—are linked closely together. The idea of Georgia's independence compels us to become liberated in any and all spheres of our life, all sectors of our activities, leaving the imperial system in order to steadfastly pursue the political aims set forth in the program. Successful accomplishment of the minimum program—such as, for example, overcoming the demographic crisis, calculating the quality of goods and manufacturers in terms of hard currency (and expanding foreign channels and acquiring the necessary equipment to do so), strictly and reasonably determining the status of Georgian citizenship, and successes in the

creation of a national army—will bring about the creation of a strong state. Therefore, we consider inadequate the notion that ecological, demographic, economic, cultural, educational, legal, military, and other problems should be resolved only after Georgia achieves independence. To resolve these problems completely, of course, independence is necessary. But unless you fight for human rights specifically today and combat violations of them in the courts, the jails, the schools, institutions, factories, and elsewhere, you will never lay the groundwork for a future democratic, law-governed state, because only through such activities, such processes of spiritual movement can we forge the knightly-civic qualities that will serve as the moral foundation and impregnable fortress of a future free Georgia. Unless you settle compact Georgian communities in Lower Kartlia and Meskheta-Dzhavakhetia right now, peace is hardly likely to be established after Georgia achieves independence. If we hadn't put a stop to the destructive course of building reservoirs, very soon Georgia would cease to exist either as a free state or as a colony. Nevertheless, the present dedicated struggle with these problems certainly does not make us forget the primacy of the political struggle; we do not forget the factors that have brought these problems into being, the Bolshevik Empire with which we are waging political battle that is oftentimes very bitter but nevertheless peaceful. In this battle we are attempting to introduce national-legal platform and fighting techniques of greater or lesser toughness in all spheres of Georgian society. In this battle we are seeking and finding confederates and like-thinkers among representatives of other nations within the Empire in order to carry out joint efforts. In this battle we are attempting to enlist the world's international organizations and the governments and diplomatic departments of the Western democracies in order to show and convince them of the crimes committed by Bolshevik Russia against the free, democratic Georgian state on 25 February 1921, offenses which constitute an international crime, and demand that the Bolshevik Empire be made to answer in accordance with the full severity of international legal norms for violating the 7 May 1920 treaty and annexing Georgia. Georgia lies within Europe, and the world's democratic forces are obligated to secure [obespechit'] Georgia's freedom and rights in accordance with the norms of the freest countries of Europe. A country with ancient traditions of statehood is worthy of joining the council of free nations. Hence, our national platform is totally opposite to the Communist Party's recently published platform concerning the same issues. As the Main Committee for National Salvation, our organization will not only fight for Georgia's independence but also to gain power [vlast'] by purely peaceful political struggle. The struggle of the Saint Ilya the Righteous Society, which forms part of it, does not go beyond attaining independence. By pressuring Georgia's present leadership, the Society is attempting to bring it out of the vicious circle of Soviet subordination in order to wean it away from the greatest vice of the present governmental system—puppethood—and put it in opposition to the Center as an independent entity. Only after

such a transformation will the aforementioned authorities be able to bring their own power to the sacred altar of pluralism and democratic elections (this may be almost impossible, but the effort is essential).

2. The present state of the national-liberation movement can be called a stage of awakening. National consciousness has definitely risen if we consider the short span of time encompassed by the new surge in the national movement launched by political prisoners who were freed just a couple of years ago. This surge has both its strong and weak aspects. Its strong side is the movement's scale, radicalism, mastery of strike [zabastovka] techniques, its perception and regular exposure of illegal factors in Soviet ideology and laws and the everyday political activities of the authorities, just and uncompromising criticism of them, and, consequently, presentation of tough demands along with protest demonstrations, strengthening of the religious spirit along with enhancement of the national movement among broad segments of the public, the emergence of new, significant individualities on the horizon of political life, the constant domination of what is most basic in the multiplicity of problems, and efforts to overcome organizational anarchy [stikhiynost']. The national movement's Achilles heel is all the manifestations of narrow party and organizational patriotism, equivalent to the narrow-provincial particularism of the past. Such manifestations include the attempt some while ago to break up the Main Committee for Georgian National Salvation, which coordinates the national-liberation movement; fortunately, the attempt failed. From this we may conclude that the national-liberation movement in Georgia has taken the correct position to the extent that it places the idea of unity above all others, so that every one of us cherishes the movement itself rather than our own place in the movement.

3. To avoid exacerbating ethnic conflicts in Georgia, [it will be necessary] to stop construction projects which artificially necessitate bringing in non-Georgian manpower from outside the republic. Next, conversely, [it will be necessary to] start and expand construction (chiefly of residential housing) in districts of compact non-Georgian settlement. Our aim, frankly, is to restore the demographic balance in those districts by bringing Georgians back, in order to dampen the desires of some representatives of non-Georgian nationalities to create autonomous entities on Georgian land, and in order to block any attempts to cut Georgian lands off from Georgia and give them away to neighboring countries. It seems to me that this kind of action is the way to resolve the demographic crisis by peaceful means. It seems to us that one peaceful means of resolving relations is to admonish or warn those non-Georgians who are hampering our efforts to implement demographic policy in national terms on Georgian territory. To those who desire to form new autonomous entities or annex Georgian lands to someone else we say frankly: Come to your senses or get out of Georgia immediately. In some districts, non-Georgians have used weapons against the

peaceful Georgian population, although there have been no attempts at revenge or genocide against such barbarians. But if such incidents recur, the bandits will receive a crushing blow.

The ethnic conflict in Georgia also extends to the sphere of agriculture. On lands of Bolnisi, Marneuli, and Gardabani rayons that have been stolen with the help of treacherous Georgians, Azerbaijanis are criminally corrupting the sacred laws of agriculture and supplying Tbilisi with chemically-poisoned produce. Whether you fire a bullet at a man or give him poison, it's about the same. These chemicals are poisoning not only plants and, through them, human beings, they are also destroying populations of animals, fish, bees, and silkworms. In short, they are the implacable enemies of God-given nature, and it is my firm conviction that the Criminal Code ought to be amended with a new article which would punish persons who abuse mineral fertilizers by confiscating their land. In general, the use of mineral fertilizers in agriculture ought to be banned. According to the age-old traditions of agriculture, the soil should be enriched with vegetable and animal fertilizer. Since in this specific case, the enemies of Georgians are also the enemies of God and nature, in my opinion, the priority of supplying Tbilisi with fruit and vegetables should be returned to the Georgian population, a priority which was taken from them by the use of the Digomi and Gldani vegetable fields for construction projects. We must find new, alternative means—for example, the land between Tbilisi and Rustavi should be turned over to Georgian cooperativists, who could sell the vegetables they raised in their own co-op stores—cheaply, of course, since it would be things they raised themselves rather than produce acquired at speculative prices. In this way, bazaar prices would become substantially lower and, through healthy competition, it would drive the poisoned produce and its criminal owners out of the Georgian bazaars and, probably, out of Georgia itself, because there is a covert war going on here for domination of the land. For the interlopers it is an easy way to get rich by criminal means. For us, on the other hand, it must constitute a sacred effort. Genuine Georgianic [georgianskaya] therapy here, as well, can save Georgia.

4. It appears the West does not wish to sacrifice the Gorbachevian "perestroika" to the current national-liberation movement in the USSR. As a result of lengthy negotiations, the West is afraid of a disruption of the stable situation in the USSR that might be caused by any attempt by the enslaved nations to secede from it. It could also be that some people in the West would just as soon preserve the present situation in the USSR, since socialism guarantees them that it will remain a land of raw materials. The Western countries' cautious attitude toward the non-sovereign nations of the USSR is also due to the defensive nature of the NATO bloc: it is not the kind of power which will intervene in the event that the Empire utilizes its oft-tested bloody repressions against the national-liberation movement. That's why the West sometimes warns the Baltic countries not to

expect any help from them. There also appears to be some kind of deal by which a reduction in the USSR's creation of hot spots around the world (on the pretext of internationalist solidarity) is directly proportional to a reduction in the intensity of intervention in the ongoing national-liberation movement in the USSR. Whatever happens, the West still remains the citadel of world democracy, although it must be said that this democracy is gradually losing its fighting character. Hence, the national-liberation movement in the Soviet Union must, again, basically rely on itself, its own powers.

5. The process of social-economic development is inseparable from the process of attaining political sovereignty. For example, the liberation of Georgia's departments (ministries, committees) from those of the Bolshevik Empire—which definitely has to be undertaken—will simultaneously constitute a political and social-economic process. Eventually the entire system of culture and education, every kind of production facility and institution such as resorts, factories and plants, and design bureaus must come out from under all-union authority. It is better for a plant to shut down than to be under all-union authority. A plant which makes just one part of a whole thing is the enemy of the national economy and basically serves the power of the Empire. For this reason, any institution, any sector of management or production in Georgia must be an integral, complete, and free organism rather than an atom or a component of some whole. Here, people might dispute me with the argument that this kind of liberation of departments is not permitted in Soviet reality. But if the informal organizations and Georgian society as a whole approach these departments not as party organizations but as associations formed according to specialties, and if they deal with department heads as specialists in their respective sectors, and if, by means of demonstrations and campaigns [aktsii] they compel them not to bow down to Moscow's directives, compel them to be independent, pursue their own national line, strive in effect to separate the departments entrusted to them and place them on an independent footing, and if this kind of spirit penetrates to the heart of every sector and the organizations connected with it, we will certainly be taking definite steps simultaneously toward political and economic independence. And after full independence is attained, which can happen only as a result of the Empire's disintegration or its complete transformation on the Western model, the prospects of social-economic development in Georgia will take on entirely new scope. Ownership and proprietorship of ourselves and the country's real estate and movable property, freedom of planning and resource distribution as well as the free choice of partner countries, and the enthusiasm and inventiveness that accompany free productivity bearing the stamp of individuality, portend entirely new dimensions of social-economic development, dimensions crowned with the eternal values by the idea of faith in God and the soul's immortality, by the attainments of world religion. And the foundations of all of this must be laid today. The preconditions for this must be shaped in

our souls and character right now as a result of overcoming the incredible obstacles of our enslaved condition, of accomplishing the impossible through titanic effort, because only by grappling with the impossible are beneficial changes scored before God and history.

Merab Kostava Dies in Auto Wreck

18130017A Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian
15 Oct 89 p 3

[Article by Soso Bagashvili: "They Stand, Grieving and Mourning"]

[Text] Through the press and on television the public has learned the tragic news that Merab Kostava died in an auto wreck near the village of Boriti, Kharagauli Rayon, on 13 October. Zurab Chavchavadze sustained very serious injuries, while Tamar Chkheidze suffered relatively slight injuries.

Yesterday morning we contacted the Georgian Health Ministry's Duty Officer, department head Mikheil Kobeshavidze, and inquired as to Zurab Chavchavadze's and Tamar Chkheidze's condition.

"The situation is very grave," he told us; "Zurab Chavchavadze's skull was injured in the wreck. We sent all the necessary medical equipment and essential drugs from Tbilisi and had them delivered to the Boriti Hospital, where Chavchavadze is being kept (the patient cannot be moved from there). We have also summoned Professor Eduard Serikovskiy, the reanimatologist from Moscow's Burdenko Neurosurgical Institute. As I said, the patient's condition is very serious; he has already been clinically dead twice but has come out of it both times thanks to the doctor's efforts. Everything possible is now being done to bring him through the crisis. As for Tamar Chkheidze, her condition is less critical....

From morning to night and from night to morning people stand on Rustaveli Square at the end of Dzhavakishvili Street....

It was here, at 1 Dzhavakishvili Street, that Merab Kostava lived—one might say he lived, fought and strove in the love and service of the nation.

But today... there is a long line to his house. It is still early, yet mourning has begun....

That morning we met Taniel Chanturia on the street; the poet was in a hurry. He told us sadly, "a saintly, tortured man has departed this world. So there are, after all, men who are able to sacrifice themselves for the nation's welfare; such a man was Merab Kostava...."

The people stand silent; no one feels like saying anything. Here on this street, at 1 Dzhavakishvili, it's not surprising to see a lot of people. It was always like that; while he was alive he was always being visited by acquaintances and strangers alike, people who discussed and dreamed about Georgia's future. But now—...

They're coming now, standing and waiting for their turn to enter the house where their selfless countryman's body lies.

Editorial Urges Compliance with New Language Law

90US0109A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 4 Oct 89 p 1

[Editorial: "The Soul of the Nationality: Legal Basis for the Use of Languages"]

[Text] Following a broad popular discussion, the recent session of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet passed an entire package of new laws, including the Law on Languages. The debate on the law was short but intense. It is enough to mention that 80 percent of our editorial mail during that period was devoted to the Draft Law on Languages. Even today, many letters on this subject continue to come, which is the sign that the subject is important to a wide range of social groups.

A variety of opinions have been expressed, ranging from full support for the law to its utter rejection. These were the extremes of opinion. Between them there was an enormous spectrum of diverse variations and proposals on every chapter and article of the law.

Some excitement was caused by the fact that for a long time there had been talk in the republic of granting the state status to the Kazakh-Russian and Russian-Kazakh bilingualism. However, the published draft mentioned only one state language, Kazakh, whereas Russian was assigned the role of the language of interethnic communication.

This caused emotional discussions among the people and in the press. Moreover, supporters of both views complained that the press was one-sided in covering the discussions and did not report sufficiently the diversity of existing opinions.

Meanwhile, the press was guided mainly by common sense and tried to show the full range of existing opinions without being partial to any particular point of view.

However, it is hardly worth dwelling on the discussions. The law has been passed. It is a balanced and well-reasoned law. Our Supreme Soviet showed that it is comprised of true politicians, since we all know that politics is the art of compromise. The compromises between radically opposed points of view that have been found are quite healthy.

The Kazakh language was declared the state language of the republic. Russian, as the language of interethnic communication, can be used freely along with the state language. Languages of other nationalities in the republic were not neglected, either. They can also be used and develop freely. One hopes that this solution will diffuse the needless tensions that have arisen around the language issue in a number of union republics.

It should be stated directly that the Law on Languages stands out favorably among similar laws passed in other republics primarily because it is so democratic, as in the course of the debate it absorbed diverse points of view and took into account interests of many groups in the republic.

The process of the law's implementation has also been thought out in detail. For instance, the controversial Article 16 (Article 17 in the draft) will be implemented over a period of 5 years, and Articles 19 and 20 (Articles 20 and 21 in the draft), which also gave rise to many questions, over a period of 10 years. Incidentally, the law itself will come into effect 1 July 1990, which is the date set by a special resolution of the republic's Supreme Soviet.

Thus, a democratic law was adopted democratically. But this is hardly a cause for becoming euphoric and thinking that all problems have been solved. We are facing the great and serious task of making the law a reality, making sure that it works and functions and does not remain only on paper.

First of all, we need the so-called companion acts, which will make sure that the law has the appropriate material, technical, financial, personnel and academic and methodological backing. It is absolutely necessary to address these issues. Otherwise, what does the right of a representative of any nationality to speak at a meeting in his native tongue mean if there is no equipment to provide simultaneous translation for everyone in the audience? We need proper equipment, and until we get it everyone should be patient and understand the complexity of the situation.

It is certain that the development of the language and the broadening of its social functions is crucial for the flowering of national culture and for the future of the nationality itself as a historically formed, stable community of people. This is the reason why the Kazakh language has been declared the state language of the republic. The majority of Kazakhstan's population and representatives of all nationalities understand this. If the Kazakh language disappears in Kazakhstan, where else will it be revived and will develop? There is no such place on earth. The language is the soul of the nation. It is not an accident that the known poet Rasul Gamzatov wrote: "If my language is to disappear tomorrow, I am ready to die today."

Each one of us holds his native tongue dear. This is why in his speech at the session of the republic's Supreme Soviet N.A. Nazarbayev, first secretary of the Kazakh CP Central Committee, thanked the entire Russian-speaking population for their understanding and support of Kazakhs' concern for the preservation and development of their native tongue.

At the same time, the reasoned and balanced approach compelled the republic's deputies to guarantee the development of the common tongue of our federation, i.e., the Russian language. It was done in the spirit of the CPSU program "The Party's Nationality Policy in Current

Conditions", which expressed its attitude to these issues as follows: "The status of the state language must not lead to discrimination on the basis of language; it means the broadening of the language's social and cultural functions, resolution of material, technical, personnel, pedagogical and other issues which are necessary for this and encouragement and assistance in the study of the indigenous tongue by other nationalities."

The study of languages of other nationalities is a complex problem which requires time and patience. Incidentally, we all must now be more patient and show more respect for each other in all areas; we must not demand instant changes in life and not insist on some abstract principles. This concerns not only ordinary citizens but officials as well. We have killed so many good undertakings already with our impatience, desire to accelerate various social processes, haste and, in the case of administrators, desire to promptly report on efforts undertaken. Let us not rush. Social processes must develop naturally.

And in the first place we must avoid impatience in daily life and in daily communications; we must not allow needless conflicts because of the language. Incidentally, the Law on Languages "does not regulate the use of languages in personal relations." (Article 6) In other words, in everyday life, everyone can use whatever language he wants, without any restrictions. And no one has the right to reproach him for this.

It is another matter for public officials and service employees. Clearly, they should not wait for the timetable fixed by the law and begin to learn the languages which are not their native, so that in time, even if they do not become completely fluent, they will at least know them passably, enough to communicate with a visitor or a client on a basic level.

Another task facing administrators and employees of ministries and agencies is to create appropriate conditions for a broader use of languages of nationalities living in the republic in all areas of cultural and sociopolitical life.

In short, we have great and complex work cut out for us. This includes self-education, too. We must teach ourselves to truly respect representatives of neighboring nationalities, their customs, languages and cultures. And let us hope that we have enough patience and tact to bring this work to an end.

Informal Groups Smooth Nationalist Tensions in Lvov

*90UN0023A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
13 Sep 89 p 3*

[Article by K. Chavaga, RATAU correspondent: "The Native Languages of Lvov"]

[Text] The poet Rostislav Bratun, who is also a USSR people's deputy, proposed that an Inter-ethnic Affairs

Section be formed within the Lvov Gorispolkom. This idea was supported by the participants in the city council session.

"In our ancient Ukrainian city," the deputy says, "members of many ethnic groups have lived for a long, long time. However, the hectic times of war, and then the years of Stalinism and stagnation led to a loss of independent seedbeds of culture. With the onset of perestroika, the oblast division of the Ukrainian Cultural Fund witnessed the emergence and initial activities of cultural societies of Armenians, Jews, Poles, the movement of the Russian-speaking friends of Ukrainian culture, as well as the Lemkovshchina Society, which includes the Ukrainian Lemki Mountaineers who resettled from abroad to the Soviet Union during the postwar years."

R.A. Bratun was one of the organizers of these amateur associations.

Our interview was interrupted by telephone calls. Rostislav Andreyevich easily switched from his native Ukrainian to Russian, and even reassured someone in Polish.

"A number of public organizations in the PPR [Polish People's Republic]," he explained, "invited about 30 young activists from our oblast's Polish Cultural and Educational Society to study at the VUZ's of their country. But stagnant, overcautious stereotypes had developed in our republic's departments, and it took several days to set this matter straight. We also succeeded in agreeing on inaugurating elective courses for the study of Hebrew and on a Sunday-type Armenian school. And now the recent exhibit of Jewish art has stirred up the idea of reviving in Lvov the Museum of Jewish Culture, which was destroyed by Hitler's minions. A similar tack was taken here, for example, by the members of the Lemkovshchina Society, who formed an exhibition regarding their ethnic group on the territory of the Museum of Ethnic Architecture and Daily Life. Up to the present time, however, the ethnic-cultural associations have existed exclusively by means of modest contributions. Here is where we need state support and tactful, constant attention on the part of the local leadership.

Recent events in Lvov have shown what an underestimation of inter-ethnic relations can lead to. In the middle of this summer rumors were circulating around the city that the Ukrainians were supposedly planning to beat up Russians and Jews.

"Despite the unrest and uneasiness among the citizens, the law-enforcement organs remained silent," Rostislav Bratun continued. "Therefore, a city-wide meeting had to be convoked upon the initiative of the amateur societies. The leaders of the ethnic groups and informal organizations who spoke at this meeting appealed to their fellow-countrymen to strengthen unity and to unmask the provocateurs. After this, the rumors ceased, and the party and soviet staff members began to proceed

more boldly to an open dialogue with the representatives of the new public formations. It is undoubtedly the case that this will likewise be facilitated by the CPSU's Platform on the Nationality question, the draft of which is now being animatedly discussed by my fellow-countrymen."

Investigation of Ukrainian Mass Burial Ground Hushed

90UN0023B Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* in Russian 4 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by Sergey Kiselev, correspondent: "Still More about Bykovnya"]

[Text] Following the first published item in *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*, entitled "The Secret of Bykovnya Forest" (30 October 1988), the Procurator's Office in the Ukrainian capital initiated a criminal case on the facts revealed by the mass burials near Kiev.

We were waiting until this case had been completely shut to tell our readers the full truth about Bykovnya, these Kievan Kuropaty. However, we must return again to this topic now, inasmuch as some strange things are happening with regard to the Bykovnya Forest. It is not exactly that the criminal case has been brought to a standstill, but it has been hushed up somehow. Someone wants very much to curtail it without allowing all the "i's" to be dotted. The opponents of exhumation in the Bykovnya Forest, permission for which, nevertheless, had to be granted under the pressure of public opinion, have tried with all their might to curtail the investigation. Matters have reached the stage whereby the investigator for especially important cases under the Procurator of Kiev, V. Ignatyev, who has honestly and courageously concerned himself with the Bykovnya case, himself does not exactly know whether or not a decree has been promulgated on curtailing this case or not....

Yes, a great deal has been done with regard to Bykovnya. The investigation has unambiguously shown that not only were the victims of the Fascist occupation buried here, as was proclaimed by the false inscription on the monument that was unveiled in Bykovnya Forest in 1988, but also the victims of Stalinist repressions (by the way, after one item was published in *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*, this inscription was obliterated). The names of 14 persons buried in Bykovnya have been ascertained. But today there is a real possibility of naming the names of hundreds of persons who were repressed and dozens of names of those who destroyed people in the Stalinist torture-chambers. Today there is a real possibility of studying other mass burial grounds of persons who were shot to death—both in Kiev and in other places in this republic. Among such sites, for example, *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* has named the Lukyanovskoye Cemetery. But those persons on whom the fate of the investigation depends prefer to pretend that, just as before, nothing is known about the Lukyanovskoye Cemetery.

Yes, the Bykovnya Forest is a bitter truth, but it must be cleared up to the very end. For Bykovnya has become not only the indicator of de-Stalinization in this republic, but also the measuring-rod of the level of glasnost and

perestroyka in the Ukrainian SSR. And the attempts to hide something, to not say something fully, not to note something in the Bykovnya case, in my opinion, hardly facilitates stabilization of the political situation in the Ukraine.

State Commission Discusses Increase in Crime in Dnepropetrovsk*90UN0177A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
12 Oct 89 p 2*

[RATAU article: "The Fight Against Crime—A Common Task"]

[Text] The regular session of the Temporary Committee To Fight Crime in the Ukrainian SSR was held. There was discussion of a report by Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies Ispolkom Chairman Yu.P. Babich concerning the status of the fight against crime, the implementation of measures to ensure the coordinated action of law-enforcement organs, labor collectives, and social organizations, and strengthening the staff of internal affairs organs.

It was pointed out that in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, especially in the cities of Dnepropetrovsk, Krivoy Rog, Dneprodzerzhinsk, and Pavlograd, the number of dangerous crimes is on the increase. This requires that we combine the forces of state organs and the public at large for an active, aggressive fight against crime. A number of cities and rayons of the oblast are implementing measures in this direction, in particular, carrying out work to form workers' detachments to assist the militia, and associations of voluntary people's patrols from among the workers, employees, and soldiers in the reserve. More than 400 candidates for work in internal affairs organs have been selected on the recommendations of labor collectives, and party and Komsomol organizations. Enterprises, organizations, kolkhozes, and sovkhozes are allocating funds to support additional numbers of militia workers, and 95 vehicles have been turned over for use by internal affairs organs.

At the same time, the Dnepropetrovsk Oblispolkom and the Temporary Committee To Fight Crime focused attention on the necessity to further strengthen the work of internal affairs organs to uncover crimes, especially in the sphere of economics, and to take measures to ensure close ties with labor collectives and social organizations in the effort to prevent repeat offenses and the commission of violations by teenagers, and the effort to raise the level of citizens' legal education. The importance of finding work for the unemployed was emphasized, especially young people and persons with no fixed place of residence.

The session also examined questions of measures which are being taken to improve the material-technical outfitting of the militia in the republic. The Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers was given the task of rendering internal affairs organs the necessary aid in providing them with automotive transport, devices of crime-detection technology and communication, and other modern technology and equipment.

The following members of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee Politburo participated in the discussion of

these questions: First Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers Ye.V. Kachalovskiy, and Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Trade Unions V.A. Sologub.

The session was conducted by Ukrainian CP Central Committee Politburo member and Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman V.S. Shevchenko.

Ukrainian Nationalist, Religious Samizdat Flourishes*90UN0177B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
13 Oct 89 p 3*

[Article by M. Derimov: "Twins Born in Hatred: On Certain Samizdat Leaflets"]

[Text] Last autumn, during customs inspection in Chop, one foreign woman was discovered to have a note from an agent of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (UHU), V. Chornovol, in which he asked N. Svetlichnaya, his colleague in the "Ukrainian service" of the American anti-Soviet "Radio Liberty" to send him a Toshiba-1000 computer and a Kodak Dikonix printer (a photocopy of this note was published in PRAVDA UKRAINY on 26 February). And in January of this year, when we and our Lvov correspondent Zh. Rudenko met with V. Chornovol and his accomplice M. Goryn and proposed that he answer a few questions (see PRAVDA UKRAINY, 9 February), Chornovol reported, among other things, that he already had a duplicating system which he was very satisfied with.

Since that time almost eight months have passed, and now on our editorial desk there is a heap of all manner of samizdat leaflets. Here is HOLOS VIDRODZHENNYA, put out by the above-mentioned Chornovol and other illegal correspondents of Radio Liberty from the UHU. Here is plain HOLOS—the bulletin of a group of Kiev deputies (V. Grishchuk, V. Chernyak, Yu. Shcherbak, and V. Yavorivskiy). And here are a number of amateur publications of the NDU, the Memorial Society, and even NASHA VIRA—a publication of the so-called "parishes" of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which arose during the Petlyurite Movement and tried in vain to "revive" during the Hitlerite occupation.

In fabricating these samizdat leaflets, of course, one could not get along without the Toshiba computers and Dikonix printers so beloved by Chornovol, which reach our country by the contraband route. Nor would it have been possible, probably, without the illegal use of the duplicating equipment of our state establishments. And it's certain that it could not be done without the use of scarce paper, obtained by, to put it mildly, not completely legal methods. There is also every reason to suggest that the copies of many such leaflets are printed in the Baltic region.

When you examine these samizdat publications, what jumps out at you immediately is the malice in regard to

the CPSU and the USSR and the leadership of the party and government. For example, the aforementioned leaflet of the our so-called autocephalists, NASHA VIRA (No 1), contains this interview with Deputy V. Chernyak: "No matter what independence was like, the opposition here was destroyed back in Lenin's time.... I am in favor of separation, in favor of independence.... The imperial center in Moscow is smothering the republic...." And in the bulletin VISNYK RUKHU (No 1), this same V. Chernyak expresses himself thus: "Influencing Gorbachev can only be accomplished by a tightly organized, well prepared opposition. We need not be afraid of this word...."

If someone who is already a people's deputy of the USSR permits himself such expressions (a far cry, incidentally, from his pre-election program), then the UHU's HOLOS VIDRODZHENNYA (No 4) has, so to speak, been commanded by God to pontificate on "Gorbachev's neo-Stalinist Ukase" and put the fear into ill-informed people that "in the elections to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, if we don't elect the maximum number of people such as people's deputy S. Konev from Dnepropetrovsk... we can never be secure from a Tbilisi, or even a Peking." It is worth noting that the issue of the UHU's HOLOS which contains these ominous threats was edited, as noted at the end of the sheet, "responsible for publication," by S. Naboka, that same activist, of the UHU's Ukrainian National Democratic League (UNDL), who was one of the especially zealous individuals who carried on the outrageous excesses by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet building in July and August.

Among the characteristic strokes of Naboka's "editorial" style we should also include the gross abuse heaped on many of our citizens. For example, he calls the well-known writer, people's deputy of the USSR Valentin Rasputin "a hideous imperialist." HOLOS VIDRODZHENNYA also subjects other people's deputies to the same insults: Kalinsh, a worker from Zaporozhe, Kasyan, the renowned hero-physician, and Chervonopiskiy, the soldier-internationalist. But abuse and even threats addressed to people with different opinions abound not only in the UHU but also all of the Rukhite samizdat. Take, for example, VICHE, the publication of the Lvov NDU organization. In its fifth issue, it says about one well-known historical scientist that he "propounded falsification, as he always does"; many of his colleagues catch it as well—"sorry men of science." And issue No 4 of VICHE contains a "resolution" to express "distrust" in the oblast newspapers VILNA UKRAYINA and LVOVSKAYA PRAVDA, because, apparently, they are the ones "stirring up interethnic strife," not the "aggressive raids" on Poltava, Kiev, Ivano-Frankovsk, and other cities of the republic from Lvov.

The same issue of VICHE contains this description of the recent arrival in Lvov of Oksana Bandera, sister of a man damned by the Ukrainian people, an agent of Hitler's Abwehr and of western special services, and a main culprit in the monstrous crimes of the Association

of Ukrainian Nationalists-Ukrainian Insurgent Army [OUN-UPA]: "...when the aged woman, worn out with grief, placed the flowers here, the glances of those present locked onto her. It went through the crowd at lightning speed: 'Stepan Bandera's sister!' With a burst of applause the assembly welcomed the unexpected guest...." In his disciple's rapture in the presence of the Bandera family, the author of VICHE brazenly blasphemes: "The fate of this 71-year-old woman reflects, as it were, the fate of all our long-suffering people."

Later VICHE describes with the same enthusiasm the Uniate service at the monument to Prince Vladimir in Kiev, arranged on 13 August by "assault teams" from Lvov. "Members of the militia," the leaflet relates, "warned the Lvovians to take down their flags [meaning the illegal yellow and blue [zhovto-blakitnye] flags—M. D.]. But a representative of the Lvov NDU addressed him with these words: 'We citizens of Lvov have just the same rights as those of Kiev, since Kiev is the capital of the Ukraine.' And they did not take down the flags...."

Well, how are we supposed to assess these acts of the Rukhites and these publications of the Rukhite samizdat? Really, isn't this a direct incitement to disobey authority, to violate law and order?

Or take a look at another provocational statement by Chornovol published in the Rukhite VILNOMU SLOVI (No 3) on the occasion of the 280th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava: "A terrible insult is being prepared against the Ukrainian people. They will spit in our faces, in our souls. And we will stand still for it!"

This is what the "so-called nationalism of Rukh" looks like in the mirror of the Rukhite samizdat!

As the well-known publicist Yu. Zhukov noted recently in PRAVDA, the "informal" publications carry on one campaign after another, in a united front, as if by an agreed plan. And these campaigns frequently have an anti-communist and nationalistic character. One and the same primitive notion is cranked around endlessly in the UHU, Rukh, Memorial, and Uniate leaflets (for example, the following variations on one and the same theme: "The Baltic Combination of Democracy and Sovereignty Will Serve as an Interesting Example," "We Are All Watching the Baltics," and "We Are Taking the Baltics for an Example!").

As with the ideas, so with the lexicon. From issue to issue both the UHU and Rukh sheets ramble through terms like "occupiers" (this label is hung both on the Russian people and on the lawful organs of authority in the republic and the USSR), "janissaries" (this is what the slanderers call the overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian people, who reject nationalistic ideas).

Where did this terminology spring from, who invented it?

Even before the appearance of the samizdat material described above, I had the opportunity to examine

materials, sent from abroad, of the Seventh "Great Assembly" of the OUN-b (Banderists), which was held under conditions of conspiracy in autumn of 1987 "in one of the Western countries." It was in these materials that I first discovered the "occupiers" and "janissaries," and also the anti-Soviet notions, which are now repeated over and over in a number of amateur publications. And thus the author of all this ideological poison is known!

The yellow-and-blue samizdat twins came from a single nationalistic bosom, they were born in fanaticism, intolerance, and hate.

Ukrainian Official on Crimes Against Foreigners

90UN0036A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
16 Sep 89 p 4

[Article by Ya.Yu. Kondratyev, UkSSR chief of criminal investigation: "Crimes Against Foreigners"]

[Text] Nowadays in any of our service summaries you can encounter reports of crimes committed against foreigners on Ukrainian territory. Previously, we tried, as the saying goes, not to expand upon this topic. But the problem is becoming more acute with each passing day.

So that you may get to the gist of the matter more quickly, let me cite a few figures. Just during the first six months of this year our republic was visited by 440,000 organized tourists from abroad, another 118,000 foreigners arrived on personal business, whereas 1.2 million foreign tourists in transit merely passed through the territory of Lvov Oblast. Add to this the 42,000 foreign specialists employed in our republic, the almost 35,000 foreign students and pupils studying here, and the 2300 foreign citizens living here permanently.

Moreover, there are quite a few foreigners who, taking advantage of our extremely acute shortage of consumer goods, bring them into our republic for the purpose of selling them at a profit. Naturally, they become the primary targets of criminal infringements.

And here are some reports which caught my attention in the summaries: some unknown persons stole a car from foreign tourists in Lvov Oblast, others used two cars to block an oncoming car containing Polish tourists in Ternopol Oblast; they robbed its passengers and fled in the direction of Moldavia....

But, of course, each such crime with regard to foreigners, to a certain degree, undermines both the prestige and authority of our country. This year more than 600 such crimes have been registered in our republic. Of these, 80 percent are thefts (531 instances). Theft from cars, hotels, dormitories....

And here it may be asked: are we really incapable of preventing most of these crimes? I am profoundly convinced that we do have that capability. This is attested to by an analysis which we conducted on the statistics of analogous first offenses. Let's take, for example, those

same thefts. Exactly 92 of them were committed this year from hotels, camping grounds, motels, and health resorts.... A certain specific procedure predominates here in general. But, at the same time, it has become easier nowadays for a criminal to penetrate such a hotel. The entrances are not monitored so strictly, there has been a reduction in the number of chambermaids on the various floors, and the security-fire alarm system has not been improved everywhere. But, after all, when a foreigner hands over his key to the person in charge, he considers that his room is reliably secure.

Now something about international dormitories. Exactly 128 crimes were committed in them. This is approximately as many as were committed throughout all of Belorussia against all categories of foreign citizens visiting there. Let's take a look at what happens there. The rooms for storing valuables in our dormitories are not equipped. But it is not the criminal investigation which should do this, right? This storage chambers should be ordered in Belorussia where they are manufactured. (One section costs something on the order of 300 rubles.)

Alas, nowadays in such dormitories both our educational work and our preventive police work are still at a low level. And unless we put them in good order today, then tomorrow, I am profoundly convinced, we will have a splash of crimes there. Let me explain my point by an example. The winter holidays will arrive in due course. A foreign student from Africa lacks enough money to go home for a week or two. So he will travel for rest and recreation to some country in Western Europe, where video equipment is inexpensive. He will bring it into our country, sell it, and obtain a tidy sum. But he has no place to keep this money. Nor can he put it on his savings account passbook; he is constantly trying to put this money into circulation. And so he either carries it with him or hides it under his pillow. It is understandable that this attracts the attention of criminal elements.

Here I want to immediately stipulate that not all foreign students behave this way. But, alas, many of them do abuse our hospitality and conduct themselves on the brink of violating the law. Or, in the extreme case, they violate our commonly accepted moral norms. For example, they bring a girl to their room. And what can we do? Well, we can warn him that she is in a risky group. But I, he declares, want her anyway, even if she is in a risky group.

There are many issues here, issues which are quite delicate. This is a topic for a separate discussion. Let me just say that, as a rule, we do not have the legal grounds for intervening in such matters. But such girls arrive for a visit, spend the night, and... "fleece" their host.

A few days ago, for example, a student at the Krivoy Rog Mining-Economics Tekhnikum, a citizen of Afghanistan named Khakhmed Khoyata brought a local female resident named K. to his room and, after a few alcoholic

drinks, had intimate relations with her; in the morning he woke up 1800 rubles short. But there are endings which are even worse.

And how can we perceive with equanimity what happened to a student of the Odessa Machine-Building Tekhnikum, a citizen of Sierra Leone named Ded Leona, who for a fee lent his own room in the dormitory to his fellow-countrymen so that they could have intimate relations with girls. Moreover, this was known to the student council.

The next stage is stealing things from cars (188 crimes over a period of 8 months). This affects primarily the western region of our republic. Foreign tourists park their transport for the night in Lvov with goods either locked or unlocked. The local authorities do not guarantee their security by paid parking places. Both the voluntary service and the police patrols are insufficiently attentive in the places where they leave these cars.

There has also been an increase in the number of crimes affecting foreigners on trains (there have already been 26). But in our republic, fortunately, this problem is less acute than, let's say, in Belorussia, Estonia, or Leningrad Oblast. Here the police organs must work more precisely, but there are problems for other departments as well.

Let's take a look at who, in point of fact, commits all these illegal acts. During the first 8 months of the year for such crimes and violations of the law—and this puts us very much on guard—approximately 6,000 persons were arrested. Of these, 769 are minors, 2,282 of the persons arrested are 18-25 years of age, and 2,898 are over 25. That is, basically these are mature persons who know how things are.

Among them are serious criminal groups who engage in currency trade. We have drawn the most persistent attention of the local criminal investigative apparatus to these groups. Another difficulty here is that, as a rule, most of these persons have no convictions yet (only 362 of them have prior convictions).

Now let's look at their social status. There are 1840 workers. Such a person works in some kind of collective, sees and hears a great deal around him. He, of course, sells what he has stolen where he works during the day. Almost 2,000 of those arrested are office employees. Most of them have an appropriate education, and they know the laws.... And so they proceed consciously. Such people represent a serious danger for us because they seek out others like them and disseminate this evil.

In my opinion, many supervisors must look about and see who they are working with, rather than simply issuing a plan.

Students on this list account for 172 persons. PTU [vocational-trade school] pupils total 416. School pupils here number 266. They are all basically engaged in black marketeering.

There is one more large group—and this is, primarily, a lacuna for the police—that portion of the young people who neither work nor study (1136 persons). This parasitical group wants to live the "good life."

I want to state my own personal viewpoint about them. I consider that their existence is not only a result purely of our professional insufficiency but also lies in the mistakes in the existing legislation, which allows many persons to lead a parasitical way of life. And this, of course, is a fertile ground for the criminal world.

Let me add that 407 persons were held criminally liable for 687 crimes. And here too another problem emerges: what measure of punishment should they undergo for demeaning our state, for infringing upon the rights of a foreign guest, for causing him property damage, and sometimes even damage to his health? With regard to these persons (as is also the case, moreover, with all the others), strictness, alas, for such deeds has now been lessened.

Public Attitude Toward Criminals, Police

90UN0045A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 7 Oct 89 p 3

[Article by A. Chukarev, candidate of historical sciences: "The Syndrome of Connivance"]

[Text] I read the item entitled "The Syndrome of Cowardice" in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA for 20 September. It was a routine, sad story about a rapist in Volgograd who, armed with a knife, violated an underage girl. None of the people strolling by on the square "saw" this crime. This is a serious occasion for a detailed discussion of how we and our society have skidded down to this level.

The syndrome of cowardice has become the norm of everyday life. Is this by chance or not? To my way of thinking, there are no such random, chance occurrences. Because, after all, it is not just in people who are engulfed in the syndrome of cowardice, but also in social conditions. In recent decades, after the tyranny of Stalinism and the stagnation of the Brezhnev period, the population of the country, its attitudes and views became completely different. People came to see and understand a great deal: unrestrained demagoguery, lies, corruption, impunity, the stratification of various layers in accordance with material position. Who lives well in our country nowadays: the person who works hard? In the first place, it is the person who is well established, who has a permanent "soft berth" in his work.

Having understood all this—and people do understand and see a great deal—the simple person, the worker, shuts himself up within himself. And he has lost much in comparison with his grandfathers and fathers; their sense of enterprise, pride, and faith in the cause which they served. Many persons live by the principle: "It's none of my business," or "You can't chop wood with a penknife," or "They pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work." All these are very serious syndromes of our

society's disease. And the syndrome of cowardice is only one of them. It is one of the aspects of many people's indifference toward the misfortunes and needs of their neighbors and friends, and, all the more so, toward persons whom they do not know. Many people, too many, have become dependent parasites.

No less important in the emergence of indifference, the syndrome of cowardice, is a second aspect of the matter: the terms and measure of the punishment meted out to criminals. This year in Yaroslavl a recidivist criminal began to press a knife to a girl and tried to drag her off a streetcar. Some workers from the motor plant intervened. One of them, the father of a family, a man of about 40 received a knife wound in the neck and died right on the spot. Others were also wounded. But they did seize and hold the criminal. Well now: one person had perished and two had been wounded. However, the criminal was not sentenced to the maximum punishment. Tell me, please, does it make any sense to risk one's life under such circumstances?

Now about the conduct of the police, which also has affected the emergence of the syndrome of cowardice. At times they grab the innocent as well as the guilty. In this same Yaroslavl a friend of mine named A.P. Golyshev, an instructor at the Polytechnical Institute, along with some friends, had seized some hooligans and brought them to the police. But the latter began to tell them that they supposedly had no business doing this. After receiving a strong shove in the back from the policeman, Aleksandr Pavlovich, together with the hooligans, found himself in a jail cell. Of course, things were sorted out, and he was set free. But tell me now, after being knocked down by a hooligan and being shoved in the back by the police, will he get involved next time with a violator of the public order?

The increase of violence and crime in our society is connected with the fact that the government has taken it upon itself to provide for all facets of public life. And it turned out that over the course of many decades it cannot feed us, shoe us, clothe us, or even protect us from criminals and hooligan elements. Under these conditions we must revise our previous laws and accord citizens the possibility to defend themselves against robbers. Gangs of bandits have long had everything, even including Kalashnikov automatics. The simple person, the working man, has turned out to be weaponless and defenseless. And the criminals, knowing this, act with impunity.

Crimes Committed by Youth Increasing in the Ukraine

90UN0213A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in
Russian 17 Oct 89 p 4

[Article by S. Litvinchuk, Ukrainian SSR deputy procurator: "Sounding the Alarm"]

[Text] Over the past 2 years the problem of juvenile crime in the Ukrainian SSR has noticeably worsened. It has not

been possible to reinforce the positive changes in its structure and dynamics achieved up to 1987. During the first half of this year it increased about 28 percent.

Today we are forced to say that juveniles are committing almost 1 in 13 of every crime committed in the republic. Last year criminal charges were brought against almost 22,000 juveniles, and the figure for the first half of this year is already more than 11,000. A complicated crime situation has arisen in Voroshilovgrad, Dnepropetrovsk, Kirovograd, Sumy, and Chernigov oblasts and in the Ukrainian capital. Almost one-third of juvenile criminals live in these regions.

The spread of group crime is particularly alarming. It is very worrying that juveniles are increasingly committing serious crimes. This year the number of premeditated murders that they have committed has almost doubled, and the number of cases of grievous bodily harm has increased by one-third. In early September 14-year-old "S" in Voroshilovgrad stabbed a militia worker, the father of two children, in the back with a knife.

But why is the curve for crime by juveniles rising so inexorably? Are we able to cope with this and control the situation? In order to provide an unambiguous answer to this let us try to reveal the roots of juvenile crime and the causes of it. In first place I would put the serious shortcomings in family rearing. Many parents are failing to meet their constitutional obligations in the rearing of their children, and have no interest in the success of their studies and their behavior at school, and in fact are indifferent to how their children grow up. This can be seen from the example that I shall cite. In Nikolayev, on 16 March this year 17-year-old Kolomojets killed a teacher at the pedagogical institute with a knife because the teacher had refused to allow him to smoke. During the course of the investigation of the criminal case it was established that the parents of Kolomojets, who had already been convicted of robbery and burglary, no longer had any influence over him, and that he had dropped out of vocational and technical school. And the result was crime and prison.

The militia records now contain the names of more than 17,000 parents who have been delinquent in the rearing of their children. More than 12,000 have been restricted in terms of their functions or deprived of their parental rights, and the numbers are not decreasing. In citing these facts and figures I am not trying to shock the imagination of the reader. I have another purpose, namely, to draw the public attention to the problem so that the people in these children's surrounding will not be indifferent observers to the formation of a new violator of the law before their eyes.

Year after year we also encounter another problem, namely, lack of supervision and lack of activities for juveniles. For example, during this 6 months more than 15 percent of juveniles who committed crimes were not studying or working. And in Crimean, Nikolayev, Odessa, Kherson and Chernovtsy oblasts the figure is

one in five or one in six. In connection with the transfer of the sectors of the national economy to cost accounting and self-financing, finding employment for young people is becoming increasingly difficult. The managers of enterprises and organizations use any pretext to try to refuse them work, sometimes making reference to the disagreement of the labor collectives. It is particularly difficult to find work for young people who have once stumbled and have returned from a work colony or a special training-and-indoctrination institution.

The young person Shabanov was convicted of committing a crime but the punishment was deferred. In accordance with law the Commission for the Affairs of Minors sent the youth more than once to work in the "Zarya" Production Association, the "Elektrogidravilka" Planning-and-Design Bureau and other enterprises in Leninsky rayon in Nikolayev, but Shabanov was everywhere rejected.

The parents of young violators of the law who have despaired of finding work for a son or daughter often seek help from the organs of the militia or procurator's office so as to find work for their children through pressure applied by those organs. But this is no solution to the problem. The trouble is that the planning organs, including the State Planning Committee, today do not have information on the number of children who need jobs after they graduate from secondary schools and vocational and technical schools. At our own initiative we undertook a study of this issue jointly with other department and we shall certainly inform the public of the results, but I think that without the involvement of economic incentives we shall hardly solve the problem. The legal obligation laid on educational bodies to educate the rising generation is of state importance. However, this obligation is in some places simply being ignored. Thus, in Kiev, for example, children from the large family of Matusevich, aged 9, 11, and 12, living in the area serviced by the No 129 Secondary School are not attending school. Nine-year-old Yankovskiy, who lives in the development serviced by the No 106 School has never been to school. Similar facts can be cited at schools Nos 3, 31 and 58 in Lvov, and the No 32 School in Poltava, and a number of training establishments in Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, Kharkov, and Cherkassy oblasts.

Unlawful expulsions are a cause of special concern. Trying to create the semblance of well-being in the educational establishments, instead of purposeful, individual educational work, some leaders sometimes prefer to rid themselves of difficult teenagers. This was the motive that prompted the director of the No 10 rural vocational and technical school Storozhenko when, without the agreement of the Commission for Affairs of Minors, he expelled 12 students from the second course. In Kharkov Oblast, 70 juveniles were expelled without sufficient grounds, and in Chernovtsy Oblast 85; in all the procurator's office uncovered about 500 such cases. The rights of the juveniles were restored by the procurator's organs.

And here is another statistic. Almost one-sixth of the crimes committed by juveniles this year were committed when they were in a state of intoxication. It need hardly be stated that it is precisely when people that are intoxicated that most serious crimes, and hooliganism and burglaries and robberies are committed. The fight against drunkenness among juveniles has weakened in Volyn, Ivano-Frankovsk, Nikolayev, Rovno, and Khmel'nitskiy oblasts.

The organization of leisure activities for children and teenagers remains a "sore" spot in crime prevention. The leading role of the organs in the housing and municipal economy, and the organs of culture and education and sports, trade union, and Komsomol organizations is not being felt. Checks conducted in Volyn, Voroshilovgrad, Zhitomir, Lvov, and Kherson oblasts and in Kiev city have shown that the activity of the schoolchildren's rooms is at the level of 9-to 12-year-olds, and that the existing discos cannot accommodate all who wish to attend. And so young people hang out on the street, frequently without help from adults, in groups, and set out on the road of crime.

Even the meager means I make bold to state it thus that according to government decrees should be allocated by the housing administrations to organize educational and mass physical culture work with children at their places of residence are not always used, or sometimes used for other purposes. In Kulikovskiy rayon, Chernigov Oblast, crime among juveniles has risen by a factor of 7, but at the same time not a single ruble has been allocated to the local housing operations office during the first half of the year to carry out educational work. There are many instances of this kind of thing. One of our most important principles has been betrayed: "The Best of Everything for the Children." This is why the teenagers who gather in the cellars and garrets of houses are convinced that no one cares about them. Let us face the truth, for we are not doing this. The conclusions should probably have been drawn long ago. We are already too late for preventive measures. So we must make haste the more so, and make up for what has been lost. We must make great haste...

Lvov Secretary on Militia Violence Against Demonstrators

90UN0183A Moscow TRUD in Russian 26 Oct 89 p 2

[Interview with V. A. Volkov, first secretary of the Lvov Gorkom by TRUD correspondent G. Klyucherov: "Hot Days in Lvov"]

[Text] What is going on in Lvov? If a tourist finds himself on these old streets, very likely, he will notice nothing. At always, a great number of stores are open, people hurry about their business, children buy ice cream, which is sold here on practically every street corner. In actual fact, for more than a year now Lvov has been rocked by the powerful shocks of people's movements. It would probably be difficult to find any city in

the country where there have been so many rallies and demonstrations within a short period of time. Sometimes they proceed in an organized and peaceful fashion, sometimes passions become so heated that they cross over the bounds of reason. Recently, a special detachment had to bring rubber truncheons into play. With this dramatic incident we began our conversation with First Secretary of the Lvov Party Gorkom V.A. Volkov.

[Correspondent] Viktor Aleksandrovich, there are two views of this occurrence: some say that the militia prepared specially to "put down" the representatives of the informals, who were moving in a column along the street, while others, conversely, consider that people "went crazy" and this could not be passed over without a response.... Which opinion do you share?

[Volkov] Well, you see, as a party leader, I believe that there must be order in the city, and all problems must be resolved in the way this is done in a law-governed state. But I believe that force should be used only as a very last resort. Incidentally, this sad incident, where there are victims both on the part of the militia and the citizenry, is now being thoroughly investigated by a special commission.

[Correspondent] Excuse me, to the best of my knowledge, at one of the conferences responsible officials of law-enforcement organs even expressed the idea of introducing martial law in the city?

[Volkov] Yes, there were such suggestions. But it seems to me that this is a strong overstatement of the situation. And at a recent plenum of the party obkom speakers said that the circumstances absolutely did not require such measures. Such a means of solving complex problems is a relapse into the old style of thinking; we will never get accustomed to the fact that representatives of the various social strata have begun openly expressing their opinions, which are not always in agreement with official opinion.

[Correspondent] Many people are suggesting that Lvov in particular is perhaps the most troubled city in the Ukraine.

[Volkov] There are a number of reasons for this. While in many zones of the country glasnost has "brought to light" social-economic sore spots, here it has also "opened up" a large number of forbidden topics which before this were interpreted uniformly and only as those of enemies-saboteurs. I refer to Cossack riflemen [sechevyie streltsy] (a regional army until 1939), the West Ukrainian People's Republic, which existed for about one year, the Scientific-Technical Society imeni T. Shevchenko, around which the local intelligentsia were traditionally united in the past.... For the country this is unfamiliar and incomprehensible, but for the local population it is living, painful history.

Nor must it be forgotten that the western lands have always been tasty tidbits for the neighboring states. During many centuries of history, there have more than

once been attempts to "Polonize" the local population, "Germanize" them or, it must be admitted, "Russify" them. And also, finally, we must not forget that the geographical center of Europe is located not far from Lvov, and that many Galicians have gone abroad in their turn for various reasons, but they did not sever their ties with their countrymen. All of this makes it possible for the inhabitants of Lvov to go abroad frequently, and meet with their compatriots. Naturally, this sort of active contacts and relations cannot help but have an impact on the psychology and mood of the local population.

[Correspondent] I sometimes hear talk like this: how can the authorities allow yellow-and-blue flags—the symbol of Petlyurite Ukraine—to be brandished on the main street of the city? Or, what is the reason why, on Lenin Boulevard, in the very center of Lvov, the informals have organized a political club under the open sky, where samizdat manuscripts are hanging in display stands, each interpreting in its own way the events which have occurred?

[Volkov] It seems to me that there is no way we can free ourselves from the psychological burden of past years: good things, they say, are only what is permitted from above. But here if something appears from below, and without even any advance agreement, then this is the next thing to sedition....

The question regarding symbolism has been studied by specialists both here in Lvov and in Kiev. They simply have not arrived at a unified opinion, although this attribute, if we speak with utter frankness, has existed, in particular, in Galicia since time immemorial. The fact that it in its turn has been compromised in some way, is still not a reason to reject it categorically. But probably the main thing should be the opinion of the people: do they support this national symbol, do they consider it their own, or not?

As for the political club under the open sky, I would sooner call it a Lvov-style Hyde Park. It arose, as everyone knows, as a result of what the people decided: right here there must stand a monument to the great Ukrainian poet and democrat T. Shevchenko. Today representatives come here from a great many different informal associations, and also anyone else who wishes to come. Here a great variety of problems are actively discussed. With some it is possible to agree, with others not. But I see nothing heretical in this circumstance itself. In fact, I think that it has become necessary to create a public assembly hall, which, incidentally, once existed in Lvov. I consider it a serious mistake that the authorities have been so slow to begin working together with the informal societies. For example, associations such as Lev, the Society of the Ukrainian Language imeni T. Shevchenko, Memorial, and Rukh have a fairly large membership and enjoy the support of various circles of society. Therefore, ignoring existing realities can only lead to increased tension, and a weakening of the authority of party and soviet organs.

[Correspondent] But there is also this point of view: the leaders of these informal associations, among whom there are nationalists and extremists, are bursting to get power, in order then to confirm their own ideas, without having anything in common with socialist ideas.

[Volkov] And many of them don't even conceal the fact that they are fighting for power. The root of the problem is something else: under the new conditions, how do we communists conduct the campaign to win people over to our side, to convince them that the true values of socialism are just what is needed to bring the economy and social justice to bloom. And this work can be carried out only by real leaders, not desk jockeys, no matter how high the posts they may hold.

Some people may object: all this is fine in theory, they say, but in real life in Lvov, when people don't have enough culture, when the correct psychology has not yet caught on in practice, the actions of the informals are sometimes manifested in unhealthy, even twisted ways. I agree completely. Even further—I think that for every deviation from moral and legal norms these organizations must bear full responsibility. At the same time, when a rally of many thousands for the legalization of the Greek Catholic Church was held at Porokhovoy Tower, there was exemplary order there, and the order was maintained by volunteers [druzhinniki] from the informal organizations.

[Correspondent] The times themselves have posed us the question of this church, and after all it is a purely west-Ukrainian phenomenon. What is your attitude toward recognizing it?

[Volkov] Even for the Ukrainians who live outside the western region, the full urgency of this problem is not completely understood. The history of the appearance of the Uniate Church and the prohibition of it is fairly complicated, therefore I will confine myself to the essentials. We have constantly assured everyone that here in Lvov there are no people who profess Uniatism, that everyone has rejected its rites and prayers. But in actual fact there are not tens but hundreds of thousands in the population who profess the Greek Catholic faith as before. Only they do it in secret or semi-legally. I think that this is an abnormal phenomenon today. We are artificially creating malcontents and a completely unnecessary social tension. I can understand why the leaders of the Orthodox Church are categorically opposed—here lies the entire historical course of the struggle. But under today's conditions of democratization, when all sorts of trends are legalized, rank-and-file believers must not be punished for the sins of the former Uniate Church....

[Correspondent] And one last question: in your view, how will the social-political situation in Lvov develop in the near future?

[Volkov] I don't want to oversimplify anything. We have learned to put an evaluation on the events which have occurred, but we are far from always able to give a prognosis. We make decisions, but are not prepared to

see their consequences, their effect on the development of the situation. A person who does not know our specific circumstances measures them by the scale of the Baltic region, Moldavia, or Nagornyy Karabakh. This is a grave error. Here there are in principle no nationalist tensions between the indigenous population and Russian speakers, therefore there is no soil which can give rise to an Interfront in the form in which it exists in certain other republics. Moreover, all the major communities (Ukrainian-Russian, Jewish, Polish, and Armenian) have organized their own cultural-educational and even religious societies, and we, for our part, are trying to help them.

Unfortunately, republic organs do not always take into account our regional characteristics, they underestimate the specifics of the history, culture, and traditions of this land. Sometimes too, the press, not looking into the concrete situation, paints the events here all in the same black color, portraying virtually everyone as nationalists and extremists.

I am not going to deny that such forces exist among us. But very frequently any person with different opinions among us is immediately perceived as all but an enemy. For long years we have been trained in this way of thinking, and breaking this habit is painfully difficult. From here comes the black-and-white, two-dimensional perception of events, but after all they are always multi-layered, multi-colored, and three-dimensional. I personally believe that mutual tolerance and understanding, and reasonable compromises, will lead us ultimately onto the path of agreement and cooperation. Let me cite one last suggestive fact. When it was proposed to representatives of the informal societies that they create a joint coordinating center for choosing candidates for the elections to local soviets, they immediately agreed to this participation. Healthy thinkers are still in the majority among us. I have a deep faith in their good sense, in their high sense of responsibility and awareness of their own interest, understanding that only a sober and well-considered approach, only joint efforts, will enable us to come through the social-political crisis.

Kazakh Police Struggle with Rising Crime Rate

90US0075A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 3 Oct 89 p 3

[Article by Militia Colonel A.K. Suleymenov, chief of the Political Administration of the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs: "What Shall We Use to Oppose Crime?"]

[Text] At one time everything was simple. Criminals did their thing and the militia did theirs. There were no flashy statistics, the number of cases solved steadily increased, and the population was firmly confident that "his militia was protecting him."

And suddenly—it is as if a veil is removed from your eyes. The militia turned out to be strangling in the grips of corruption and lack of professionalism, the criminal

was outwitting [the militia], becoming more insolent with each passing day, and was putting together strong organizations which were similar in form to the foreign mafia. It became clear that we did not have adequate forces, assets, or skill to fight this new criminal. It also became clear that many laws which were considered to be models of perfection at one time simply did not work under the new conditions.

Colossus turned out to be standing on feet of clay. They also defeated it. And what else could we do with it? Now a new system of law enforcement agencies is being built on its fragments. It is being built slowly and painstakingly since the process is occurring in real time. But it requires a rapid and direct reaction to the changing situation and this reaction must be adequate. There are both objective and subjective factors in this difficult matter which interfere with it. A.K. Suleymenov, chief of the Kazakh SSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Political Administration, reflects on them today.

We all know from press reports that crime continues to increase in the republic. We are still "adding" onto the majority of statistical areas, in particular, murders, rape, robbery, and theft of state and personal property.

Does this mean that the militia has begun to operate more poorly than before? I list the following case to confirm the fact that we are not sitting idly by. With the same numbers, but under a noticeably increased workload of unwitnessed crimes, the republic's criminal investigations subdivisions solved 8,500 more crimes this year than during the same period last year. Operational personnel work 12 to 14 hours per day without days off or compensatory leave. But unfortunately we have not succeeding in breaking the crime wave. The growth rates of unsolved crimes exceed the growth rates of recorded crimes by a factor of 1.5 to 2. And it is this increase that is absorbing the indicators or militia labor and making it invisible. There can be only one conclusion here: The mass of crimes has exceeded the potential capabilities of the operational and investigative apparatus.

A series of problems associated with both internal and external factors with regard to the internal affairs agencies are the cause of this situation. We are forced to conduct the fight against crime under conditions of social tension and a progressive shortage and serious deficiencies in criminal and procedural law. All of this manifested and exacerbated the far from best qualities of a certain portion of the population. A rapid reduction of social mores which entails a strengthening of criminal activities is occurring before our eyes.

Both the legal and social protection of the employees of the militia agencies does not correspond to these negative processes. For example, resisting a guardian of the law is severely punishable by law in all developed countries. In our country, hooligans are spoiling for a fight with militiamen, they incite brawls in patrol areas, and

they swagger in militia departments. And frequently they are not punished at all for this.

Incidentally in my opinion the leaders of internal affairs agencies share the blame for this by having assumed a temporizing position suggesting that not they but someone else was primarily obligated to shield subordinates from humiliation and insults and to pacify the hooligans.

Criminals are becoming insolent. They are increasingly using guns against militiamen and our losses are increasing. If 19 employees were killed and ten were wounded during skirmishes with bandits in the republic in 1987, there are already 26 and 69, respectively, this year.

We also need to take a good look at what is going on today in the investigators' crowded offices. Troubles started here after the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR in December 1986 when it was precisely declared that a conviction could only be based on that evidence which was examined during the judicial session itself. In that case, this is a legitimate question: Why do we need a preliminary investigation? It is actually from this Plenum that judicial practice's inexplicable "avoidance" from side to side began which investigators cannot keep pace with. It is impossible to not understand their perplexity: Procedural law remained as before, no Supreme Court guiding clarifications were noted, but cases, qualified in accordance with them are being "broken." This very resolution is being regarded as a norm which absolutely does not tie the accused to his testimony. He can endlessly change it setting forth new versions in his favor. Therefore, some judges in cases associated with severe crimes have practically freed themselves from evaluating evidence attained during the preliminary investigation. Time after time cases are being returned for further inquiry. The court can return a case for additional investigation three or four times without making a final decision. Cases are endlessly tied up in red tape, all conceivable and inconceivable time periods expire, and the end result is we have a case with individuals suspected of committing crimes who have admitted it during the preliminary investigation who are freed from incarceration by the courts... In the language of professionals, this practice is called "burial of a case." Obviously it is not always used but we have noted that it is increasingly occurring. And is the court without sin in this situation? In 1988, procurators protested 1,188 determinations of courts on the return of criminal cases for additional investigation and of this number 806 were approved. This year, these numbers are 586 and 348.

Liberalization with regard to the criminal element also significantly complicated the activities of BKhSS [combating the embezzlement of socialist property and speculation] organs. It is hard to say how many of the 129 criminal cases of bribery brought by them in the last eight months will reach the courts. Really arrest sanctions are very rarely issued now. And while remaining

free, the briber conducts intensive arm twisting of witnesses, searches for protectors, and resorts to bribery and blackmail. Embezzlers do the same thing, they are refined and professional operators. How can we thoroughly investigate a major theft without temporary isolation of the suspect? We really fear that they are preparing a countermove which may simultaneously negate all the efforts of our colleagues. I am not an opponent of humane treatment but how can a practical worker be deeply convinced that appeals to place himself in the position of the person being incarcerated cannot but drown out the interests of society and the principles of social justice. When they are impudently trampled upon, there is no basis for humane considerations.

This serious factor also troubles BKhSS workers. Today the majority of thefts are committed at the junction between the cooperative and state enterprises. Illegal economic transactions are sort of legitimized and are conducted under the aegis of the development of the cooperative movement. It is understood that merging the state sector with private enterprise based on a violation of the law could not result in anything good. Furthermore, many ministries and departments, referring to the introduction of cost accounting and self financing, considered it possible to significantly reduce their monitoring and auditing apparatus. As a result, we have a noticeable worsening of the criminal environment in various sectors of the national economy.

The danger of spreading one of the real manifestations of organized crime—home-grown racketeering—recently appeared in the republic. According to the latest data, 58 statements of cases of extortion have come into MVD agencies, 47 criminal cases have been brought, and investigations are being conducted. The offensive nature and effectiveness of the fight in this direction is being held up by the lack of legislative acts on admission of videotape materials and photographs as evidence of guilt. That is, we need a broadened evidence base. The legal basis for the use of such examples in investigative practice has already long existed not only in capitalist but also in socialist countries.

We also only need to envy our foreign colleagues in the context of material and technical equipment. Of the 21 UVD's [Administration of Internal Affairs] and UVDT's, only four have computers and these are obsolete. Provision of automobiles even at the very lowest organic level totals a little more than 80 percent. There is not enough elementary criminal equipment. Front-line subunits are practically not equipped with communications equipment. The established fuel limit of 10-15 liters of fuel per day per automobile is ludicrous.

The issues of housing and financial support of internal affairs agencies has already bored us to death. More than 11,000 militiamen are on the list to receive housing throughout the republic. Overtime volume of work, the degree of professional risk, and compensation for internal affairs workers is inadequate. If compensation in the republic's industrial enterprises averages more

than 200 rubles, a militiaman's salary is 155 [rubles]. It is not by accident that during the last 1.5 years 376 experienced workers have already left internal affairs agencies for the sphere of cooperative or individual work activity. And really the prolonged delays in resolving material and daily life issues is having an extremely negative effect on the psychological climate in militia collectives. Peoples' depressed states are taking the form of a sharp increase in personnel turnover and replacement. Vacancies are continually increasing. Today we lack more than 2,000 officers and militiamen.

Attempts to increase militia personnel by directing leading workers of the party and government apparatus to join [MVD] agencies do not always justify themselves. We frequently immediately entrust complicated sectors to them without giving them time to master the specifics of the service and to develop the required professional qualities. Naturally the profession is suffering from this. The requirement to consider competence and professionalism as required conditions for promotion to leadership positions within internal affairs agencies is increasingly being heard among personnel.

I have listed some of the most pressing problems of the Kazakhstan Militia in general terms. It is impossible to examine them in isolation from the activities of state agencies and public organizations. Therefore, I think that success in the field of activity entrusted to us will depend to a significant degree on how quickly the central government adopts (with the help of our people's deputies) legislative acts and directives which provide militia employees with legal and social protection, how effectively local government authorities react to our needs and, finally, how society itself becomes involved in supporting law and order in the republic.

We need to oppose crime with more powerful forces and conduct the fight against it in all directions. And all strata of society need to participate according to their capabilities.

Semipalatinsk Gang Fighting, Witness Disinterest 'Disturbing'

90US0075B Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 3 Oct 89 p 3

[Article by L. Reznikov, KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent, Semipalatinsk: "A Fight in the [Outskirts of the City]"]

[Text] A large fight occurred during late evening in Semipalatinsk's working district in which boys from the microrayon near the Zarya Movie Theater and from the village of Zholomanovka participated. Both sides used pieces of steel fittings and sticks.

The Incident

The outcome of the conflict was sad. K. Isin, a student at the auto mechanics technical school, died at the scene of the incident. Eight men were taken to the hospital in

serious condition and, as T. Bolyspayev, chief of the Oblispolkom UVD [Administration of Internal Affairs] Political Section, reported, two more died there from their wounds.

Unfortunately, the report of a brawl from one of the local residents to the duty officer of the internal affairs administration arrived too late. It is strange: Residents of nearby multistory homes "did not see anything...." And really patrol service workers could have prevented the bloody outcome if the alarm signal had arrived earlier. Alas, they found one body at the scene along with the steel fittings and sticks that the fight's participants had dropped. Now only the evidence of the juveniles' course to recovery can help to reconstruct a picture of the clash. An investigation will have to establish who the instigator was and how many people participated on each side.

We hope that we will be able to find the guilty and that they will receive just punishment. But this is what bothers me: Recently, incidents between hostile groups have been occurring more and more frequently. Having divided the city into areas of influence, young people constantly "clarify relations" using far from peaceful

means. A newcomer who violates the border of any of the zones is cruelly punished. This is why massive fights frequently occur on evenings of dances, in parks, at discotheques, and in houses of culture and clubs. Lately, these activities as a rule are taking place under militia "escort."

And it looks like the participants in the youthful brawls do not worry anyone besides the militia employees. The Komsomol is living with entirely different concerns right now. Komsomol committee secretaries of all ranks—from oblast to leading organizations—are doing hardly anything at all to improve educational work among the younger generation. We can only be surprised by the striking indifference that many parents manifest by allowing their children to be outside of their homes late at night. They close their eyes to the fact that their children are starting to smoke and use alcohol. And it is precisely alcohol that drives juveniles toward violating the law...

Young boys need the friendly participation of their elders just like they need air. Just who will extend the hand of assistance to them?

Afanasyev, Sakharov, Others Defend Journal Oktyabr

90UN0062A Moscow KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 38, 22 Sep 89 p 4

[Article by Yuriy Afanasyev, Andrey Sakharov, and others: "A Very Simple Proposal: In Alliance with the Publisher, Not Under the Heel of a Department"]

[Text] In May the magazine "Nash Sovremennik" (Our Contemporary) (No 5, 1989, A. Kazintsev, "The New Mythology") threatened the magazine "Oktyabr" (October) that if it published A. Sinyavskiy's "Strolls with Pushkin" and V. Grossman's "Ever Flowing," then "people would turn up who would exercise" their right to sue "Oktyabr" for defaming the national honor.

"Nash Sovremennik," whose editorial profile, as is well known, diverges fundamentally from those of "Oktyabr," has exchanged the language of literary polemics for that of ideological denunciation and demagoguery: "Can a Russian magazine consider Russophobic propaganda the high road?" This is anything but a question; it is an indictment.

"People from nowhere"—cosmopolitans—are "already returning"! "Nash Sovremennik" gasps with rage from one issue to the next in its reports about this.

This magazine points at A. Sinyavskiy, whom it detests, using noteworthy devices: "Terts [Sinyavskiy] enumerates the best features of the Russian, of our entire people. He rightly finds them in Pushkin. And that is why he hates him. And not only he." If only A. Sinyavskiy's trial could be repeated now! Now the finger pointer from "Nash Sovremennik" could rake the Russian writer over for "Russophobia," using the very same methods of proof. And he could demand punishment for Sinyavskiy as a "belated accomplice of Pushkin's murderers"! He could even seek corresponding sanctions against the editors of "Oktyabr."

No less insulting to the patriotic feelings of "Nash Sovremennik" is Iosif Brodskiy. "Here, then, you have a word of abuse for all of Russia. Today's and yesterday's. Russia as such." This was written in response to Brodskiy's lines: "there the single mother takes her daughter out on the square," "there in the church the image is blackened from the candle of wax," "there the fashion's gray—the color of time and logs." This seems a good deal milder than what Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol, Nekrasov, Korolenko, Gor'kiy, Bunin, or Prishvin, with their "odd" love for their native land allowed themselves. However, the verdict on Brodskiy is merciless: "The candles in front of the icon, the single mother with her daughter on the square, the Russian landscape, and Russian deaths and births are all negative images," and in addition, all of it is "executed with a wistful hatred beyond anything you ever encounter in people"! In general, Nobel Prize winner Brodskiy is a terrible person. "Nash Sovremennik" would be happy to try him a second time—for hating "our land and our very selves."

The deputy editor-in-chief of "Nash Sovremennik" addresses the entire nation, no more, no less, calling on them to fight just this kind of Russophobia, the delirium of which has overcome him: "I shall repeat the words to the people with which I concluded my last article in 'Nash Sovremennik': 'You are the strength. Understand this, at last.'" This appeal to "strength" is unambiguous and extremely dangerous. It is not intended, of course, for "the entire nation," but only for a mob inflamed by base nationalistic instincts and passions, a mob which in its very essence is anti-popular, inasmuch as it pertains to those very dark strata of society whose strength in concrete action engenders the cruellest forms of violence and serves as a weapon for sanguinary hatred, destruction, and ruin. The world has already known similar appeals to "strength" in the twentieth century. Put into practice, they all ended in catastrophe.

The campaign has been unfolding deliberately, step by step. Following the article with the threats against "Oktyabr" for publishing the "Russophobes," Grossman and Sinyavskiy, in issue no. 6 of "Nash Sovremennik," there appears a treatise by I. Shafarevich, "Russophobia," an essay that affirms the concept of the inevitable demise of the "Big People" at the hands of the "Little People," who have taken hold among the Big People as an anti-people, savagely hating and definitively destroying all of life's religious and national foundations: "the milieu has been transformed into a dead wasteland, and with it man is perishing as well. More concretely, man is losing interest in labor; life has become a senseless burden; young people look for outlets in irrational acts of violence; men are becoming alcoholics or drug addicts; women are ceasing to bear children; the people are dying out. . . . Such is the end to which the 'Little People' have been pushing us, incessantly working to destroy everything that keeps the 'Big People' alive. Therefore the creation of weaponry of spiritual defense against it is an issue of national self-preservation. Such a task is within the powers of the entire nation alone."

But who is this "Little People," overcome with "anti-Russian emotions," militant Russophobia, in holy war against which Shafarevich is calling up his host? Shafarevich answers this question directly. The Little People are the Jews, the Russian intelligentsia of Jewish nationality or with an admixture of Jewish blood, as well as the intelligentsia of any nationality who have joined "a certain very specific circle of a circumscribed sector of society highly reminiscent of the 'Little People.'" It turns out that the authority of artists and thinkers belonging to this people, as well as of Russians who disdain anti-Semitism and anti-Semites, is founded "exclusively on the power of hypnosis." But Shafarevich is not susceptible to this hypnosis. Therefore he is certain that "the understanding of our descendants will be safe from the influence of Freud as a scholar, from the glory of the composer Schoenberg, from the artist Picasso, the writer Kafka, and the poet Brodskiy. . . ."

There is nothing surprising in the fact that soon after this publication I. Shafarevich along with M. Antonov and V.

Klykov wrote an angry letter to the secretariat of the administration of the Union of Writers (UW) of the RSFSR demanding that they "immediately call upon the magazine 'Oktyabr' to respond: for the fact that it 'treats the reader to one more Russophobic work with Vasilii Grossman's story 'Ever Flowing'; for the fact that specifically in 'Oktyabr' excerpts from A. Sinyavskiy's 'Strolls with Pushkin' have been published; for the fact that G. Vodolazov's essay 'Lenin and Stalin,' anticipating the Grossman publication, 'emphasizes the conscious intent of the magazine to publish such works.'"

Thus "Nash Sovremennik's" May threats that "people will turn up who will take advantage . . ." are coming to pass. As we see, people have "turned up," and the "judicial instance" has also been determined and has already expressed its willingness to hear the case. So on 31 July of this year, the secretariat of the UW RSFSR considered the letter of three authors, ordered that it be immediately published in "Literaturnaya Rossiya" (Literary Russia) (it was published three days later, on 4 August), and also "they discuss the work of the 'Oktyabr' editors at a special session of the secretariat of the UW RSFSR administration on 5 October."

Since the 1930s, and even earlier, our country has been all too familiar with the intonation, the line of thought, and the "organizational conclusions" of this letter's authors: "every magazine, every printed edition, is an organ of one or another social organization and, consequently, expresses the views of the given organization. What are the views of the Russian Writers Union if we are to judge by its recent principal publications, such as the magazine 'Oktyabr,' the organ of the republic's Writers Union? . . . Thus, we have it that a Russian journal is a ringleader in demonstrating the decline of the Russian people and Russian geniuses. What is this? The position of the editor-in-chief A. Ananyev or of the secretariat of the Russian Writers Union administration? . . . But still, the entire secretariat of the UW RSFSR administration bears responsibility for the policy of 'Oktyabr.'"

Fortunately, it doesn't at all. On the contrary, the views and policy of the RSFSR Union of Writers secretariat and its administration coincide wholly with those of "Nash Sovremennik," where Shafarevich has seen the light of "Russophobia," where in issue after issue, in the guise of the struggle for national dignity, the image of the internal non-Russian-enemy, cultural values are spat upon, and one nation is poisoned against another.

It has been no secret to anyone for a long time that command-order methods and group intolerance have flourished in the UW RSFSR leadership, that personal interests have been passed off for common national, popular, and party interests, that the organs of the press have forceably been transformed into mouthpieces for Black Hundred "ideas," into sources of personal gratification. Quite recently the editor-in-chief of "Literaturnaya Rossiya," who had protested these practices, was "discussed" and fired. This is how consolidation is

understood in those ranks who have been disturbed by the "Russophobia" of A. Ananyev and "Oktyabr" but who have expressed to the editor-in-chief of "Nash Sovremennik" the gratitude felt in the secretariat of the UW RSFSR "for his conscientious work."

The UW RSFSR secretariat and its organ, "Nash Sovremennik," want a monopoly on Russian patriotism. It has apparently never occurred to them that the bitter truth of Pushkin, Lermontov, Nekrasov—any Russian writer on Russia—is not Russophobia, not a slander on our national dignity. Only a genuine Russophobe, for whom Russian history is merely a card in the career game, is capable of pushing the Russian people to total hatred for any of the smaller nations, calling from the pages of the press for closed ranks in the struggle against this anti-Russian affair. On the threshold of the elections to the local Soviets, when the people are being given, finally, an opportunity to wield their creative, constructive will, they are being doggedly led away down the fatal path of battle with the next internal enemy, whose image has been concocted by the monopolists of patriotism, who are protecting all sorts of interests, but certainly not the people's.

The "group of comrades" from the UW RSFSR administration have appropriated the authority of a supreme court in order to try and sentence "Oktyabr," having accused it of "Russophobia" in the name of all the writers of Russia. This is the first instance since perestroika's inception of a large-scale ideological "critique" in the spirit of the times of terror and following the old pattern.

In the light of all this it is perfectly clear what awaits the editors of "Oktyabr," in what spirit its discussion in the UW RSFSR administration will take place, and what decision will be reached. It is time to take Ananyev and the magazine in hand and turn it into a "Nash Sovremennik" yes-man.

But the main question is this: What are we, the authors, readers, and admirers of the present "Oktyabr," to do? Merely by publishing the two works of V. Grossman, that magazine did immeasurably more for the understanding of Russian history, of the bitter truth of the peasantry, the fount of the people's spiritual strength, than the members of all the expanded secretariats of the UW RSFSR administration put together.

We have a concrete, practical, very simple proposal. In our view, this would be the most peaceable resolution, the most natural way out of this conflict situation.

We feel that the editor-in-chief, the editorial board, and writers of "Oktyabr" must themselves spare the secretariat of the UW RSFSR administration any imagined responsibility for all present and all future publications of the magazine. All this would take would be to remove from the cover the notice that "Oktyabr" is an "organ of the UW RSFSR. In this way the magazine will come out from under its nominal subordination to all the

expanded and unexpanded secretariats of that organization, which are in no condition to treat soberly the objective processes now taking place in literature and in society, nor are they in any condition to "rehash" without threats or tribunals the publications of Grossman, Sinyavskiy, to say nothing of works not yet published but already announced in "Oktyabr."

"Oktyabr" is principally attached to Russian literature, to the Russian and broad multinational reader, and not to any writers ministry, its secretariats or plenums. The works of Grossman, like any other literary work, belong to the history of our native land's culture, not to any office—even if that office were not so aggressive but perfectly tolerant, even if that office understood completely that the editors' views do not necessarily coincide with all the views of the authors whose works represent artistic value, and that no single administrative level has any basis for usurping this right, usual for all civilized societies, from the editors.

"Oktyabr" is in no way obligated for its success with the reading public, or for its weaknesses, or even for its very arising, to any ruling elite of the Union of Writers of the RSFSR. The sum total of the practical participation of this organization's secretariat in the magazine's work has consisted of nothing but hindering, pressuring, and irritating editors and writers alike. In fact, "Oktyabr" is not an organ of the UW RSFSR secretariat, and the time has come to put an end to this mess. "Nash Sovremennik"—there is an organ that expresses the views and carries out the policy of that organization's leadership.

Fine then, the readers ask: but if the magazine is published by the UW RSFSR, that means that it is the republic's Writers Union that gives it funds, housing, a printing operation, paper, and so on, right? No. The magazine exists independently, brings in a decent profit, and its partner in all technical and financial questions is Pravda Publishers. The magazine is, as is our custom, an organ of a superior office to which it is assigned for purposes of ideological thrashing. This is an absolutely barbaric, distorted situation left over from Stalinist times. Many people, accustomed to it, attach no importance to it.

But seeing as they so blatantly wish to destroy a fine magazine that has done so much for Russian culture, to gather it up and turn it into a second "Nash Sovremennik," we advise, demand, finally, that "Oktyabr's" editors commit a sane, decisive act: become a free literary-artistic and sociopolitical magazine and not be dependent upon a group of leaders in the UW secretariat. "Oktyabr" is one of the oldest magazines in the country, having first appeared before the UW RSFSR. It was assigned to them later, unlike "Nash Sovremennik," which actually was created to meet the needs of the newly arisen UW RSFSR and became the organ of its secretariat. Judging from the letter of "the three," "Oktyabr" has long since lost any creative or intellectual tie with the UW RSFSR secretariat, which requires all

Russian writers and all Russian magazines to convert to the faith of "Nash Sovremennik."

A very simple proposal. Stop counting it an organ of a department and discuss its work not there but with its own authors and readers, because it is an organ of our exclusively Russian and multinationality native literature. The editorial board, editors, and writers can become a juridical person—the autonomous creative association "Oktyabr" assigned to a publishing house. The example will be encouraging to others as well, in the spirit of genuinely Russian patriotism. After all, Russian people will be thrilled to find out that in Russia a normal, independent literary and sociopolitical magazine attached to the people, to literature, has appeared. It is time to put an end to our slavish tradition, when a magazine or newspaper is in fact dependent not on these or other organizations but on a handful of officials (albeit literary) who are keeping house in these organizations to their own personal advantage. After all "Ogonek" (alone!) is not listed under any office, economically speaking is connected only with its printing house, and creatively—only with the reader. And it does fine—it gets on.

If A. Ananyev, his colleagues, and his co-workers were to make such a decision, then that in and of itself would be a gratifying event in the history both of society and of the Russian language. Deeds are needed now, deeds and not all the interminable abuse, retorts, and thoroughly intolerable squabbling.

We await the deed of the entire "Oktyabr" collective. And we shall help them in every way to stand firm. And we are confident of the support of our country's readers, its subscribers.

Yurii Ananasyev, people's deputy of the USSR; Leonid Batkin; Yuriy Burtin; Boris Vasilyev, people's deputy of the USSR; Igor Vinogradov; Mikhail Vol'kenshteyn, corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences (AS) of the USSR; Nikolai Vorontsov, people's deputy of the USSR; Aleksandr Gel'man, people's deputy of the USSR; Lidiya Ginzburg; I. Grekova; Nikolay Gubenko; Alla Demidova; Ion Drutse, people's deputy of the USSR; Oleg Efremov, people's deputy of the USSR; Mark Zakharov, people's deputy of the USSR; Vyacheslav Ivanov, people's deputy of the USSR; Vyacheslav Kondratyev; Dmitriy Likhachev, people's deputy of the USSR, academician of the AS USSR; Arkadiy Migdal, academician of the AS USSR; Ionna Morits; Viktor Rozov; Roal'd Sagdeev, people's deputy of the USSR, academician of the AS USSR; Afanasiy Salynskiy; Dmitriy Sarab'yanov, corresponding member of the AS USSR; Andrey Sakharov, people's deputy of the USSR, academician of the AS USSR; Anatoliy Strelyanny; Les' Tanyuk; Vladimir Tikhonov, people's deputy of the USSR, academician of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences; Zoya Tomashevskaya; Leonid Filatov, Al'fred Shnitke.

Conservative, Liberal Journal Editors Defend Policies**Stanislav Kunyayev, NASH SOVREMENNİK
editor in chief***90UN0136A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Oct 89
Second Edition p 3*

[Interview with Stanislav Kunyayev, editor in chief of NASH SOVREMENNİK, by V. Sinenko: "For the Word, the Weighty Word!"]

[Text] On 3 September PRAVDA published, under the rubric "The Journalist and the Times," discussions entitled "I Am For the Reader" and "Following Truth," with the editors in chief of OGONEK and MOLODAYA GVARDIYA magazines. The interviews evoked a large amount of reader interest. "These polemics, these comparisons of points of view, are very beneficial. The reader can compare and make conclusions for himself," is the opinion, for example, of Muscovite A. Dzadziyev. "I thank you for comparing the views of V. Korotich and A. Ivanov. This is interesting both in form and in content," V. Shiyan writes from Leningrad. The author of the letter did not limit himself to evaluating the article. He proposes his own new sharp questions "for subsequent discussions." We received responses from K. Petrosov, A. Musalo, V. Raskin, D. Novokshchenov, V. Yudin, S. Fedorenko, V. Siyakov, L. Kisilev, Kh. Shapiro, I. Russu, and many others. The readers argue and support or, conversely, reject the position taken by OGONEK and MOLODAYA GVARDIYA, and they request continuing the publication of the items under the rubric "The Journalist and the Times," and developing the form that was found by the newspaper for reflecting the pluralism of opinions and views.

Today we give the floor to the editors in chief of the journals NASH SOVREMENNİK and DRUZHBA NARODOV.

[V. Sinenko] Stanislav Yuryevich, quite recently you headed NASH SOVREMENNİK. From newspaper interviews it is obvious that you wanted to guarantee the succession of directions and traditions in the magazine. But you will agree that there still is very little of this. What innovation will the new editor in chief bring? In the "old" portfolio, are there any manuscripts that you would have rejected?

[S. Kunyayev] At the present time, when questions that determine the fate of social, state, and national existence are being resolved, I would want particularly to note that flippancy, idle talk, and narrowly shop arguments are the yesterday of our literary life. They are burning out from the unprecedentedly high temperature in which we live. Therefore NASH SOVREMENNİK cannot allow itself the luxury of printing entertaining belles lettres, mediocre poetry, or social and political items that pertain to minor problems. As I see it, the times are becoming brittle, and are breaking up within our sight. That which today is of vital importance becomes obsolete tomorrow.

But we want our published items to exert a noticeable and long-term influence upon public life and want them to look into the future.

[Sinenko] In certain letters from readers, one hears critical comments to the effect that your magazine stands on extremely rightist positions and defends the interests of the conservative part of society.

[Kunyayev] Of course it is more advantageous to be listed among those who are "gung ho" about perestroika, among the ultrarevolutionaries, than among the conservatives. But let's not forget that the word that was fashionable three years ago—"acceleration"—has shamefully disappeared from our vocabulary. Couldn't it be because, without enlightened conservatism, society will resemble an automobile without any brakes? Enlightened conservatism is an inseparable and necessary part of all democracies. This is a political axiom which, for some reason, radicals cannot understand.

What is conservatism? In literal translation, it is defense, protection. If one applies the term "conservatism" to the protection of Lake Baykal and our northern rivers, to the saving of historical monuments, and to the preservation of the spiritual, eternal traditions of the Russian classic authors and the moral traditions of the nation, then we shall remain "conservatives" and be proud of it.

Incidentally, in real life everything is more complicated than in speculative schemes. Tell me to what camp should we assign a former frontliner who sees and evaluates the war differently than the fervent researchers of Stalinism who never smelled gunpowder? Mightn't it be desirable for us to listen calmly to what he has to say, without including him, on the run, among the conservatives, or, in other words, the opponents of progress and reforms? Recently, a certain book jacket contained the photograph of an officer who was a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, and stamped across his face were the words "Stalin With Them!" We all have this stern score to settle with Stalinism. But isn't it shameful to mock the fate of the frontline generation, which was perhaps the best in Soviet history?

And are we really supposed to give the label "enemies of everything that is new and advanced" to those persons who are not too voluble or adroit at meetings and rallies, but who give their heart and soul to their job—the worker, the peasant, the engineer who, for some reason, do not want to speak too loudly in lavishing praise on our home-grown entrepreneurs and cooperative members who have engaged not in the production of output, but in open speculation? A search is under way in our country—a search for the most reliable and most stable paths for further development. And I would want our magazine to be evaluated not from the point of view of "leftism," "rightism," or "curvism," but from the positions of common sense. Division into "leftists" and "rightists" is largely artificial. Are we really supposed to ignore the fact that, for example, today certain persons who yesterday were radicals have suddenly become

infatuated about the iron fist, authoritarian power, and a president with extraordinary powers. Ultrarevolutionarism is always aggressive, contradictory, and hysterical in evaluating those who do not want to close their eyes and run after a phrase.

We are well aware that our present-day citizen has completely changed during the past four years. He demands an answer both from himself and from us as to what the state will be tomorrow—a single, powerful, and healthy organism, or one that is dismembered into economic and even political regions that are united only by a common name, flag, and articles of the Constitution. He wants to know what role in our future state system will be played by Russia, because he still has a live memory about the fact that Russia always was, in the state, the unifying and supporting force for all nations. Our contemporary demands a life that is spiritually much more saturated and richer, a life that is linked, among things, with the rebirth of religious values—moral and cultural. He demands the reconsideration of our history—first of all the history of the Soviet period—and wants us to interpret and eradicate the cancers of the destructive ideology of the civil war, terror, and economic and political extremism, and to begin to rely more firmly on the forgotten or half-forgotten traditions of humanitarianism and the spirit of belonging to mankind as a whole, in their national hypostasis.

In order to satisfy these powerful and live demands, we open up new rubrics in our magazine, particularly ones like "Not By Bread Alone," "Patriotic Archives," and others. We expand the circle of authors, relying, naturally, upon the magazine's constant friends and world-famous writers and commentators—Rasputin, Belov, Astafyev, Bondarev, Shafarevich, Kozhinov, Soloukhin, Pikul, Ivan Vasilyev, and others. Next year we shall begin printing Solzhenitsyn's novel "October 1916."

[Sinenko] You have listed truly brilliant names. But aren't you contradicting yourself? On the one hand, the attempt to encompass a broad, largely disparate area of social problems, and, on the other hand, the magazine's customary and traditional choosing of authors with what might be called a "Pochvennik" [1860's Slavophile political group] trend.

[Kunyayev] That trend is still called a Russophile one, that is, one that is nourished by a love of Russia. But can one really be reproached for having love, especially if it rests upon a profound knowledge of life, upon high culture, and upon talent in the final analysis? Although, on the other hand, to a definite degree you are right when you say that, until recently, we have ignored the writers who are arbitrarily called the "fortiers," who, without a doubt, can enrich our magazine by their vision and their understanding of life. I regret the fact that V. Makanin, A. Kim, M. Vorfolomeyev, and V. Luchutin were not printed in NASH SOVREMENNİK. Incidentally, I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to invite them into the magazine.

[Sinenko] In your opinion, who is the present-day writer or poet whose works express most completely that Russian national self-consciousness that is mentioned so often on the pages of NASH SOVREMENNİK?

[Kunyayev] I feel that the persons who express the most universal and the broadest point of view concerning Russian national life today are those same writers—Viktor Astafyev, Vasiliy Belov, and Valentin Rasputin. Let us take at least a cursory look at the works they have created. The dispossession of the kulaks and collectivization, the interpretation of the fates of the nation and our beloved land from the philosophical, historical, moral, and universally human point of view. The turbulent soul, acute problems, and contradiction of the present-day individual and of society, the struggle against the threat of an ecological catastrophe...

And among the poets, I always admire Yuriy Kuznetsov for the fearlessness of his words, his emotions, and his thoughts.

[Sinenko] The readers also ask this question that is directed personally at you, Stanislav Yuryevich. Do you feel that you are organically linked with the generation of so-called "sixtiers"—their ideals and strivings? Because you entered literature during the period of the "thaw," together with Ye. Yevtushenko, A. Voznesenskiy, R. Rozhdestvenskiy...

[Kunyayev] Yes, I began as a "sixtier," and I expressed the entire set of ideas that arose during the era of the "thaw." But the natural development of events led to a situation in which, in the mid-1960's, there arose currents of, to use an arbitrary term, "quiet lyricism" and "wooden prose" (Nikolay Rubtsov, Vasiliy Belov, Anatoliy Peredreyev, Vladimir Sokolov, Valentin Rasputin), and I came to the realization that the ideas of the "thaw" and the literature that had been engendered by it were, to a certain degree, superficial, and I began to consider myself a "child of the 20th Congress," perhaps necessarily, but too little. Gradually I began to sense a responsibility for Russian history as a whole, rather than only for that history that began with the year 1956. And that is what determined my further literary path both in poetry and in commenting on political and social topics.

[Sinenko] The historical topic is constantly present on the pages of NASH SOVREMENNİK. The actions of many historical individuals in the Soviet era are subjected to critical reconsideration. Individual readers, noticing this critical directedness, accuse the magazine of making a tendentious choice of names, with a bias toward persons belonging to certain national, chiefly Jewish, groups.

[Kunyayev] Before considering the editorial balance among the names, it is necessary first of all to say that, in our country's history, the chief disaster was caused by the ideology of totalitarianism. All the leading ideologists and practioners of socialist construction after Lenin were people with a totalitarian frame of mind. Against that background, the question of the national or social

group to which they belonged is secondary, although, without a doubt, it does have significance. Take, for example, the fact that in a country where 80 percent of the population were peasants, not a single one of the representatives of the ruling group, with the possible exception of M.I. Kalinin, had emerged from that segment of the population. As far as national correlations in the power pyramid are concerned, the blame here should be placed not upon the magazine, but upon history. It would seem that the readers should not be offended when the actions of various figures in the past are subjected to sharp or unexpected re-evaluation. Their names and their presence in history are an objective reality. And the crux of the matter is not in the selection of names, but in the fact that the responsibility for what has occurred must be shared by all those who were guilty of the nation's tragedy, irrespective of the taste, predilections, or desires of the historians or commentators.

[Sinenko] Certain readers, as well as agencies of the press, accuse NASH SOVREMENNİK of being antisemitic. When you were still acting in the role of an active author in the magazine, you repeatedly and sharply protested this. I would like to hear what you consider to be the role that literary and artistic figures of Jewish origin in the development of Russian Soviet culture.

[Kunyayev] Yes, people say all kinds of things. At a recent CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the accusation of antisemitism was heard emerging even from the mouth of the secretary of the CPSU Obkom from the Jewish Autonomous Oblast. But I think that he was either poorly informed, or well disinformed. Indiscriminate insults and the putting of labels on people are not the best argument when evaluating a magazine, much less from such a high rostrum. We sent Comrade Korsunskiy a telegram refuting that senseless accusation. But let's return to the subject. In general, you will notice that, in addition to the term "antisemitism," a term that has arisen in recent times is "Russophobia." In the history of Russia there have been a rather large number of people of Jewish origin who made a tremendous contribution to the development of our common culture. Without exaggeration, a real exploit, in my opinion, was performed by Gilferding, the collector of Russian folk poems; readers show the most profound respect and recognition for the works of Levitan, Antokolskiy, Pasternak, Mandelshtam, Gershenzon... What distinguished them? Love of Russian culture and of Russian history, and the complete lack of any Russophobia.

I think that none of them would accept the idea expressed by Vasily Grossman, to the effect that Russia always rejected the freedoms coming from the West, including that freedom that was "carried by the boots of Bonaparte's soldiers." Is it really possible to censure our nation for that? Russia is working out its freedom, in its own manner and in accordance with its own ideals. Natural giftedness, talent, and intelligence have always engendered the best representatives of the Russian and

Jewish nations. Misfortune and sufferings borne in common united, more strongly than any words or assurances, the Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Jews during the war years on the territories that had been occupied by the fascists. Ordinary people, in their interrelations in the most varied situations, provided—frequently at the cost of their own lives—monumental models of humanitarianism, brotherhood, and internationalism. History has preserved a large number of such examples. How many Jewish children were saved during the war years by Belorussians on the land which today certain cultural figures are branding as a Soviet anti-prestroyka Vendee!

[Sinenko] Stanislav Yuryevich, your magazine is constantly in confrontation with ZNAMYA, OGONEK, OKTYABR, and DRUZHBA NARODOV magazines. Our readers remark that, in the heat of polemics, NASH SOVREMENNİK is at times betrayed by any sense of moderation.

[Kunyayev] Let's admit that our contradictions are not the capricious action of a particular political leader, but the struggle between political philosophies: national and denationalized, popular and caste, traditional and experimentalist.

But to a large extent your readers are probably right. Each of the confrontational sides attempts to use the errors made by the opposing side and frequently—and I agree about this—gets too vehement. For example, something that is perpetually getting blown out of proportions is the so-called "letter of the eleven," that allegedly persecuted Tvardovskiy. In response to this, the story is immoderately inflated with the careless publication of a provocative anonymous letter in ZNAMYA, etc. I think that we ought to act jointly to reject this practice. No power, no appeals from above, will be able to unite us until we ourselves arrive at the common understanding that our Motherland, culture, life, the future of our children, and even our misfortunes are shared in common.

[Sinenko] And now could you please answer a question that Sergey Baruzdin, editor in chief of DRUZHBA NARODOV, suggested that we ask you. "The Russian Federation that NASH SOVREMENNİK represents is a multinational republic. Therefore a rather large number of political, economic, social, and cultural problems pertaining to the sphere of interethnic relations have accumulated here. Where do you see a way out of the rather painful situation that has been created?"

[Kunyayev] Russia needs its own well-developed, flexible, creative state system. It needs a party that fights for the interests of all the nations in the republic. Russians and the other nations of RSFSR must become the completely equal and free masters in their tremendous and very neglected home. The situation is dramatic, but the Russian peasant has a saying, "If you mow with your tongue, your back won't get tired." We shall remember that saying and shall do our job. With hope in our hearts!

**Sergey Baruzdin, DRUZHBA NARODOV editor
in chief**

*90UN0136B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Oct 89
Second Edition p 3*

[Interview with Sergey Baruzdin, editor in chief of DRUZHBA NARODOV: "Respecting One's Opponent"]

[Text] [V. Sinenko] Sergey Alekseyevich, DRUZHBA NARODOV is a well-developed magazine with a time-tested course and well-established traditions. But our times are extremely changeable. Complicated and sometimes unpredictable processes occur in interethnic relations. How is the face of your magazine changing?

[S. Baruzdin] It seems to me that the face of our magazine began changing as long ago as the years that we now call the years of stagnation. For that we got quite a bit "from the top." During that period a rather large number of books appeared and there were publications that, to a particular degree, prepared the current perestroika. A public council on interethnic relations was created at the magazine, and with its aid we attempt to analyze exactly what these "complicated and unpredictable processes" are.

Not only the magazine's items on social and political matters, but also its prose, joined in the job of interpreting what is occurring. A large amount of reader mail, for example, was evoked by Semen Lipkin's novel "Dekada" [Ten-Day Festival], which deals, in a generalized form, with the fates of the nations that were chased off their historic places of residence. At all levels today one comes up against the new and the old way of thinking. For example, in Russian literature the "unexplored areas" of its history are being actively studied and filled in. In certain other republics this process has been slowed down, and by habit the people there are still waiting for instructions from Moscow about who should be printed or translated, and who shouldn't be. We have no intention here of being behind the times. The CPSU platform on the national question has become the compass by which everyone checks his course. But, while providing the general direction, this document does not (and cannot) take into account all the specific painful situations, which moreover are becoming aggravated with every passing day. In addition, in my opinion, there has been an inability to resolve the question of autonomies. For the time being, there have been few specific shifts in the situation of the Crimean Tatars, the Volga Germans, etc. The magazine will continue in the future to be involved in such problems.

[Sinenko] For many years we were lulled with the inviolable friendship of nations. Nowadays what is said and written is directly opposite. By their singlemindedness and their retilinearity, aren't the mass media encouraging negative manifestations in a number of areas in the country? In this regard, our readers are also interested in your attitude toward the so-called independent publications. In Lithuania alone, for example, there are about 90 of them.

[Baruzdin] Recently I have frequently been asking myself: why, during the 1930's and 1940's, with all their complexity, were there considerably fewer manifestations of national enmity than now? People took a more tolerant, more respectful attitude toward one another. The war confirms this idea. In the army there were no frictions or contradictions on the basis of nationality, although the fascists hoped that there would be. Suddenly today, when we are fighting for humanitarianism and universal human values, nationalism and extremism are raising their head and neighbor is telling neighbor, "Clear out! This is my land..."

In our time chauvinistic, nationalistic associations like Pamyat have been born and have even found for themselves allies among certain publications. While talking much about patriotism and national self-awareness—which, in general, are holy concepts—they construct their policy and actions on hatred, insults, and the nonacceptance of other nations.

For some reason we smear black paint very thickly over the prewar years, including in the press. And yet at that time there was quite a lot that was instructive. Every nation painstakingly preserved its language, traditions, and culture. I recall the ten-day festivals of national cultures in Moscow. A large number of them were held, with much pomp and ceremony. Yes, they praised Stalin—because that was the tradition then—but they also praised their own people, their own nation, they genuinely displayed their feelings, achievements, and talents. Most importantly, there was no straining or fakery about any of this.

With the passage of years—and, in fact, up until the most recent times—the national attributes of the nations have been lost, and together with them the cultivating of interethnic relations, tact, and the respect for one another. The Soviet authority abolished the insulting label—"non-Russian" [inorodets], but today it has been resuscitated and in certain places is being hung on absolutely everyone. The image of the enemy is being created. People, entangled in their own squabbles, are looking for the culprits among other nations, forgetting or not even wanting to look into the mirror. Was it just on a local basis that the national cadres, in the attempt as rapidly as possible to melt into the single Soviet nation, quite recently rejected national schools and hastened to forget their native language, traditions, customs, and history? Why, incidentally, is an Abulkasim Lakhuta night in Dushanbe being held, even now, in Russian? Who is to blame for this? The Russians? Moscow?

But this is the conclusion you come to when you deal with the remote prewar years: the deeper the people's national tradition and the higher the nations' dignity and self-awareness, the stronger the internationalism. Leveling is destructive. As is, incidentally, the division of nations into older and younger brothers.

The press is a very delicate and strong instrument. An awkward word can actually cause a fire. But in the

appearance of independent newspapers, as of informal associations, the factor that dominates is an unbridled and sometimes not very intelligent elemental force with all the negative consequences, which complicate even more the relations in the republics and regions.

[Sinenko] Certain readers remark that the literatures of the various republics are represented unequally in DRUZHBA NARODOV. The magazine has, so to speak, its "darlings," and conversely...

[Baruzdin] Yes, you're right: all the talented writers are among our "darlings." We rejected long ago the representative principle of selecting works for publication. Big Russia, five novels a year; small Estonia, one. It wouldn't be that way. That is insulting for nations and pernicious for literature. We also rejected the approach by which a completely equal amount of space is allocated to everyone. Five Russian, or Estonian, or Georgian, or any other works in a row—that also is possible. We attempt to select that which is more talented, most noteworthy, and we do so from the point of view of the nationwide reader, rather than the local literary managers.

[Sinenko] From the very first days of perestroyka, we have all looked carefully into our history. Recently there has been a re-evaluation of many apparently unshakable values and there has been a sharp change in the attitude taken to a number of historical personalities and to many events. In this regard the press and television have been exerting an active stimulating effect on public opinion. As a result, our readers ask the question: isn't this stentorian revision of the past—with the predominant demonstration of the negative—contributing to the birth of nihilism? Isn't this tearing apart the ties between the generations and aggravating the problem of fathers and sons?

[Baruzdin] The process of reinterpreting the past is a painful one that requires bravery and the constant awareness that, without it, society, as well as the individual himself, will not be able to move ahead. We published Anatoliy Rybakov's novel "Deti Arbata" [Children of the Arbat], which was met by the readers as a sensation. But the novel, for all its varied perception, when unmasking the personality cult, it seems to me, rather accurately conveyed the spirit of that time and objectively showed the era and people's attitudes. The fate of Sasha Pankratov with all its tragic nature is not a martyr's fate. However paradoxical it may sound, he was even more fortunate than many of those who his same age today. He lived, fought, loved, and knew how to laugh and to delight in each new day. A person who has ideals, convictions, and, finally, decency, a person who, in the most difficult circumstances, knows how to preserve himself, cannot be miserable. But today, for the most part, literature and writing on political and social matters see in the past either evildoers or sufferers, and they destroy the true atmosphere in which we lived.

This causes a large amount of harm, especially for the understanding of the world by young people who are still

in the formative stage. A repellent or prettified image of the past cannot be the foundation for the future. Our generation believed in ideals. And those ideals are no myth. In this true basis they carry philosophical, humanistic, universal human values that took centuries to develop. And when I see the way in which we have now stopped restoring our morality and are resting practically on a religious basis only, I begin to feel very uneasy. Once again we are tearing ourselves away from our beloved land, we are attempting to search for that which is genuine everywhere else but on the land where we live and stand. With my own eyes I saw, and I remember well, the blowing up of the cathedral of Christ the Saviour. Aren't we attempting to start up the same kind of destructive mechanism, but in the opposite direction?

Nor am I pleased to see that our literature, our motion pictures, painting, and theater are slowly but surely being converted into commercial enterprises. But we cannot reduce spiritual life as a whole to "international girls" and feel that, by doing so, we are bringing up a healthy, highly moral, harmoniously developed generation.

[Sinenko] You have touched upon A. Rybakov's novel "Deti Arbata." Certain readers do not agree with the author's treatment of the image of Stalin. They object to the author's "violating" of his thoughts and feelings, which "no one could know except himself." By resorting to conjecture and embellishing the images of historical figures both in literature and in writing on political and social issues, do we not give rise to new myths that are remote from historical truth? What is the attitude that you yourself take to the Stalin's personality?

[Baruzdin] Much has already been written about A. Rybakov's novel. "Deti Arbata" is not a documentary book, but an artistic work. Any historical personage can be viewed differently in a scientist's research work and an author's perception. When I read the manuscript of the novel as it was being prepared for publication in the magazine, I did not feel any desire to ask the author for a signed and sealed certificate authorizing him to recreate those inner monologues of Stalin's. The author posed and resolved artistic tasks, and proceeded from the logic of the events being described and the nature of his personage. At the same time I cannot get rid of the sense of irritation when I read in newspapers and magazines learned discussions concerning the topic of whether or not Stalin was paranoid, or reminiscences in which Stalin is alleged to have stated publicly approximately the following phrase: "I do not believe anyone. I do not even believe myself."

My generation had a holy faith in the revolution, in its final goal. And whatever deviations occurred, that faith remained. As far as Stalin is concerned, in the eyes of the nation he was the personification of an idea. He was, if you will, the banner. Naturally, I did not imagine him in another quality. Even after the 20th Congress, after becoming acquainted with Khrushchev's report, I adamantly opposed all disappointments. The report was not convincing for me, because practically every thesis

evoked a question in me. For example, "Well, then, where were you, Nikita Sergeyevich? You headed the Ukrainian party organization and the Moscow party organization. You were part of three-man teams that signed sentences. You were at that time a thriving person. And, finally, you were the chairman of the commission at Stalin's funeral and it was not without your participation that he was placed in the mausoleum." So I personally needed time to change my attitude toward Stalin, to look at him with different eyes. If this had happened earlier, it may be that I would not have committed certain acts that I regret today.

[Sinenko] Will the magazine print works that will treat in a new way—more deeply and more broadly—our recent past?

[Baruzdin] Yes. We shall develop the historical topic both in prose and in writings on political and social matters. I shall mention the names: A. Adamovich, O. Chiladze, S. Alekseyevich, G. Baklanov, G. Matevosyan, T. Pulatov, D. Granin, Ch. Guseynov, Ch. Amiradzhibi, S. Antonov, Yu. Davydov, S. Golitsyn, V. Kondratyev, and V. Kozko. We shall publish L. Likhodeyev's novel about N.I. Bukharin. Roy Medvedev is giving us his serious work "L.I. Brezhnev." We are continuing to publish A. Rybakov's novel "Tritsat pyatyy i drugiye gody" [1935 and Other Years].

We are attempting not to go to any extremes in evaluating the past and the present—from any immoderate extolling of them to the same kind of immoderate, single-minded annihilation, in the spirit of the times, of absolutely everyone, since we would then convert glasnost into semi-glasnost, and democracy into semi-democracy.

[Sinenko] We are all witnesses to the sharp polemics that have broken out among a number of publications. The boundaries of mutual hostility have been designated very sharply. Personal animosity is being created among editors in chief. What are the reasons for this? Hasn't pluralism given rise to squabbling?

[Baruzdin] You obviously have noticed that our magazine attempts to keep out of any squabbles. In literary circles

there have always been group scores, and currently they have come out onto the surface. Unfortunately, they are what frequently determine the nature of the polemics. The argument frequently deals not with the substance of the problems, but is more frequently on an ad-hominem basis. And, incidentally, people remark jokingly that most often it is not the outstanding authors themselves, but those representatives out on the literary fringes, who have existed at all times and not only in our literature, and who will continue to exist. It must be noted with deep regret that it seems that our time has come today. We have not developed the traditions of taking a respectful attitude toward our opponent. Our discussions more frequently develop into the exchanging of insults. During the period of stagnation, it was difficult for good books to force their way through. Currently the floodgates have been opened, and, on the crest of the wave of a group struggle, the beachhead is sometimes seized by books that are not always good, by weak motion pictures, and by opportunistic critics. The writers' organization must be reorganized with a consideration of these complexities, rather than being organized into a so-called "new wave" that is churning on the surface.

[Sinenko] Now I would like to direct to you a question that Stanislav Kunyayev, editor in chief of NASH SOVREMENNİK magazine, has asked you at our request: "Sergey Alekseyevich, for more than 20 years you have been at the helm of the magazine. The printing run that has increased during that time from a modest 36,000 copies to more than a million copies typifies more brilliantly than anything else the actions of its editor in chief. But life marches on. Whom would you want to see as your successor? What should he be like, in your opinion?"

[Baruzdin] If the time comes when I will have to hand over the magazine to someone else, the most important thing is that that person must not be infected with any group mentality. An editor must know how to unite, rather than disunite, writers. He must feel and understand the literature of other nations and various cultures, and on the pages of the magazine he must present them to the reader in the most models.

Armenian Historian Views NKAO Problem, CPSU Nationalities Policy

90US0122A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian

4 Oct 89 p 1

[Article by Professor Khikar Barsegyan, doctor of historical sciences, chairman of the Inter-Agency Council for the Study of Nationality Processes of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences Presidium: "A Platform Exists, the Problem Remains...(Reflections Following the CPSU Central Committee Plenum)"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee plenum has completed its work on the party's nationalities policy under current conditions. Great hopes rest with the platform which was approved. Of course, this very important document, which has permanent theoretical and practical significance, contains not only a definitive formulation of the most urgent problems but also proposals for ways to resolve them.

However, the platform was not unambiguously received. Let us note that while some of the country's peoples and nationalities were able to find in the document satisfactory answers to the questions which trouble them, the Armenian people, unfortunately, once again did not discover anything new in the approach to the NKAO (Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast) problem troubling them. What great hopes our people held out for nearly two years—our people who survived the terrible tragedy of the December earthquake and the forced mass evictions from Azerbaijan, our people who have been scattered throughout the country....

We lived with great hope; we looked into the future with optimism (and even now it still smoulders in our hearts); however since the September plenum the Armenian people have experienced many disappointments. And once again a new wave of dissatisfaction. As sad as it is to recognize, we received—instead of a solution to the problem and the removal of the NKAO blockade which has lasted for more than a year—"a present" from the leadership of the neighboring republic in the form of a blockade of the Armenian SSR, a phenomenon which has no precedent in the history of civilized states under peace-time conditions, and especially not in a socialist country. These thoughts of ours are confirmed once again by the recently-concluded session of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet, by the party activists, and by meetings and rallies of working people at the republic's enterprises.

The September session of the republic's Supreme Soviet adopted significant decisions with regard to the following: the worsening situation in the region and urgent measures to remove the blockade of the Armenian SSR and NKAO; measures to resolve the NKAO problem; and the problems of providing security for the Armenian population in the Azerbaijan SSR, NKAO and the border regions of the Armenian SSR, as well as for military personnel of Armenian nationality serving in the Soviet army.

The document notes correctly that "the blockade of the Armenian SSR and NKAO is incompatible with the Agreement Concerning the Formation of the USSR, with its existing Constitution, with the UN Charter, with the Final Act of the Helsinki Agreement and with other international agreements which the Soviet Union has signed.

The blockade has inflicted a significant blow primarily against the population of the regions which suffered from the earthquake.

The Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet judged the blockade to be an "act of war," a "deliberate political act for the purpose of hindering through the use of force the just resolution of the NKAO problem by democratic means."

The position of the republic's Supreme Soviet has been confirmed in the frequent statements and interviews given to the mass information media by the first secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee, S.G. Arutyunyan. His comments are characterized by a high degree of principle, inter-nationality spirit and anguish for the success of perestroika; they express the opinion not only of the republic's party leadership and of a USSR people's deputy but also of all communists in Armenia and of the Armenian people as a whole. One can state firmly that a consolidation of forces is taking place.

As is well known, the platform is a political program. Because the CPSU Program, which is not standing up to the demands of the time and perestroika, will not be subjected to changes even at the 28th CPSU Congress, (on which subject the plenum adopted an appropriate resolution), this very important document on the the party's nationalities policy is the basis of program actions for the near future. The platform is not an ordinary party document; it has been invested with enormous responsibility for the resolution of inter-nationality conflicts and for the problems of nationality relations in general. And the success of perestroika depends to a significant degree on the successful resolution of these problems.

What were the communists and other working people of Armenia waiting for during that period of almost two years? They were waiting for the fundamental resolution of urgent problems, which were caused by deformations from the period of the cult of personality and stagnation, and by the departure from the Leninist principle of a nationality's right to self-determination, and especially for the resolution of the all-important problem of NKAO, i.e., the reunification of two artificially and crudely split parts of the Armenian people within the framework of the USSR Constitution (although in the light of the principle of a law-based state and the improvement of the Soviet federation even the Constitution now in effect needs changes).

The Armenian people never set for themselves the task of redrawing boundaries (let us recall that as of today the evil hand of fate and history have allotted to them only one-tenth of their original historical territory, and they

must be satisfied with this) or of withdrawing from the community of Soviet peoples. The Armenians of Nagorny Karabakh, who have added heroic pages to the history of their people and who have given the world spiritual values, were forcibly torn from their natural roots and for 70 years they were subjected to every kind of humiliation, to the suppression of their national dignity and to eviction from their native land; these people were inspired by the new policy of perestroika and democratization of society begun by the party to raise their decisive and fair voice and to demand, finally, the implementation of their long-standing constitutional right to self-determination and re-unification with their mother-homeland of Armenia.

It is not our purpose to analyze the provisions of the document which has been adopted in comparison with the previously-published draft platform, but we cannot fail to note the following. The draft published in the 17 August 1989 issue of PRAVDA says: "Adopt all measures to resolve the problems of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast..." Even then, during discussion of the draft, opinions were expressed to the effect that one cannot "lump together" the NKAO problem and the problems of the Crimeans Tatars, the Volga Germans, the Greeks, the Kurds, the Meskhetinite Turks and others. All these peoples have their own history and their own problems, which require, undoubtedly, a just solution. Not one of the problems of these peoples, however, resembles the problem of the Armenian population in the NKAO, which requires an immediate and just resolution. After all, the discussion here is about the unification of a part with the whole, i.e., the Armenians of Nagorny Karabakh with the people of Soviet Armenia. The problem of reunifying the two parts of a single people is so clear and simple that there is no need to delve once again into the labyrinth of the archives and into the legal fine points.

However, what is it that we see in the final version in the approved platform with regard to the problem which concerns us? "Conflicts which for various reasons have arisen on an inter-nationality basis, require a particularly attentive approach and tact; they must be resolved on a constitutionally-legal and democratic basis, openly, and with mandatory participation by representatives from all the interested parties."

"It is from these positions that the resolution of the problems related to the conflict surrounding Nagorny Karabakh must be approached."

It is not difficult to note that "editorial work" on the draft led to a point at which the NKAO problem was buried; it was driven into a dead-end once again in order to start from zero, and the conflict surrounding Nagorny Karabakh came to the forefront. But is conflict really a more worthy concept to include in a party's political platform than problem? This is not a new provision because for two years the Soviet people and the international community have been presented not with the problem but rather with the events surrounding

NKAO; in these events the hands of unseen conductors wove the threads of the Sumgait genocide of 1988 and the harsh economic blockade of NKAO and Armenia in our time, with the blood of Armenians, Russian, Ukrainians, Moldavians, etc. being spilled even now...

In fact, all the previous decisions of the Center Concerning Socio-Economic Transformation in the NKAO, the creation of the Special Administration Committee and the resulting elimination of leading oblast party and soviet organs, the frequent high-level sessions in search of a compromise, the hypocritical statements of A.-R. Vezirov and the leadership of Azerbaijan, etc.—all this has proved ineffective and superfluous, bringing only disappointment...Life has confirmed this.

The NKAO problem is clear. Gradually people have come to understand what is what and who is who...Voices are now being heard about the legal norms of the problem. They are also clear. We can advise any person who would like to add to his knowledge to take a look at a small but very detailed work by a well-known legal scholar, Professor Yu.G. Barsegov, doctor of juridical sciences, entitled "Pravo na samoopredeleniye—osnova demokraticheskogo resheniya mezhnatsionalnykh problem. K probleme Nagornogo Karabakha" [The Right to Self-Determination—the Foundation of the Democratic Resolution of Inter-nationality Problems. Concerning the Problem of Nagorny Karabakh].

At present they are trying to convince us that the resolution of the most complex questions of inter-nationality relations is not the prerogative of the plenum. You see, "the Central Committee members did not have in their hands a magic wand with one wave of which they could settle disputes or dispel mistrust and long-standing prejudices" (See IZVESTIYA, 23 September 1989). They say that this falls within the competence of a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies. A session is now taking place. Since the very first hours of its work the deputies from the Armenian SSR and NKAO have again raised the problem of Nagorny Karabakh and demanded that it be put on the agenda. The impression is that the actual problem has been sucked into a whirlpool of discussion, while political bargaining over the removal of the Armenian blockade has come to the forefront, by which they want, it seems, "to please" the Armenian people and "fully satisfy" their aspirations.

It is surprising: why are they so stubborn about not wanting to listen to the voice of justice, to the voice of the entire Armenian people? After all, at the second session of the USSR Supreme Soviet representatives of the NKAO and the Armenian SSR deputy corps spoke in their deputy inquiries with great anxiety about the current situation in Nagorny Karabakh.

The agenda of the second session has been adopted and published. Neither in the "Top-priority Questions" or in the "Other Questions" section did we find a special point devoted to the NKAO problem. One must assume

that the 19th point of the top-priority tasks includes the question which interests us. But how has it been formulated? "Information from the Commissions Formed by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet"—is this not too pale a copy for such a complex conflict, a conflict which has become tangled into such a tight knot and which interests not only the country, but, indeed, the international community? Was this burning problem really not deserving of a separate point? We hope that during the session the NKAO problem will acquire flesh and blood and will become an object of particular discussion. The Center confirms that the leadership is well aware of the situation in the region. Undoubtedly this is all the more so because for nearly two years the problem of Nagorny Karabakh has been highly visible: the scholars have had their say, as well as the political experts and party figures. Beginning with the 19th party conference and ending with the September (1989) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the first secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee, S.G. Arutyunyan, with the directness characteristic of a genuine communist, correctly laid out the entire essence of the NKAO problem, without making any deals with his conscience. And he was not the only one.

The indecisiveness and sluggishness in resolving the NKAO problem raise a new wave of tension and bring not only socio-economic and political damage, they also produce moral erosion in the souls of a new generation, sowing the seeds of anger and lack of confidence in the future.

From the podium of the USSR Supreme Soviet statements were made about the intolerability and criminality of a blockade of one republic by another and its elimination within the course of one or two days. However, the blockade policy still continues. Freight trains are arriving with only building materials; as before, the most important item—fuel—is missing. Food is arriving already spoiled and not suitable even for cattle fodder. And let us note that some of the incoming tank cars have been found to contain water instead of gasoline! The outrage continues. And we are not even talking about the fact that for some reason there has been no discussion about removing the harsh blockade of NKAO, which has gone on for many months. And, after all, the people of Soviet Armenia cannot be indifferent to the fate of their fellow countrymen in Karabakh.

Even in such an inflamed and confused situation, when sessions of the Armenian and Azerbaijan supreme soviets have taken diametrically opposed decisions on the given question, the Center, in the search for a solution to the NKAO problem, proposes that the two neighboring republics should arrive at a compromise and resolve the questions locally. But is it not clear that under the present conditions this is an unrealistic path? Is it not clear that the Union leadership must apply the constitutional and legal levers of the federation to eliminate the conflict on the basis of Leninist principles—on the path leading to a new quality in inter-nationality relations? After all, under the Constitution we possess equal rights as members of the Soviet federation.

A platform exists, but the problem remains...

Data Given for Ecological Impact on Health

18300844A Kiev POD ZNAMENEM LENINIZMA in
Russian No 15, Aug 89 (signed to press
28 Jul 89) pp 37-38

[Unsigned article: "On the Threshold of Ruin"]

[Excerpt] "In the past 30 years the destruction and pollution of the environment have assumed unforeseen and incomparable scales. Three decades is not in itself a long time. During this time, however, we people have succeeded in traveling half the way between humanity and ecological catastrophe. A quarter of a century, or perhaps even less—this is how much time remains for us to change our minds and stop on the brink. I say this as a UN expert on environmental issues. I would very much like to be mistaken in this fatal prognosis. However, today I have to state the fact that we have little time left. Human civilization is on the threshold of destruction."

These are the words with which Mikhail Yakovlevich Lemeshev, a well known doctor of ecological sciences, began an article about ecology, "Apocalypse", appearing in the journal *Studencheskiy meridian* (No 6, 1989).

A correspondent asked, "Does this mean that if in the immediate future humanity does not have the sagacity to reexamine its relationship with nature, then people who are 20-30 years old today will have the tragic opportunity of becoming witnesses and actors in the apocalypse?"

Apocalypse? No we are threatened by something much worse. Apocalypse is an instantaneous general transition to non-being. For those who live to the unleashing of an ecological catastrophe, such an outcome would be merciful... Another fate will befall people in the future—slow extinction. This includes horrible physical suffering from cancers, skin, nerve, psychological, and a mass of other diseases and allergies caused by air and water pollution from toxic industrial wastes. There is nothing with which to compare these torments of the soul. You only need to think about what parents will have to experience day after day, looking at a mentally retarded infant. Knowing, moreover, that if they have an other child, it will all the same be similar to this one. It is a bitter consolation to know that this is not just a personal tragedy for the family, but the common fate of humanity, that there will no longer be any normal children, that is, no continuation of the human race,

The scientist continues: Please do not think that I want to frighten weak nerved average citizens with fabricated horrors and am therefore painting such a murky picture of our future. Unfortunately, the tragic prognosis follows from our everyday reality. It is unnecessary to exaggerate.

These are only some of the facts presented in a discussion and supporting what has been said. Just in the past quarter century the mortality rate of the country's working population below age 55 has increased by one-third. There is an increase in the number of children

born with serious birth abnormalities. For example, in Moldavia, where mineral fertilizers and pesticides have been used at criminally high levels for decades, almost every school is teaching mentally deficient children. The situation is similar in several oblasts in Uzbekistan. Moscow Oblast is in third place. The reasons are the same.

In general, the health of young people leaves something to be desired. Today in the country there are approximately 100 million people under 24 years old. According to specialists only 40 million of these are totally healthy. The remaining are the so-called weakened. They either suffer from various diseases or are distinguished by an increased disposition to disease.

In answering a question as to whether, as some assert, the increase in mortality and the growing percentage of infants with serious mental and physical defects is due exclusively to drunkenness and smoking, M. Ya. Lemeshev noted:

Alcohol and nicotine undoubtedly do serious damage to human health. They supplement the destructive effects which pollution of the biosphere has on the organism. However, to isolate these vices as the sole cause for the increased mortality and morbidity is to assure and deceive ourselves.

Recently completed research on the effect of the environment upon human health is indicative with regard to the results presented in the discussion. This work was conducted in 10 cities in the country, divided into 2 groups of 5 each.

Climate, transportation, food supplies, housing conditions, income levels and even the per capita consumption of alcohol and tobacco were similar for the control and analyzed groups. The only difference is that the cities in the control group are in areas with a relatively clean environment, while those in the analyzed group are where air and water pollution levels are 3-4 times higher.

Research showed that in ecologically polluted cities the levels of cancer, blood and liver diseases and other serious disorders are 3-4 times higher. As can be seen there is a directly proportional relationship between the health of the environment and that of people.

In the author's opinion the threatening ecological situation in the country is the result of unskilled and at times criminal economic management, distortions and twists in previous decades. What is the solution?

Above all it is necessary to radically change the structure of industry. Without delay, there must be a transition to an intensive, resource conserving development path for the country. Sectors should pay for the use of natural resources and pay high taxes to protect the environment. Also, the "nature protection" tax should be progressive, increasing with enterprise or sector capacity.

In agriculture it is necessary to sharply reduce the use of mineral fertilizers, replacing them with organic. The

same applies to pesticides and herbicides. Money should be spent upon selection and biological methods of plant protection to replace them.

Naturally, it is not enough just to be worried about the barbaric attitude towards the environment, it is necessary to act. Public opinion can play a great role, and in some places it is doing that. More active efforts must be made here. In the scientists' opinion the public should actively influence its deputies, while the deputies are obligated to protect the interests of the voters.

What role should youth and students play in the ecological movement? (Remember that this discussion was published in a student journal.) It should play an exceptionally great one! However, in order to attain noticeable successes it is necessary to have a mass movement. As a rule, only future biologists are active in the student movement. A immense amount of young people's potential energy remains on the sidelines—future engineers, economists, lawyers and people in the humanities. Why is their activity so low? Because the overwhelming

majority of the student body lacks elementary knowledge about ecology. In order to fight it is necessary to know what one is fighting for. Therefore today, while there is still time, the widespread education of the student body in ecology is vitally necessary.

And not only that of students! M. Ya. Lemeshev stresses that starting from the cradle, people need widespread ecological education. Ecological awareness has somehow been driven out of human moral consciousness.

The scientist concluded: "Therefore, I assume the responsibility of asserting that intelligent and accurate ecological education of new generations is the force which can slow down and turn back the flying arrows of this monstrous mechanism threatening the destruction of our planet. In saving nature, we are saving not the flowers, not the grass, nor the butterflies, as to this day they inspire our children. We are saving ourselves."

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"Pod znamenem leninizma", 1989

Baltic Komsomol, Communist Youth Union First Secretaries Interviewed

90UN0099A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 12 Sep 89 p 1

[Interview with A. Matsaytis, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Youth Union: "You're Not Leaving the Komsomol?" by A. Ollis and Ye. Meshkov]

[Text] People are leaving the Komsomol. Let's look at the statistics: During the first eight months of this year Latvia's Komsomol lost almost 32,000 people. As of September 1, the republic's Leninist Communist Youth League numbered 223,500 people. That's the head count, nothing more. But what if it was announced tomorrow that the Komsomol would conduct a membership re-registration? Lithuania, for example, has already taken that decisive step. As a result only 40,000 people reaffirmed their membership in the resurrected Lithuanian Communist Youth Union.

Alfonsas Matsaytis, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Youth Union, talked about how they are operating today, and his colleagues Ivar Priyeditis, first secretary of the Latvian Leninist Communist Youth League's Central Committee and Urmas Laanem, first secretary of the Estonian Komsomol, shared their impressions.

[Matsaytis] Initiatives must come from the bottom up, and the leadership must support them. Otherwise, any undertaking, even a very necessary and useful one, will fail. The idea of creating a Youth Seim is an example of this. Prior to the reorganization of the Lithuanian Komsomol, our Central Committee proposed that the mechanism of a parliament be developed through which the republic's young people could implement their plans and defend their interests. It was not supported. One can understand why: Many people reckoned, "If the Komsomol suggested it, something's not right here." Time passed and people again began talking about a young people's parliament, but this time the talk was "from the bottom". And that's something altogether different.

[Interviewer] It must be said that the idea of a young people's parliament met the same fate in Estonia at first. Now people in Estonia have also come to understand that this is the optimal approach for today. So what about Latvia?

Our republic youth publications, under the rubric "I Have an Idea!", published proposals to create a young people's seim. By the way, Ivar Priyeditis could not give any specifics when asked what steps have been taken to date. The Komsomol is not the leading character in the creation of a young people's seim. Why, ultimately, the question is not one of a Komsomol seim, but a young people's seim. Last spring an event occurred that was perceived by many as a "Komsomol emergency of international proportions." The Komsomol in Hungary was disbanded. The Hungarians replaced the monolithic,

colorless organization with 37 new youth organizations. It seemed here was a model! And we've needed one for such a long time! But, as is known, the rote copying of experience doesn't produce results.

[Matsaytis] Now many people are praising the Hungarian approach. But the Hungarians themselves already consider the congress at which the Komsomol was disbanded a mistake. What happened there? The idea was a good one. A young person would have some 37 organizations from which to choose. But today not one of them is operating independently, not one is realizing its goals. They can't even form common administrative bodies. There is now no Komsomol, which, even if only imperfectly, represented the interests of young people. So the Hungarians themselves are beginning to talk about reestablishing the Komsomol. We must find our own way.

[Interviewer] Matsaytis himself might be called the organizer of an "emergency of all-union proportions"—the congress of the Lithuanian Komsomol at which the Communist Youth Union was formed. At the time, and even now, many people voiced the fear that the word "communist" in the name of the reestablished organization would alienate young people.

[Matsaytis] I often hear: "There is nothing communistic in your organization. The word 'communism' isn't even mentioned once in your documents." But what's in a name? In my opinion, it is the Komsomol that has borne little semblance to a communist youth organization in recent decades. I think that our union will be more communist than the Lithuanian Komsomol. Let's say we are called democrats. Democrat is a very general concept. Again we would have many people, we would still have a large organization, and nothing would have changed. It would be better if only people who held a clearly defined position stayed and worked. Many people are also confused because the word "Leninist" has been removed from the union's name. But this doesn't mean that we do not acknowledge Lenin's ideas. To be convinced of this, one must carefully read our program documents. The fact is that we recreated the Lithuanian Communist Youth Union that existed in the republic until 1940. We resurrected the organization, and correspondingly, its name as well. As regards communist ideas, I think that we should not discard the entire theory, alleging that it has not proven itself, but on the contrary, we should return to genuinely communist ideals.

[Interviewer] But declaring and defining goals and tasks, and changing the name were just the first step. What has the Lithuanian Communist Youth Union done since the congress?

[Matsaytis] First, our primary organizations are now formulating a budget, and are themselves deciding how much money to keep and how much to send "on up". In addition, we have substantially reduced our bureaucracy. Previously, there were 72 people in the Central Committee; now there are 38. A total of 7-8 people used

to work in the raykoms, while now we only have 4-5. In major cities, such as Vilnius and Kaunas, we dismantled the raykoms. Now there are only city committees there. If two-thirds of the Komsomol members feel that a decision of the higher body does not meet their interests, they can refuse to submit to it. One other "achievement" of ours: We do not have to coordinate and confirm a candidate for first secretary of the Central Committee with the party Central Committee, since he is not required to be a member of the party. He must only be a member of our Union.

[Interviewer] Today the Komsomol no longer agrees to its role as the "younger brother and faithful assistant" of the party. With increasing frequency the Komsomol's stand on a series of questions diverges from the party's stand. One of the latest examples of this divergence of views is the reaction of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the Latvian Leninist Communist Youth League to the Statement of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Situation in the Soviet Baltic Republics".

[Matsaytis] We do not agree with the assessment of the political situation given by the CPSU Central Committee. We feel that it does not reflect the real situation in Lithuania. The statement injected an irritant into Lithuania's public life and created a schism between Lithuanians and residents of other nationalities. I think that the people who composed this document did not set the goal of thoroughly analyzing the situation in the Baltic region. As it turned out, they simply showed the entire country and the world community just how dangerous the situation here has become—virtually to the point of street confrontations. We asked a group from the Youth Editorial Board of Central Television to visit us and gather material. They visited Snechkus, where the majority of Russians live, and the Polish regions, and talked to people. They subsequently admitted that they had been struck by how much the actual situation differed from that pictured in the Central Committee's statement. I don't know what this statement was trying to achieve. Perhaps, by silencing the Baltic region, it was hoped to put a brake on other regions? One can only guess.

[Interviewer] All the same, where is the Komsomol headed? Will it be able to earn back the prestige it has lost? What will it give to young people? After our conversation with the secretaries, we asked ourselves these questions once again. The time for paper theories has past.

Latvian SSR SupSov on Creation of Riga Humanitarian Institute

90UN0119A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
11 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by P. Kirillov and V. Spila: "The Riga Humanities Institute: To Be Or Not To Be?"]

[Text] This question was the focus of a press conference conducted by the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's working group to study the proposal of the Baltic-Slavic Society on creating a Riga Humanities Institute [RHI].

"It's no secret that a multitude of problems have accumulated in humanities education in the republic," said S. Buka, group leader and deputy head of the Chief Administration for Higher Education of the republic's Ministry of Education, in opening the press conference. This applies to the non-indigenous population in particular. Serious deformations exist in the system for training specialists from national minorities. It simply does not reflect demographic realities in Latvia today. Thus, while representatives from this group of the population totaled 52.4 percent of those employed in the republic's economy, they comprised 41.2 percent of public education employees, 31.8 percent of the Academy of Sciences, and 25 percent of those employed in the sphere of culture and the arts. The national minorities are primarily concentrated among workers or unskilled laborers. They do not have adequate representation among the intelligentsia in the humanities—the group responsible for giving shape to their culture and forming their world view, and channelling their social activism to the good of the republic.

The working group came to one conclusion: The RHI is essential to the republic and the entire Baltic region. The idea of organizing a new higher educational institute garnered the support of many social organizations. They include, for example, the Association of Industrial Enterprises, the Latvian Union of Cooperatives, Interfront, the "Dnipro" Ukrainian Cultural Society, the Lithuanian 'Unity' movement, the Center for Democratic Initiative and others. Representatives of the orthodox and old belief churches expressed support for the institute. The idea of establishing the RHI has been included in the Latvian Communist Party's Program of Action.

Of course, it's one thing to advance even the most progressive of initiatives, and something altogether different to put it into practice.

Material and financial resources are needed. Where can they be found? Opponents of the RHI stress that a new higher educational institute will "devour" a disproportionate share of the already scarce funds allocated for public education. The working group feels that additional appropriations are needed. They can be found, given a good-faith effort to look for them.

Take just a reduction in the administrative apparatus for example. If, of course, it becomes a reality, it will free up substantial financial and material resources. Buildings and premises will become available. Why not give them to the republic's educational institutions? Such an investment of capital will produce the most tangible profit—after all, the level of culture can't be measured in rubles.

What will this higher educational institute of the future be like (if the resolution on its formation is adopted)? It is intended to be a completely new kind of educational institution. Not simply a higher school, but a scientific, cultural and educational complex. Instruction here will be based on advanced, experimental methods. It is proposed that the permanent teaching staff be small, while the remaining teachers will work on a contractual

basis. Plans call for inviting leading specialists from other republics and from abroad to teach classes and lecture.

The institute will be an autonomous higher educational institution. This implies freedom in the selection of principles and methods of teaching. Its activity should be jointly financed. Funds allocated by the state and social organizations will come here, as will contributions from private individuals, and income from its own cost-accounted activity. Administration will also be shared: The council of trustees will include representatives of state as well as public organizations.

The institute's task is not just the training of highly skilled specialists in the humanities, the acute shortage of which is clearly felt today, but also the formation of a broadly educated and cultured person. Here the doors will be open to representatives of the most diverse nationalities, including the indigenous population.

Secondary school graduates, of course, will have a choice in selecting the forms, methods and place of study. Doubtless, competition among the higher educational institutes could promote the return of Latvia's higher school to its former status. Likely, it is the fear of losing their monopoly that motivates some educational officials, for whom the idea of the RHI doesn't sit well.

Why, common sense says that the Riga Humanities Institute is needed. The working group of the Latvian Supreme Soviet Presidium came to the very same conclusion. Now the ball is in the republic government's court.

Culture Workers Petition Supreme Soviet for Increased Wages

90UN0173A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 24 Oct 89 p 2

["Open Letter to People's Deputies, Members of the USSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] Esteemed People's Deputies!

The Culture Workers Trade Union Central Committee Presidium appeals to you, those elected by the people, who are called upon to resolve urgent problems objectively, taking into account the logical pattern of all-around development of Soviet society.

Over the course of more than one decade, a disparaging attitude toward the development of culture has become entrenched, a fact which, we are deeply convinced, is a substantial hindrance on the road to perestroika in the economic, social, national, and all other spheres of human life.

New industrial and agricultural enterprises, equipment, and technology can be built or purchased. But goods will be produced by people whose level of inner culture determines their quality.

Ever wider understanding in Soviet society is being gained by the idea that the lack of spirituality, immorality, increased crime, economic problems, and huge losses in the national economy are directly linked with the culture of the individual.

The left-over principle with regard to culture, despite a number of positive decisions taken by the party and government in recent years, continues to operate. The material-technical base of the culture sector is being developed much too slowly. Many establishments, enterprises, and organizations are in a hazardous condition, most have received no repairs at all for long years, and their rigging and equipment fall far short of the modern standard.

The country numbers more than a million workers in clubs, libraries, museums, movie theaters, theaters, concert organizations, and so forth. The majority of them are specialists with high qualifications and true devotees of their work. But the wages for their labor are 2-3 times lower than those in the sphere of material production. In the first half-year of 1989 the average wages in industry totaled 260.7 rubles per month, in construction 296.8 rubles per month, while in establishments of culture the figure was only 113 rubles per month. The average wages of a worker in cultural education were 108 rubles. The rural worker in cultural education is in a particularly impoverished condition (97 rubles per month in clubs, 90 rubles per month in libraries). The material situation of cultural workers verges on the poverty line. The introduction of new conditions for the payment of labor in the production sectors, and also in education and law enforcement, has exacerbated still further the situation which has taken shape.

The profession of cultural worker is losing prestige. The turnover of cadres in the sector has reached 40 percent.

The prevailing opinion about cost-accounting in culture is intolerable, immoral, and contradicts the very essence of a socialist state. Establishments, organizations, and enterprises of culture and art which are on a budget, working under the new conditions of management, should use elements of cost-accounting, but it must be done sensibly, without subordinating the entire effort to extracting money from the working people, to earn the funds to pay for our employees. Art and culture are called upon to serve the people, and expanding the number of paid services in the sphere of culture will give it a definite elitist quality.

The Culture Workers Trade Union Central Committee Presidium appeals to the people's deputies of the USSR to resolve the following questions at the present autumn session of the USSR Supreme Soviet:

1. Rename the USSR State Plan of Economic and Social Development, to be the USSR State Plan of Social, Cultural, and Economic Development.
2. Set a normative of withholdings from the national income to go toward the development of culture.

3. Set aside at least 200 million rubles for increasing the wages of cultural workers for 1990 (the entire program for increasing wages amounts to 930 million rubles), and begin it everywhere in January 1990.

In the main, these proposals have been supported by the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Science, Public Education, Culture, and Upbringing, and the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities Commission for the Development of Culture, Language, and National and Internationalist Traditions, and Preserving the Historical Heritage, to which the Trade Union Central Committee has appealed.

The Central Committee Presidium of the Trade Union of Workers in Culture has previously brought the question of raising the wages of cultural workers to the attention of CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR Council of Ministers Chairman Comrade N.I. Ryzhkov (15 July 1988, No 01-12/317).

In addition, more than 50 ministers of culture of the union and autonomous republics, and chiefs of kray and oblast administrations of culture representing all regions of the country have been approached on this question through the newspaper SOVETSKAYA KULTURA (SK, 16 February, 1989).

The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Decree of 15 March 1989 No 231 "On Measures for Improving the Financial Health of the Economy and Strengthening the Wage System in the Country in 1989-1990 and the 30th Five-Year Plan," which was passed without any discussion and without taking into account the opinion of the trade union, called for allotting only 40 million rubles for the first stage of increasing the wages of cultural workers, which is planned to begin in the fourth quarter of 1990, beginning with rural localities.

This kind of approach to bringing order to the system of wages for workers in culture for all practical purposes ignores the fact that the social-political situation, which has been particularly exacerbated in the last few months, has a negative effect on the activities of establishments, enterprises, and organizations of culture, which are in essence ideological, and called upon to bring ideas of perestroika to the masses.

[signed] N. Naumenko, chairman of the Culture Workers Trade Union Central Committee; Yu. Vorovyev, secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Council of Trade Unions; N. Gubenko, people's artist of the RSFSR, winner of the RSFSR State Prize, and chief director of the Moscow Theater in Taganka; Ye. Isayev, poet, Hero of Socialist Labor, winner of the USSR State Prize, secretary of the board of the USSR Writers Union; V. Krupitskiy, secretary of the trade union Central Committee; V. Lanovoy, artist of the State Academic Theater imeni Evg. Bakhtangov, people's artist of the USSR, winner of the Lenin Prize; D. Mamleyev, first deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Press; A. Novikov, chairman of the Central Committee Buro of the Trade Union for

Leadership of Trade Union Organizations in Moscow; M. Paramonov, Hero of Socialist Labor, printer in the Moscow Production Association "Pervaya Obraztsovaya tipografiya"; L. Perelygina, people's deputy of the USSR, chairman of the Ukrainian Republic Committee of the Culture Workers Trade Union; V. Plaksya, chairman of the Trade Union Committee of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee; T. Ogorodova, secretary of the Culture Workers Trade Union Central Committee; V. Slonin, secretary of the Culture Workers Trade Union Central Committee; M. Sukhov, deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio; L. Chursina, artist of the Central Theater of the Soviet Army, people's artist of the USSR, winner of the RSFSR State Prize; and P. Shabanov, deputy minister of culture of the USSR.

Council for Religious Affairs Chairman Interviewed

90UN0203A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY
VESTNIK in Russian No 20 Oct 89 p 8

[Unattributed untitled report of interview with Yuriy Nikolayevich Khristoradnov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Council on Religious Affairs; time, place not given]

[Text] Biographic pages: Born in 1929, Russian. Graduated All-Union Correspondence Financial-Economic Institute. Began labor activity in the Gorkiy automobile plant, went from foreman to section chief to deputy shop chief, foundry party committee secretary. Since 1962, doing party work in the CPSU raykom [rayon committee] and gorkom [city committee]. From 1974-1987, worked as first party secretary, Gorkiy Obkom CPSU. Elected USSR Supreme Soviet deputy (9th-12th convocation). 1988-1989—Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of the Union. Member CPSU Central Committee.

[PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK] Yuriy Nikolayevich, you have assumed your new position at a very complicated time, a time of unceasing discussions, debates, reevaluations. But you will note that despite all the dissonance, public opinion is in unison when the subject turns to the administrative apparatus, the ministries and departments. The verdict is harsh: It is to be decisively reduced! We would like to know what you think with regard to the viability of your department.

[Khristoradnov] I will frankly say that I have no pessimism. And not only because I am not one to panic. The objective reality is such that it is perestroika and democratization themselves which have reanimated—I am not afraid of that word—the activity of the Council for Religious Affairs.

Society needs our organization. At least in order to adjust relations between Church and state, which have been far from simple lately, and to consistently implement the policy of the Soviet state with regard to religions, as well as the control over the observance of

legislation on religious cults, to prevent infractions both on the part of citizens who are believers, and on the part of the organs of power...

[PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK] Excuse me, but you are enumerating things which can be read in any atheistic dictionary...

[Khristoradnov] Without a doubt, they can be read. Incidentally, there is also an appropriate entry in the currently effective Constitution on freedom of conscience, and legislation on cults, but whether or not all this has been fulfilled is the question.


I can cite the following figures: In 1956, there were about 12,000 active Orthodox churches in the country; by 1965, their number had been reduced to not quite 7,000. They declared freedom of confession of faith—and at the same time, the Administration came down like a sledgehammer in a fine, delicate area. And I suppose that we will not eliminate this distortion in the near future.

The foundation, however, has been laid. Do you recall that in April of last year, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev met in the Kremlin with the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church? This meeting marked a new stage in relations between the Church and state. It became clear

even then: There can be no return to previous approaches, to a primitive diagram of religion—opium, believers, a low-consciousness portion of the population, etc.

In the not too distant past, I myself was a party worker, and in my own experience I know how simply these problems were presented, when the dynamics of local religious moods were seen through the criterion of ideological efficiency. I can imagine the fuss that would have been raised some 6 years ago if the information had seeped through to god's world that in one year alone, about 3,000 religious communities had been registered! And in the mean time, this is a fait accompli: Approximately 3,000 have indeed been registered over the last year. It seems that we have finally begun to understand that the reason for this is not an outburst of religious activity. This is a natural process of reinstatement under conditions of democratization of the rights of those religious communities which had been shut down in the pre-stagnation period, I would put it that way. I think that this process is not over yet.

[PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK] What of the new is the Law on Freedom of Conscience supposed to introduce, what changes should be expected? And most



importantly, is there a guarantee that the new law, unlike the old one, will be fulfilled?

[Khristoradnov] There can only be one reliable guarantee—the creation of a law-governed state. And I see the higher goal, the fundamental predestination of the new law in that it will be conducive to society's consolidation. Let us look the truth straight in the eye; after all, what has been happening up to now cannot be called anything other than infringement upon the rights of believers.

During the first days of my work in my new position, I familiarized myself with the Council's archive, its correspondence: The overwhelming majority of the letters are complaints. The Constitution proclaims one thing; life presents what it will. They are not accepted into a VUZ [higher learning institution], not given a job, given a negative personnel recommendation, refused an apartment... It was getting to be ridiculous at times. The council apparatus staffers had to somehow figure out this signal: A woman is raising 10 children, yet the red tape mongers are not about to present her with the title of Mother-Heroine—you see, she believes in god!

This is not funny, it is tragic. Here, even the political glitches are visible to the naked eye. Let us be frank: Such approaches have negatively predisposed a significant portion of our compatriots with regard to official powers. Now we are faced with winning this trust.

As far as religion itself is concerned, in effect, the attitude toward it has not changed. However, as we now understand, the struggle of opinions must be conducted on a basis of parity, under conditions of respect for the sides.

Removal of CRA Chief Kharchev Examined

90UN0337A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 22 Nov 89 Second Edition p 6

[Article by Professor A.I. Ipatov: "Will He Go Down in History as 'Saint Konstantin'?"]

[Text] The London CHURCH TIMES of 11 April 1989 reported that K.M. Kharchev, chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs [CRA], USSR Council of Ministers, had been given an award "for his actions as a champion of religious freedom." "The award was made," the newspaper writes, "by Adventist Doctor Bert Beach, general secretary of IARF (International Association of Religious Freedom) and its president, Doctor Carl (Mau), former general secretary of the World Lutheran Federation."

The CHURCH TIMES then went on to accompany the granting of the award with the following piquant details: "IARF proponents did not stint their praising of Mr. Kharchev. One of them even said that Kharchev had opened up so many churches that he could go down in history as 'Saint Konstantin.' During the lavish luncheon he blushed from embarrassment and giggled from pleasure."

More than two months later, OGONEK (issue No. 44) printed a conversation between K.M. Kharchev and journalist Aleksandr Nezhnyy, under the title "Third Discussion." The conversation largely reproduces Kharchev's answering speech when he was given the award at the IARF conference.

The publicized conversation between Kharchev and Nezhnyy attracted the attention of many readers by its "sensationalistic revelations," and engendered interest in some individuals, and false rumors and perplexity in others. The high-handed revelations evoked in them the question: who, exactly, headed the Council for Religious Affairs for four and a half years? To whom had that state agency been entrusted?

Kharchev says about himself that in the past he had been a Komsomol worker, and then a party worker (he had been secretary for ideology at the CPSU Maritime Kray Committee), a "graduate of two academies,... ambassador." That conversation was Kharchev's confession concerning the kind of evolution he had had in developing from an atheist who had been educated in the aggressive traditions of the militant godless, to a champion of religious freedom, an almost Biblical path from Saul to Paul. He even rails mercilessly at himself for errors he had made while in the position of council chairman.

Exactly what are the "errors" about which the former council chairman remains silent?

Soon after Kharchev headed the Council for Religious Affairs, he began to use coercion to force alien functions on that institution, asserting that the council apparatus was supposed to wage aggressive atheistic work, as was proper for Communists according to the Party Rules. A certain while later, he began to orient the council of religious-research activity to forecast the development of religions by the year 2000. For purposes of increasing the effectiveness of the atheistic work, he attempted to organize a union of atheists under his leadership, and began striving to establish such a procedure that not a single book or pamphlet on atheistic matters would be released from publishing houses without the sanction of the Council for Religious Affairs. With regard to these innovations of Kharchev's, wits joked that the sign "Council for Religious Affairs" should be replaced by the sign "Council to Combat Religion."

So the newly appeared chairman began to carry out a restructuring in the sphere of state-church relations, and its chief, central tasks were: the elimination of the consequences of the previous years, of the arbitrariness and stagnation which were still preserved in the outlying areas, that had proven to be off to one side of his tempestuous actions, which were not typical of the council. During his chairmanship there was a preservation of the departmental powers that had been established during the stagnant period—the powers to carry out the policy of the Soviet state with respect to religion and the church on the entire territory of the country despite the lack of any union law governing the freedom

of conscience. That principle, which determines the council's basic actions, has not been annulled. But the restructuring that one ought to have expected did not affect the council's centralized system itself. The entire matter was reduced to the discussions in OGONEK concerning the proposal "in general to liquidate the Council for Religious Affairs." That delicate bragging floats away like a dandelion if one keeps in mind the fact that Kharchev started talking about liquidating the council after he had learned in late 1987 that he was being removed from the position of council chairman. He based that timely retirement on "serious discrepancies" with certain workers in the CPSU Central Committee's Propaganda Department, who took the position that "for the state, the thousandth anniversary of the christening of Rus is of absolutely no importance," whereas he insisted that "that date should be marked as a holiday that pertains to the nation as a whole and to the culture as a whole." This can be believed in words by those who do not know that it was precisely on the initiative of the Soviet side that the UNESCO General Assembly called upon its 159 member-states to mark the thousandth anniversary of the introduction of Christianity into Rus as a major event in European world history and culture.

But there is something rather curious. In the APN [Novosti News Agency] monthly RELIGIYA V SSSR (No 10, 1987), we read: "Summer 1988 marks the thousandth anniversary of Christianity in Rus. I would not include that date among the nationwide holidays. It is a holiday for a number of Christian denominations that exist in our country, and, of course, the Russian Orthodox Church." That is what Kharchev wrote. As the expression goes, further comment is superfluous. To all appearances, for him all means are good for the purpose of camouflaging his retirement and becoming famous as a champion of religious freedom.

A champion of religious freedom is not averse to exploiting for his benefit the incipient process of normalization of state-church relations, particularly the legalization of the religious societies that are actually in existence. In 1988 the council registered 1070 religious associations; in the first ten months of 1989, 2886. Can it be that it was for good reason that the former chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs was crowned by the laurels of a champion of religious freedom?

Let us return to statistics. During the first three years of his chairmanship (1985-1987), the activities of approximately 80 religious associations were restored each year, whereas during the previous three-year period (1981-1984) 582 religious societies had been registered, or the average number of houses of prayer that were opened annually was 145. We might note that this was done during the period of stagnation. From April to the end of 1988 alone, the council registered approximately 1000 religious associations. That shift in the council's activities occurred after the well-known meeting with CPSU CC General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev with the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church in April 1988. The

April meeting removed the administrative-bureaucratic restraints that had been hampering, in the outlying areas, the observance of the legislation governing religious associations and that had been encouraging violation of that legislation by the officials. The local state agencies began to make decisions independently concerning the renewing of the activities of the religious societies in response to the believers' requests. The only action left to the Council for Religious Affairs was to approve those decisions in a routine official manner.

It is true, however, that the former chairman made vain attempts to convince readers that, under his chairmanship, legality had triumphed, and that the requirements from the local executive agencies responsible for executing that legality had led to a collision between him and the apparatus. "The first persons who, to use Kharchev's words, reared back on their hind legs were in the oblasts and krays," who began to accuse him of being "unmanageable, of pandering to the clergy, and of hampering ideological work." Here too he takes up arms especially against administrative interference in internal church matters.

That is how it was in words. But it was a different situation in deeds. While he was at the head of the council, he acted as though he was the omnipotent "state administrator" of the country's religious associations (prior to the revolution, the attorney-general of the Most Holy Synod had been such). It is completely understandable why he began to assume the direct resolution of personnel questions pertaining to the competency of the synod of the Russian Orthodox Church. At one of the meetings with synod members, he had forced into the position of deputy chairman of the economic administration of the Moscow Patriarchate (a prelate position) a layman. The synod members, seeing the administrator of a state agency crudely trampling on church traditions and on the church rules, became indignant. Despite that fact, Kharchev literally began to cajole the synod members into supporting the candidacy that he had proposed. His extremely unceremonious interference in internal church matters is attested to by the fact that when that state official attempted to reorganize the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, he solicited the removal of several of its members from the positions that they occupied. The Holy Synod, with the blessing of Patriarch Pimen (of which the former chairman was not allowed to know), deemed it necessary to make known to USSR Supreme Soviet the facts of that state figure's interference in church affairs. That became—to use a phrase taken from "Third Discussion"—"the last drop that caused the apparatus' cup of patience to run over." Warning reports arrived from many places, from many individuals, about his unnecessary crudeness, his outbursts of aggressiveness, and his attempts to cajole his subordinates into supporting his prideful actions and making hasty decisions. At USSR Supreme Soviet his continued chairmanship of the Council for Religious Affairs was deemed to be undesirable. True, a few people rushed to present the former council chairman as a

"liberal reformer," and to state that he had indeed had to pay for that liberality of his.

Let us now consider "Third Discussion," from which it is obvious that the champion of religious freedom is unaware of the astonishing discourtesy with which he is affected, as demonstrated by the expressions "the church's upper crust," "the synodists," "it is difficult for the church's upper crust... to preserve its moral health," that are used in the "conversation." Appealing to morality, he reproaches the Holy Synod for having remained silent concerning the hunger strike by believers in Ivanovo, who had demanded the return of their cathedral. But there is no greater immorality than shifting one's own omissions onto other people's shoulders. As the expression goes, "he cannot govern for the good if he is too cunning in his ways."

K.M. Kharchev loses all sense of proportion when he attempts to explain the reason why the synod members complained to USSR Supreme Soviet about his interference in the administration of the Russian Orthodox Church. He sees that reason in the struggle "that had become more acute in recent time in the church's upper crust... the struggle for the succession of power." That insulting, naked assertion, then, is the mirror in which the former chairman reveals his own naked appearance.

While the patriarch is still alive, to conduct a search for his successor and, at such time, to utter one's own opinion about the alternative election of a patriarch in the spirit of the Local Council in 1917-1918. Tactlessness of this crude kind could be exhibited by a person who lacks even the elementary rules of decency. Incidentally, the right to make recommendations concerning the procedure of electing a patriarch is granted to the episcopal assembly, and the right to establish the procedure for that election is granted to the Local Council. The former council chairman should have known the rules for administering the Russian Orthodox Church.

In "Third Discussion," the former council chairman expressed a number of recommendations, emphasizing each time that these are "our recommendations." For example, he mentions a proposal, in honor of the thousandth anniversary of the christening of Rus, to lay the foundation for a cathedral in Moscow. However, speaking at a ground-breaking ceremony at that cathedral, he said, "This carries out the request of the Russian Orthodox Church that was expressed at a meeting with M.S. Gorbachev. The Moscow authorities made the decision, and they set aside the land for the new cathedral." But whose recommendation had it actually been: the recommendation of the Moscow patriarchate, or of the former council chairman? Obviously, he is so accustomed to interfering into church matters that he stopped noticing what falls within church competency, and what falls within his own departmental competency.

A recurring theme that Nezhnyy's conversational partner returns to in the three discussions in OGONEK is his initiative in creating the nationwide law governing

the freedom of conscience. For the sake of truthfulness, it must be said that the decision to develop that law had been made in 1981. It may also be a good thing that that law had not been enacted by that time, if one keeps in mind the Vienna agreements that had appeared and the implementation of which our government had confirmed.

As for the intentions relative to the law governing the freedom of conscience, they manifested themselves very clearly in the published draft of the law that had been prepared by his personal advisor, Yu.A. Rozenbaum (SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO, No 2, 1989), in which it is proposed to absolutize the system of state management of the activities of religious organizations and to eliminate the councils for religious affairs under the Councils of Ministers in the union republics, establishing everywhere a system of independent representatives in the republics, krais, and oblasts, thus providing, in the author's concept, a qualitatively new level in state control.

Thus, we now see on the scales of conscience the champion of freedom of religion, who is seeking popularity and authority, former council chairman Kharchev, and his conversational partner in the three discussions in OGONEK. (We might note that "Third Discussion" is the third level in self-advertising.)

What, then, lies at the basis of the sensationalistic revelations in the apparatuses of church administration, ideology, and state security? What is the former council chairman attempting to achieve by his frank confessions, and why did he remain silent about them when he occupied the position of chairman? It would seem that we are dealing here with the actions of a very calculating kind of person.

The chairman manque probably senses that he is becoming an ambassador manque, and therefore the "Third Discussion" can completely explain the reason for this: he had criticized the apparatus and his assignment to a managerial position had been delayed.

But really it would be unworthy to smear tar on the courtyard gate from which he left.

Head of New Latvian Entrepreneurs Association Interviewed

90UN0115A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
13 Oct 89 p 3

[Interview with B. Vertseshuk, president of the Latvian Entrepreneurs Association, conducted by EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA correspondent P. Antropov: "Why Entrepreneurs Are Needed"]

[Text] The republic's executives have varied perceptions about the creation of the Latvian Entrepreneurs Association. Some approvingly assert that finally, executives and managers, and young ones in particular, will have a genuine defender and assistant in the implementation of

numerous ideas and plans. Others consider the creation of such a social organization merely a concession to fashion and expect no particular benefit to accrue from it.

Just whose opinion is closer to the truth? We posed this question to B. Vertseshuk, the association's president, who is well known in the republic as an initial sponsor of the "Quality-90" business club, and asked him to talk about the tasks and plans of the Latvian Entrepreneurs Association.

"Time and deeds will show how correct the skeptics are," noted Bogdan Yevgenyevich. "But our association owes its origin not to fashion, but to the economic reform. I don't think it necessary to try to prove that it is developing too slowly and has yet to show the results people expect of it. An increasing number of executives, especially those with a creative bent who have become accustomed to acting without orders from above, realize that restructuring of the economy must be carried out more energetically. The desire is there, but it is not always accompanied by sufficient knowledge and experience. Little hope is placed in the ministry. There they don't always have time now for enterprising managers with their projects and schemes. Frequently these managers must rely more on like-minded individuals and on the development of horizontal business ties. "It was a natural progression of thought to identify the need for some type of union or organization of executives and managers that would help them utilize their creative potential with greater effectiveness for their own good and the good of all society. Thus, the idea of creating the Entrepreneurs Association gradually crystallized. It was actively supported by the "Quality-90" business club, the Central Committee of the Latvian Leninist Communist Youth League, the Latvian Republic Union of Scientific and Engineering Societies, the republic's State Committee on Labor and Wages, and State Industrial Committee, the Latvian State Standards Committee, and a number of major enterprises."

[Correspondent] But after all, a business club and the Latvian Association of Industrial Enterprises already exist. Doesn't this new organization duplicate them?

[Vertseshuk] At first glance it would appear that these organizations are in some ways quite similar. This is indeed the case. Each of them considers the acceleration of economic reform to be their primary goal. But one must bear in mind that their opportunities and methods of work differ fundamentally.

The Association of Industrial Enterprises is composed not of executives, but of labor collectives, and reflects not so much intellectual, but rather production potential. It's completely natural that this organization is more concerned with raising productivity than with developing an entrepreneurial spirit among executives. Moreover, our association unites executives from all spheres of material production.

The "Quality-90" business club, needless to say, devotes greater attention to increasing the professional skills of

executives and strengthening ties among them. But the fact that this club is, after all, not a legal entity, must be taken into account—a fact that hinders it from properly defending the interests of new-style managers. Yet the need in this regard is great: Why, at present, there is likely no one more defenseless from the high-handedness of the apparatus and departments than executives of enterprises and organizations. They do not even have the right to appeal decisions of higher agencies in court. It is very difficult for them, frequently without support, to defend their innovative proposals in the ministries and government of the republic and country. We hope that the resolution of such problems will be somewhat easier with assistance from the Entrepreneurs Associations.

[Correspondent] Why does the word "Entrepreneurs" and not "Executives" appear in the association's name? Won't this phrasing frighten certain executives?

[Vertseshuk] There is, obviously, a definite risk. After all, until quite recently the word "entrepreneurship" [predprinimatelstvo] itself elicited far from positive emotions and was considered somehow alien. But restructuring forces us to take a different view of the essence of a manager. Under conditions of the democratization of the economy, we don't need executors; we need entrepreneurs and workers who have the will and knowledge to conduct business not according to directives but proceeding from concrete conditions. Here it is also necessary to help develop an entrepreneurial bent in people and to form a new type of manager, capable of working under conditions of a market economy and diverse forms of property.

These capable managers will become increasingly common at enterprises and in industrial and agricultural organizations, at construction sites and in transport, at production cooperatives and scientific institutions. One can confidently include among such managers Vitaliy Gavrilov, general director of the "Aldaris" Production Association; Gundars Kriyevs, director of the Riga Polytechnical Institute's Youth Initiative Fund; Yelena Dorofeyeva, deputy chairman of the presidium of the republic's Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Vladimir Kulik, chairman of the board of the Riga Commercial Bank; Sergey Pashev, director of the "Orgtekhstroj" trust and other executives.

Many capable managers have already become members of our association, while others will fill its ranks with time. Procedures for admittance are not hindered by any particular formalities—an application and the recommendation of a member of the association are all that is needed. The main thing that will be taken into consideration in accepting new members is their desire to enhance their professional skills and to take part in the development of modern methods of management. I think that our participation in the All-Union Association of Young Executives, which our association decided to join as a collective member, will also prove beneficial.

[Correspondent] What do you see as the association's primary tasks in its initial stage of work?

[Verteshuk] First and foremost, we want to increase the contribution of Latvian entrepreneurs in the development and introduction of economic mechanisms, norms, and legislation needed for the republic's transition to economic independence. In our opinion, the set of laws regulating the new forms of management must, without fail, include a law on the fundamental principles of entrepreneurship.

Further, we will have to thoroughly analyze the draft plans for improving the work of individual enterprises that have been developed by a number of our association's members, and we must discuss ways to accelerate their implementation.

We plan to become seriously involved in the analysis of socioeconomic problems that have accumulated not only at individual enterprises, and in cities and rayons, but also throughout the republic as a whole. This will help improve consultation by the association's members on economic, legal and social issues, and foster a more efficient exchange of advanced experience. We are considering organizing efforts to come up with economic forecasts for branch development.

The association will take part in defending executives' interests in the agencies that issue directives, in the courts and in arbitration. Thought is also being given to establishing a special legal aid bureau.

We face a great deal of work in the training and retraining of managers and in promoting new methods of management and administration. In this regard we are placing high hopes on the association's special bulletin.

[Correspondent] The new approaches to resolving economic problems that are being trumpeted by Latvian entrepreneurs presuppose, as well, a search for new forms of operation on the part of the association itself...

[Verteshuk] This search is already underway. Thus, we plan to organize, within the framework of the association, a unique business club that would help managers foster better ties with entrepreneurs in other republics and countries, and promote a better understanding of the basis of international marketing.

Our association plans to conduct various experiments in the development of new forms and methods of management. To this end, we decided to create a special risk fund to insure managers who undertake the testing of economic innovations.

The firm that leases means of production will be a benefit to the association's work. It will render assistance to the association's members both in leasing the most up-to-date equipment and instruments, and in the sale of surplus equipment.

In light of the particularly acute situation with respect to ecological problems in the republic, we intend to sponsor the establishment of a special "Tevzemes dabay" charitable fund.

[Correspondent] From all appearances, the Latvian Entrepreneurs Association

will attempt to teach its members entrepreneurship not only by its words, but by its deeds as well?

[Verteshuk] Absolutely. We will learn how to produce, engage in commerce, and earn in a high-quality manner. In this effort, we are counting on the support not only of social organizations, but also the republic's government. I am convinced this support will be forthcoming. After all, it is self-evident that the more managers of an entrepreneurial bent we have, the better things will go in the economy. It follows that efforts to help establish entrepreneurs are beneficial to the republic as a whole. This, incidentally, is brought to mind by the slogan of our association's members. It goes, "What's good for the republic is good for me."

Consumer Interests Addressed in Turkmenistan

Food Shortages Tied to 1st Secretary's Absence

904D0016A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 31 Oct 89 p 3

[Article by M. Meleshenko, Turkmen SSR: "Now the Top Man Will Arrive"]

[Text] At the entrance to the food store on Svoboda Prospect a fellow in a white lab coat sped past me like a bullet. "He'll be here in just a minute," he yelled as soon as he got inside the door and disappeared into the building, which looked like an excited beehive.

On that day, alarm gripped almost the entire trade network of the Turkmen capital. Only in contrast to the usual, the unhealthy agitation reigned not among the people standing in the meters-long lines and not for the reason of goods in short supply appearing on the shelves. The salespeople were nervous. Trade workers of all ranks and colors, including the representatives of the republic's trade ministry, were moving along the depressingly bare store windows in an obviously dejected state of mind. With the speed of lightning the news that S. A. Niyazov, first secretary of the republic's CP Central Committee, was visiting local stores spread through Ashkhabad's trade network at a time when stores were totally empty...

Until recently, the residents of Ashkhabad and of a number of other cities in the republic felt it was a sin to complain about poor supplies of meat products—almost without interruptions the trade network received several types of sausages, poultry, sweet butter and sugar; in other words, many of those goods that today in other regions of the country are issued only with coupons. Luckily, the people here know only through hearsay about all of the expenses, inconveniences and simply

humiliating circumstances in which the consumer finds himself under the coupon system.

But this summer the local trade network clearly ran into trouble. For several weeks, meat disappeared from stores and the supply of dairy products deteriorated. Ashkhabad, the city boundaries of which literally touch the lands of large vegetable-raising enterprises, began suddenly to experience a serious shortage of "vitaminous" production at the very height of the harvesting season. Prices in the market jumped sharply—2 rubles for a kilogram of potatoes, grapes and carrots; 3 and more for a kilogram of cucumbers, apples and pears... In general, the markets are southern but the prices are out of this world, and this is at the peak of the season when on vegetable plantations and in the republic's orchards and vineyards signs are hung up at the very height of the season saying, "Take them—I do not want them."

The empty counters in food stores, and prices that have never before been seen here for vegetables, potatoes and fruit, have resulted in the justified indignation of people. In the corresponding instances, the corresponding complaints poured in. And evidently in response to them the republic's administration decided to survey trade enterprises. This was done, as is to be expected, with a request for an explanation by the guilty parties—the directors of the state trade network, of consumers cooperatives, of the agricultural sector and of enterprises of the food industry. The discussion was exhaustive and demanding. Many had to blush because of their inefficiency, helplessness, incompetency and simple laziness. Literally, the very next day Ashkhabad residents felt the results of this action. Products appeared in stores. In the most populated areas of the city, fruit and vegetables were sold from kolkhoz and sovkhoz cars at purely symbolic prices—10, 20 and 30 kopecks per kilogram...

My friend Grigoriy Kolodin, SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent, and I walked through the grocery stores and markets of Ashkhabad and could not stop being surprised—where did all of this come from? After all, just yesterday there was not a trace of it. It turns out that the interference of just one person can so cardinal, so swiftly, change for the better something that just a few hours ago seemed so unshakeable, not subject to any changes in connection with "objective" reasons—the meat combine is being repaired, deliveries have decreased, there are problems with transportation, farms are experiencing a fodder shortage, we do not have the manpower to perform harvest operations. Yet here suddenly, "Everything is done!"

We wondered why things were not like this everywhere in the country. Why is it necessary that the top man make a trip here so that a building which has been in need of repair for decades be put into good condition? Why, in order to have public transport function correctly, do we need a special passenger in the guise of the first secretary of the party obkom? Why, in order to have products, the taste of which was forgotten long ago by residents, appear in abundance in some village stores, is

the interest of the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee necessary? Why does the secretary of the republic's CP Central Committee, substituting for just a few hours for the trade minister, the director of the city trade administration, and hundreds of trade organization workers, have the ability to untie the knot of supplying the population with food products, even for a short period of time, whereas responsible parties (who are paid wages and accelerated piece rates to do this) cannot?

No, I do not want to say with this that the CC secretary is wonderful—he came, he saw, he supplied everyone! On the contrary, I want to once again focus attention on the vicious circle, on the sad phenomenon of our lives—everything is decided by the "top man."

Why is it that, despite the party's long-ago proclamation of "influencing but not substituting," party committees continue to substitute? Alas, is it because our managers are helpless? Or is it because councils are just barely acquiring power? These are not the only reasons. Another is that right now, judging by everything, it is easier to substitute than to influence. Because it is much more difficult to operate according to a purely party method and to introduce those other, spiritual forms, those which must be characteristic of the party and spiritual institutions of our society. From time to time we hear the common statement that we must improve socialist competition among beet farmers and sugar refiners and then there will be no sugar shortage.

Some may think that I am criticizing the first secretary for an unsuitable work style. No, I am not criticizing him; if you will, I am protecting him...from an unsuitable work style. Probably it is not his fault, but our common problem—that the republic's party leader is forced by circumstance sometimes to substitute for people's control, the inspector auditor, the city trade director, and so forth. And did it happen in just this case?

I remember one meeting of the members of the bureau of the Turkmen CP Central Committee with the republic's youth. A young Komsomol member was interested in why until now the promise of the CC secretary had not been fulfilled within a certain period of time to renovate the institute she studied in. Immediately, the chairman of the Ashkhabad city executive committee was told to complete the renovation of the institute within one month. No sooner, no later—in one month! Most of all, I was surprised that no one was surprised about this order, which after all was not supported legally in any way. Let us finally decide whether that CC secretary has the right, even if he is the top man, to give such commands to the representative of Soviet power, even if the latter is a rank worker? That is the essence of the question.

Moreover, such commands can be heard everywhere and not only in Turkmenistan; they can be heard in the fifth year of perestroika, which has as one of its mottoes: "Do not dare to command!"

Several weeks after the unexpected abundance that showered Ashkhabad, in its stores once again there were no sausages, no tomatoes and no chickens...Perhaps it is accidental, but this shortage coincided with the departure to Moscow of the republic's administration for a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Once again, I and my aforementioned friend surveyed the trade enterprises and markets that we had visited before. A different question struck us now: Where did everything go?

And then we were comforted by the thought—don't worry, don't worry; when the top man comes...

Consumer Monitoring Club

904D0016B Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 10 Oct 89 p 3

[Bylaws for Consumer Club: "Regulations of a Correspondence Club of Consumers Associated with the Editorial Board of TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA and the Turkmen Trade Union Council"]

[Text] Our consumer correspondence club is just beginning its work and is not yet registered. In order to become an officially recognized organization, we must pass our regulations and program. Today we are publishing the draft of our club's regulations, with the hope that you will participate most fervently in its discussion. In the course of two weeks, you can write to the editors with your remarks and proposals, or call telephone number 6-87-72. We await your responses, proposals and desires with impatience!

I. General Conditions.

The correspondence club of consumers is an independent, self-governing, self-contained social organization, unifying its activists on a voluntary basis with the goal of mutual protection of the rights and interests of citizens as consumers of goods and services.

In its activities, the club is guided by the USSR Constitution, the Constitution of the Turkmen SSR, laws that are in effect and the current Regulations. The club bases its activities on a close interaction with local Soviets of People's Deputies, party trade unions and other public organizations, organs of internal affairs, people's control, state inspectorates, educational institutions, organs of mass information and other organizations.

II. Club Goals and Purpose.

The club's goals and purpose include:

1. Support of perestroika in the sphere of consumer goods and services, protection of consumer rights and interests of citizens, of consumer demand for quality consumer goods and services and of a high level of quality in handling customers. The struggle to expand the assortment and high quality of consumer goods, and against careless and shoddy workers.

2. Propaganda of legal information on the rights of consumers and obligations of goods producers, of the trade network, of the administrative organs. Propaganda of economic quality of consumption, efficient means of implementing the family budget and of running the household.

3. Aid in the creation and development of clubs, societies, unions and other formations that protect the rights of consumers; assistance in developing the public activity of the population in defending consumer rights.

4. The achievement of the aforementioned goals by means of dealing with the following tasks:

—To study public opinion about consumer characteristics, assortment and quality of goods and saturation of the consumer market with these goods, about the level of trade, household, municipal and other forms of services to the population, as well as about the level of prices for goods and services and the ecological condition of the environment;

—To participate in consultations and testing of consumer goods carried out by government and other organs, to provide an objective assessment of the quality and assortment of consumer goods and services. To participate in the organization of public control in adhering to the rules of trade and services, in the control of justified wholesale prices and current price lists for the goods and services; of adherence to the principles of social justice within the consumer sphere;

—To provide legal information, information about goods and other consultation to readers of our newspaper;

—To support and propagandize the positive experience of enterprises that produce consumer goods on the level of the international standard, and the experience of organizing trade and providing goods and services to the population in terms of transportation, within the sphere of municipal and communal services, health services and so forth.

—To participate in the preparation of proposals for drafts of ongoing and future plans of economic and social development in the region and in branches of the national economy on the territory of the Turkmen SSR on questions of increasing the output and improving the quality of goods and services.

—To introduce proposals to organs of government, economic and public administration on passing measures to expand production and improve quality of goods and services, to halt the production of poor-quality articles and products and of those that bring harm to the healthy population and also to revoke prices that have been elevated by goods producers and to confiscate profits received by illegal production means; to improve trade, household and other services to citizens;

—To protect the interests of low-income families, invalids, children, retired persons and families with many children;

—To elucidate on the pages of TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA and through other means of mass information the results of club activities, and to make known information about the real consumer characteristics and assortment of goods and services, about cases in which goods and services do not correspond to hygienic and consumer standards, norms or stated claims, about "the flushing out" of the inexpensive assortment, about cases in which the rules of Soviet trade are violated and other cases of mass or ill-intentioned violation of the rights and interests of consumers. To organize consumer conferences with workers of enterprises that produce food products and consumer goods, workers in the sphere of consumer services, representatives of local organs of government administration, departments, and leading specialists on questions of protecting the interests and rights of consumers;

—To exchange information on work experience with other public consumer organizations in the USSR and to publish it on the pages of the newspaper.

III. Club Structure.

The club council includes the representatives of the newspaper editorial board, TSPS [Turkmen Trade Union Council], organs of people's control, internal affairs, office of the prosecutor, ministries, departments, enterprises and organizations and activists from among the newspaper's readership.

The chairman of the club council is selected from among the members of the club council for a 1-year period.

Any resident of our republic who is prepared to participate in the work of our club can become a member.

The more active members can become, upon the decision of the club council, club activists who will participate in surveys, raids and other measures carried out by the club council.

IV. Rights and Obligations of Council Members and Activists of the Consumer Correspondence Club.

Club members and activists of the correspondence club have the right:

—To participate in any measure carried out by the club;

—To elect and be elected to the council of the correspondence club;

—To participate in club administration, in the development of its decisions and in their implementation;

—To bring up for club discussion any proposals and initiatives that do not contradict the club regulations.

Council members and activists of the correspondence club of consumers have the obligation to:

—Adhere to club regulations;

—Participate in the implementation of tasks and measures being put forth by the club council, in the preparation of publications, and in the development of prospective plans for club work;

—To report on all violations of consumer rights known to them;

—To propagandize club activities among the population;

—To coordinate their actions as regards solutions to the problems facing the club with the club council and to inform the latter about the results of this work.

A person may leave the club voluntarily. Activists can be excluded from the ranks of the club only on the basis of a decision by the club council in this regard.